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In developing a thematic strategy on the prevention and recycling of waste, the European 
Commission envisages an important role for the use of economic instruments, such as 
landfill taxes. The Netherlands is one of the EU Member States applying a landfill tax. 
The present study aims at investigating the effectiveness of the landfill tax as a waste 
policy instrument, in terms of market impact, costs and benefits (including external envi-
ronmental costs and benefits), and to compare it with other (command-and-control type) 
instruments. The results should contribute to the European debate on landfill taxation. 
The study addresses three central questions: 
1. To what extent is the Dutch landfill tax providing the right incentives to the appro-
priate market parties, and is the waste market functioning sufficiently in order to 
achieve the policy objectives by means of market incentives? 
2. To what extent does the landfill tax cover the external costs of landfilling? 
3. Is the landfill tax the least expensive option to minimize landfilling, or are there 
other (‘command-and-control type’) instruments that are more cost-effective? 
In answering these questions, a number of different approaches were followed. 
A short literature survey was done on the existing theoretical and empirical insights in 
the effectiveness of landfill taxes, including experiences in several EU countries. This 
survey shows that if landfill taxes are to be effective in terms of reducing the amount 
(and the share) of (municipal) waste going to landfills, the tax rates should be put at a 
fairly high level. Moreover, the price signals that they convey should be transferred to 
the sources of the waste. This can be done by introducing unit-based pricing systems for 
waste disposal services. However, such systems also have potential disadvantages (e.g. 
high transaction costs, illegal disposal of waste). A careful design of the instrument is 
therefore needed.  
There is also a large variety of estimates for the price sensitivity of waste supply. In 
some cases, relatively large reductions in waste supply have been recorded following the 
introduction of unit-based pricing schemes, but these may be partly attributable to an in-
crease in illegal waste dumping. On the other hand, part of the recycling behaviour ob-
served in households seems to be unrelated to the cost of waste disposal and may be bet-
ter explained by attitude factors. 
The literature furthermore suggests that embedding the landfill tax in a mix of policy in-
struments that promote prevention and recycling can enhance its effectiveness. Differen-
tiating the tax rates (taking account of the environmental features of the landfill) may be 
effective in speeding up the modernisation of landfills. 
Despite these findings, scientific research on the effectiveness of landfill taxes is still 
scarce. An exploration at European level of the instrument ‘landfill tax’ would definitely 
benefit from more research into conditions for effective landfill taxes. The present study 
is a first attempt to do so for the Dutch situation. The focus is on household waste and 
comparable waste from the service sector (offices, shops etc.), as these are the waste 
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streams to which EU policy pays a lot of attention and on which a lot of information is 
available. 
The Dutch landfill tax was introduced in 1995 with the primary aim to increase the fi-
nancial attractiveness of alternatives to landfilling (i.e. recycling and incineration). The 
present tax rate amounts to almost € 85 per tonne, which is the highest landfill tax rate in 
the EU. In 1995, 35% of household waste and 43% of service sector waste was land-
filled. By 2003, these percentages had decreased to 6% and 11%, respectively. 
An ex post analysis was made of the impact of the Dutch landfill tax on the amount of 
waste and on the choice of treatment option, using statistical (regression) analyses. By 
the year 2000, when the tax rate was increased substantially, the landfill tax had made 
landfilling a more expensive waste treatment option than incineration. Whether or not 
landfilling has also become more expensive than recycling is less clear. It appears that 
the landfill tax did not have a significant direct impact on the generation of household 
waste, nor did it affect the choice for household waste disposal options. However, there 
may be an indirect effect if municipalities pass on the higher costs of landfilling to 
households by means of a unit-based charge (instead of a ‘flat fee’) on household waste 
(in 2004 29% of Dutch municipalities applied such a differentiation). The analysis shows 
that provinces with a high share of municipalities using unit-based pricing schemes have 
lower amounts of waste per capita, a lower share of waste landfilled, and a higher share 
of waste incinerated. Whether there is any causal relationship is unclear, as the choice 
between landfilling and incineration is not made by the households themselves, but by 
the municipalities. 
For the service sector, the level of disposal costs is not affecting the generation of waste, 
but it does influence the waste disposal choice. In particular, higher costs for landfilling 
and incineration increase the share of recycling. Moreover, if the relative increase of 
costs of landfilling exceeds the relative increase of costs of incineration, firms from the 
service sector will landfill less waste and incinerate more. In this sense, the landfill tax 
can play a crucial role in the decision making of firms from the service sector with re-
spect to disposing waste 
The higher costs of landfilling due to higher landfill tax levels increase the demand of 
the service sector for the incineration of waste. Due to a constant capacity and a slightly 
growing incineration of waste, the efficiency of use of waste incineration plants shows a 
slightly positive trend. In the case of recycling, we observed a moderate growth in the 
case of household waste, and a strong growth in the case of the service sector waste. We 
were not able to link these findings to the efficiency of the use of recycling infrastruc-
ture.  
During the observed period (1995-2003), no new incineration capacity has come into op-
eration in the Netherlands (though some new plants are presently under construction). 
However, export of waste for incineration and use as a secondary fuel has increased. So, 
the landfill tax in the Netherlands might have contributed to a more efficient use of for-
eign waste incineration capacity and/or new foreign incineration capacity. More research 
into developments of the European waste market is needed to come to a reliable conclu-
sion on this issue. If the landfill tax has led to investments in recycling infrastructure is 
ambiguous, because different kinds of recycling options require their own infrastructure. 
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In future research, the development of recycling options could be investigated in more 
detail. 
The ex ante effectiveness of landfill taxes under a number of scenarios was assessed by 
means of a general equilibrium model. The results of the ‘benchmark scenario’ show that 
a landfill tax has a significant effect on the amount of waste landfilled. The higher the 
landfill tax the more waste will be recycled or incinerated. The model predicts that mu-
nicipalities will start to incinerate all their waste if the landfill tax becomes too high. 
Only in municipalities that charge a unit-based price for waste collection will households 
directly notice the effects of the landfill tax by an increase in the price for waste collec-
tion and thus start to recycle more waste. In municipalities that charge a flat fee for waste 
collection, households will not have an incentive to recycle more waste. Recycling ef-
forts, however, are low regardless of the pricing system for waste collection. The in-
crease in the landfill tax will only provide a small price incentive to recycle. Most of the 
municipal solid waste is already incinerated so the price increase of waste collection due 
to the landfill tax will be slight.  
The service sectors, in contrast to the municipalities, choose (according to the model cal-
culations) to recycle more waste. Some sectors slightly increase their demand for waste 
incineration services, but the biggest difference in the service sectors is the amount of 
waste that is recycled. This is mostly caused by the fact that, similar to the Dutch situa-
tion, the incineration capacity in the model is too low to accept both an increased amount 
of municipal solid waste and an increased amount of service waste. If export of combus-
tible waste is allowed, then the service sector will also increase the amount of waste they 
incinerate. Export of combustible waste will slightly reduce the recycling effort of the 
service sector.  
The model shows that while export of combustible waste will only stimulate producers 
to incinerate more waste, export of waste to be landfilled has more far reaching effects. 
If the price of landfilling (including the landfill tax) in the Netherlands exceeds the price 
of landfilling in the neighbouring countries, the model calculates that all landfill waste 
will be exported. As a consequence, producers will no longer have a price incentive to 
recycle or incinerate waste. Thus the landfill tax will no longer be effective in terms of 
reducing landfilling. 
An increase in the landfill tax will decrease the welfare of society, measured in terms of 
consumption. The impact analysis shows a relatively large decrease in waste landfilled 
combined with a relatively low decrease in welfare if the landfill tax is increased from a 
low level to a slightly higher level. If the landfill tax is higher (for example higher than 
100 euro per tonne) the decrease of waste landfilled is much lower compared to the loss 
of welfare. 
A landfill ban can also be used to reduce the amount of waste landfilled. The model 
shows that compared to the landfill tax, the ban is not nearly as cost-effective. To reduce 
landfilling to zero may involve higher costs than would be socially optimal. Besides, the 
optimal level of landfilling may not be equal to zero. A landfill tax can be used to reach 
the optimal amount of landfilling. The landfill ban strictly enforced will not be able to 
reach this optimal level of landfilling (even though transaction costs may be lower). 
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The analysis suggests a number of important conditions for the functioning of the waste 
market in order to make a landfill tax effective. There should be no restrictions on the 
availability of incineration capacity (both within The Netherlands and abroad). Allowing 
export of combustible waste increases the effectiveness of the landfill tax, assuming that 
there is sufficient capacity available in neighbouring countries. Unit-based pricing of 
household waste collection also enhances the effectiveness of the landfill tax: households 
will not increase their recycling efforts if they do not ‘feel’ the higher cost of landfilling. 
However, the costs of such systems should be weighed against the benefits in terms of 
the (limited) increases in recycling effort that can be expected. Finally, allowing waste 
export for landfilling abroad will reduce the effectiveness of the landfill tax significantly 
(although the amount of waste landfilled in the Netherlands decreases, the amount land-
filled abroad increases). 
At the present landfill tax rate of almost € 85 per tonne it is already attractive for a lot of 
waste suppliers to turn to alternatives. However, due to other restrictions (such as a lack 
of incineration capacity or a ban on the export of waste) they may be forced to landfill 
their waste anyway. In the absence of such restrictions, higher levels of the landfill tax 
rate would lead to less landfilling, but at the expense of relatively high social costs. Our 
analysis does not allow us to draw conclusions on the impact of a differentiation of the 
tax rate by type of waste, treatment option or waste supplier. However, economic theory 
tells us that any differentiation should only be based upon differences in external costs of 
the waste and the treatment option, and not on the type of waste supplier. 
The external costs and benefits of landfilling as well as incineration were estimated, us-
ing various techniques for the valuation of the environmental impacts (or ‘externalities’) 
of both types of waste management. Generally, information from existing international 
sources was used and adapted to the Dutch situation. In particular, the size of the popula-
tion exposed to the local impacts of landfills and incineration plants (such as disamenity 
and health impacts) was calculated using GIS analysis. 
Table S.1 shows the estimates of the external, private and net social costs for the waste 
treatment options landfilling, incineration and co-incineration. ‘Negative’ costs of dis-
placed energy production are taken into account. 
Table S.1 External, private and net social costs of landfilling, incineration and co-
incineration (€/ton, rounded figures). 
 Landfilling Incineration Co-incineration 
External costs 10 18 28 
Range 7 - 79 12 – 25  
External costs of displaced energy -1 -8 -4 
Range -1 - -4 -7 - -13  
Net external costs 9 11 23 
Range 6 - 75 5 – 13  
Private costs 36 101 101 
Net social costs 45 112 124 
Range 42 – 111 106 – 114  
In the case of landfilling, greenhouse gas emissions (mainly methane, which is only 
partly recovered and used for energy production) and disamenity account for the largest 
share of the external costs. Due to substantial uncertainties, the range between the ‘low’ 
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and ‘high’ estimate is relatively large. The uncertainty range in the external costs of in-
cineration is smaller than in the case of landfilling. Co-incineration leads to higher exter-
nal costs than incineration, because most emissions per tonne of waste are higher. For 
recycling, no estimates of net social costs could be made, as many different waste 
streams are involved and both the external and the private costs can be either positive or 
negative. 
The calculations made strongly suggest that the current landfill tax rate of almost € 85 
per tonne is at least equal to, but probably substantially higher than the marginal external 
costs of landfilling. The ‘best’ estimate of the external costs is about € 9 per tonne, and 
even the ‘high’ estimate (€ 75 per tonne) is lower than the current tax rate. 
A definitive conclusion on the ‘lowest social cost’ option for waste management cannot 
be given, due to lacking and sometimes contradictory information, especially regarding 
co-incineration and various recycling options. Nevertheless, it is clear that the net social 
costs of landfilling are probably much lower than those of (co-)incineration. Some com-
bination of landfilling (with methane recovery) and recycling might well be the strategy 
implying minimum net social costs. Obviously, such a strategy would be dependent on 
the availability of sufficient space for (new) landfill sites. 
Compared to other instruments, such as a ban on landfilling or an obligation to accept 
waste, the social costs of a landfill tax are relatively low. In economic terms, a landfill 
ban is similar to a prohibitively high landfill tax rate. The social costs of reducing the 
amount of landfilled waste to zero would be very high. A legal obligation to accept 
waste would also imply significant welfare losses. A well-designed system of environ-
mental taxes will minimize the total social costs of waste treatment, provided that there 
are no market distortions. This means that waste suppliers should have the opportunity to 
choose between alternative treatment options (domestically or abroad) and that the tax 
rates reflect the external costs of the treatment option. In the current Dutch situation, this 
would probably mean a reduction of the landfill tax rate and an increase in the waste tax 
rate for incineration (which at present has a zero rate). Both rates should be around € 10 
per tonne of waste. However, it is clear that a waste tax of this magnitude would reduce 
the incentive to divert waste from landfilling to recycling and incineration substantially. 
Alternatively, tradable landfill permits could be considered. This instrument, which 
combines the efficiency advantages of a tax with the certainty of a cap on the total 
amount of landfilled waste, deserves further investigation.
Effectiveness of landfill taxation 1 
	
In its Communication ‘Towards a thematic strategy on the prevention and recycling of 
waste’ (COM(2003)301) the European Commission states: “The main obstacle to further 
recycling is the latter’s cost disadvantage compared to other waste treatment options. 
The use of economic and market-based instruments is therefore considered to be the 
most promising way to promote recycling” (Section 5.3). One of the instruments the 
Commission deals with in this respect is the landfill tax. On this instrument, the Com-
munication states: “The role of landfill taxes should be explored in the context of this 
thematic strategy, despite the political sensitivity associated with fiscal measures in gen-
eral. This would not necessarily imply the introduction of a harmonised Community 
landfill tax. Closer co-ordination between competent authorities in Member States could 
be a useful first step to address this issue. This could initially focus on building consen-
sus concerning the effectiveness of landfill taxes and later develop criteria for closer 
alignment of taxes adopted at national level.” (Section 5.3.1). 
The Netherlands is one of the EU Member States applying a landfill tax. It was intro-
duced in 1995 and was primarily aimed at bridging the gap between the costs of landfill-
ing and incineration. As such, the choice for this instrument and the rates that are applied 
in The Netherlands are mainly based on political and administrative considerations and 
decisions. The present study aims at investigating the effectiveness of the landfill tax as a 
waste policy instrument, in terms of market impact, costs and benefits, including external 
environmental costs and benefits, and to compare it with other (command-and-control 
type) instruments. The results should contribute to the European debate on landfill taxa-
tion. The focus is on household waste and comparable waste from the service sector (of-
fices, shops etc.), as these are the waste streams to which EU policy pays a lot of atten-
tion and on which a lot of information is available. 
The study addresses three central questions: 
1. To what extent is the Dutch landfill tax providing the right incentives to the  
appropriate market parties, and is the waste market functioning sufficiently in or-
der to achieve the policy objectives by means of market incentives? 
2. To what extent does the landfill tax cover the external costs of landfilling? 
3. Is the landfill tax the least expensive option to minimize landfilling, or are there 
other (‘command-and-control type’) instruments that are more cost-effective? 
More specifically, a number of sub-questions were formulated: 
1a)  Has landfilling become a relatively more expensive waste treatment option com-
pared to alternatives such as incineration and recycling1? 
1b)  Has the landfill tax led to a relative increase in waste supply for incineration and 
recycling, and to a relative decrease in waste supply for landfilling? 
                                                   
1
  The term ‘recycling’ is used in a broad sense in this report, and covers all kinds of operations 
in which waste is being put to useful purposes. 
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1c)  Has the landfill tax led to a better utilisation of the existing infrastructure for in-
cineration and recycling, both in The Netherlands and abroad? 
1d)  Has the landfill tax led to investments in new capacity for incineration, separa-
tion and recycling, both in The Netherlands and abroad? 
1e)  What are the conditions that the waste market has to fulfill in order to apply the 
landfill tax as an effective instrument? 
1f)  What is the desired or optimal rate of the waste tax in order to make the suppliers 
of waste choose alternative waste treatment options (incineration and recycling)? 
In particular, should the rate be differentiated according to certain aspects such 
as type of waste, treatment option and waste supplier? 
2a)  What are the social costs and benefits of the following treatment options for 
household waste and comparable waste from firms: 
• Landfilling all waste; 
• The present situation; 
• Terminating the landfilling of combustible waste by shifting it to waste  
incineration; 
• Terminating the landfilling of combustible waste by shifting it to co-incineration 
(in power plants); 
• Terminating the landfilling of combustible waste by optimizing/maximizing  
recycling. 
2b)  To what extent can the current level of the Dutch landfill tax rate be regarded as 
an internalisation of the environmental costs of landfilling? 
2c)  From a social cost-benefit perspective, what is the optimum way of waste treat-
ment for household waste and comparable waste from firms? 
3a)  What are the financial consequences (in the short and the long term) of landfill 
taxation, landfill bans and legal obligations (for landfills and incineration plants) 
to accept waste, both for the waste suppliers and the waste treatment companies? 
3b)  Which instrument will (in the short and the long term) lead to the lowest costs of 
waste treatment for the waste suppliers? 
In answering these questions, a number of different approaches were followed. A short 
literature survey was done on the existing theoretical and empirical insights in the effec-
tiveness of landfill taxes, including experiences in several EU countries (Chapter 2). In 
retrospective (ex post) the impact of the Dutch landfill tax on the amount of waste2 was 
analysed using statistical (regression) analyses (Chapter 3). The ex ante effectiveness of 
landfill taxes was assessed (under a number of scenarios) by means of a general equilib-
rium model (Chapter 4). Furthermore, the external costs and benefits of landfilling as 
well as incineration were estimated and compared with the ‘internal’ costs and benefits 
and with the existing landfill tax rate (Chapter 5). In Chapter 6 of this report, conclusions 
on the research questions are drawn, based upon the analyses in the preceding chapters.  
                                                   
2
  As indicated above, the focus of the research was on household waste and comparable waste 
from offices and the like. 
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In many countries in the world, the waste management hierarchy (see Figure 2.1) has 
been taken as a key element in waste management policy. Especially in Europe, the hier-
archy is widely applied as a guiding principle. The hierarchy is based on environmental 
principles, and implies that waste, depending on its characteristics, should be handled by 
different methods: a certain amount should be prevented by either reducing the content 
of waste or by reusing the waste, another share of the waste stream needs to be converted 
into secondary raw materials, some parts can be composted or used as source of energy, 
and the remaining may be landfilled.3 
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Figure 2.1 The waste management hierarchy. 
A large set of policy instruments is available to promote the waste management hierar-
chy. One of them is landfill taxation. Apart from raising revenues (for the general budget 
or for specific waste related purposes) landfill taxes can provide incentives to divert 
waste from landfilling towards destinations ranking higher in the waste management hi-
erarchy. Obviously, this incentive will only be effective if the ‘waste market’ functions 
well. This means that the price signal from the landfill tax should be transferred to all 
other elements in the waste chain, and there should be no institutional, regulatory or 
other barriers impeding actors to respond adequately to the price signal. 
This chapter addresses the question to what extent empirical evidence can be found in 
the literature for the effectiveness of landfill taxation as an instrument to move waste up 
in the waste management hierarchy. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, the issue of price sensitivity of waste 
supply is addressed, with an emphasis on household waste. Section 2.3 looks at the em-
pirical evidence with respect to landfill taxes in a number of EU countries. Finally in 
Section 2.4 some conclusions are drawn. 
                                                   
3
  It should be realised that the hierarchy has always been subject to fierce criticism. For exam-
ple, many believe that the options presented in the hierarchy should not be ranked in a par-
ticular order but considered as a ‘menu’ of alternatives. ‘It is not a question of good and bad 
waste management options. Rather, each option was equally appropriate under the right set of 
conditions addressing the right set of waste stream components’ (Schall, 1995). 
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If a landfill tax is to be effective in terms of providing an incentive to produce less land-
filled waste and to recycle more, it has to be ‘translated’ into an incentive for the produc-
ers of the waste (in our case primarily households). This means that, ideally, a household 
should be confronted with the exact marginal costs of each kilogramme of waste it sup-
plies to the waste collection service. Such ‘unit based’ pricing systems have several ad-
vantages, but they also have drawbacks. 
One advantage of the unit-based pricing system is that it is directly based on the ‘polluter 
pays principle’ as established in the framework directive on waste of the European Un-
ion, which, among other things, rules that the cost of waste disposal should be borne by 
the individual who generates it. The ‘polluter pays principle’ is generally accepted as in-
strument of justice given that it not only charges the polluter for the administrative and 
environmental costs generated by their behaviour, but it also encourages the polluter to 
mend his ways (Perman et al., 1996). Goddard (1995), however, raises an interesting 
question regarding the ‘polluter pays principle’ namely, who is the actual polluter in this 
case? Is it the consumer who generates the waste by consuming the product, is it the pro-
ducer who designs a product that contains either too much waste or is not recyclable, is it 
the package designer, who pays little attention to the waste content of his design, or is it 
the retailer who desires packaging that keep transaction costs low? It is impossible to an-
swer this question. Goddard demonstrates that it is more appropriate to consider which 
of the actors is in the best position to control the waste flow. A well-informed consumer 
would be the proper person to make personal consumption choices. By getting the prices 
of waste disposal right, the consumers can decide on their own how much municipal 
solid waste should be prevented or recycled.  
Another advantage of the unit-based price is that it ensures an efficient allocation of re-
sources without requiring other tax and subsidy instruments (Fullerton and Wu, 1998 
and Palmer and Walls, 1994). If a unit-based price is introduced, households will start to 
consume, recycle, and dispose waste in such a way that the marginal benefits of con-
sumption and recycling are equal to the marginal costs of disposal. In such a case, the 
market will provide the proper prices for consumer goods, recycling and disposal. For 
example, if consumers start to recycle more waste, recycled material becomes cheaper. 
Thus producers will start to use more recycled material without needing an extra incen-
tive of the government in terms of a recycling subsidy (Kinnaman and Fullerton, 1999). 
In fact, Dinan (1993) shows that introducing both a unit-based price on waste disposal 
and a subsidy on the use of recycled material is inefficient as this basically subsidizes the 
use of recycled material twice.  
Several studies, however, have illustrated that the introduction of a unit-base price will 
lead to significant transaction costs, thus it may be inefficient to introduce such a pricing 
system. First of all, the administrative costs of introducing a unit-based price may exceed 
the social benefits of lower waste generation. Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) estimate 
that the administrative costs of introducing a unit-based price on the bases of an ‘expen-
sive bag’ in Charlottesville, Virginia could exceed the $3 per person social benefits men-
tioned before. Linderhof et al. (2001), however, reveal that in Oostzaan the cost of waste 
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collection and disposal did not increase after the introduction of a weight-based price for 
waste collection. Furthermore, they show that the costs invested in the introduction of 
the weight-based pricing system are compensated by the lower cost of waste treatment 
due to the reduction of waste. These results depend largely on the individual municipal-
ity. In the case of Linderhof et al., the average consumer in the municipality was very 
environmentally friendly oriented. Thus, consumers were more than willing to recycle 
and prevent waste. It can be expected that results in other municipalities would be less 
positive. 
Secondly, Dinan (1993) showed that a uniform unit-based price for all types of waste 
might be inefficient if materials within the waste stream led to different social costs. For 
example, the treatment of hazardous waste, such as flashlight batteries, will generate far 
greater social costs than the treatment of recyclable waste, such as old newspapers. The 
unit-based price collection of flashlight batteries should, therefore, be higher than the 
unit-based price for collection of old newspapers. Other studies, such as Walls and 
Palmer (2001), Eichner and Pethig (2001), and Calcott and Walls (2002), support these 
results. A solution would be a selective unit-based pricing system based on the social 
costs of disposing the material in question, but this would of course be rather expensive 
to implement. 
Thirdly and most seriously, the unit-based pricing system may promote the illegal dis-
posal of waste. Households may start to dump their waste in their neighbours’ bins, dis-
pose of it at work, illegally dump waste, or burn it themselves. Such behaviour leads to 
large social costs and has been identified as one of the most serious obstacles to the in-
troduction of a unit-based pricing for waste collection. Both Dobbs (1991) and Fullerton 
and Kinnaman (1995) demonstrate that if illegal disposal is a possibility, it may be opti-
mal to have a negative tax on waste disposal, i.e. legal waste disposal should be subsi-
dized. In such a case, policy makers would be better off implementing other policy in-
struments to reduce waste generation. Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) estimate that 
about 28% of the decrease in waste generation may be caused by increased illegal dis-
posal. Empirical studies, like Jenkins (1993) and Miranda and Aldy (1998), also report 
instances of increased illegal dumping. These results, however, are contradicted by other 
empirical studies. For example, Miranda et al. (1994), Strathman et al. (1995), Nestor 
and Podolsky (1998), Podolsky and Spiegel (1998), Sterner and Bartelings (1999) and 
Linderhof et al. (2001) found no significant evidence of increased illegal disposal. 
Despite the three disadvantages mentioned above, the unit-based price is one of the most 
effective policy options to provide an incentive to increase prevention and home com-
posting. None of the other policy tools can significantly influence the consumers’ choice 
to prevent waste. Therefore, Calcott and Walls (2002) find that a modest disposal charge 
will always be part of the set of optimal policy instruments. Shinkuma (2003) even goes 
a little farther, arguing that even if illegal disposal is an option, the unit-based pricing 
system will still provide a second best optimum as long as the price of recycled material 
is positive. Only if the price of recycled material is negative, should another policy tool 
like the deposit-refund system be considered. 
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The success of market based policy instruments depends on the elasticity of demand4 for 
waste disposal services. For example, a unit-based price for waste disposal will only af-
fect the disposal of waste if the demand for disposal services is sensitive to the price of 
the waste disposal services. As municipalities have been experimenting with the intro-
duction of recycling programs, unit-based pricing, and deposit/refund systems, a large 
range of empirical studies discussing the price elasticity of waste generation have been 
conducted. In this Chapter, we will discuss the most important literature on this subject.  
Wertz (1976) analyzed the households’ responsiveness to unit-based prices. By compar-
ing the average quantity of waste generated in San Francisco, a city with a user fee, with 
the average quantity generated by an average town of the United States, without a user 
fee, Wertz calculated a price elasticity of demand equal to –0.15.  
Hong et al. (1993) examined the effects of volume-based pricing using a survey of 2298 
households from Portland OR, USA. Hong et al. estimated a price elasticity of demand 
equal to –0.03 and an income elasticity of 0.049 suggesting that unit-based pricing only 
affects demand in a minimal way. They did, however, find that the demand for recycling 
services is influenced positively by the introduction of volume-based pricing. They also 
concluded that households are less likely to increase recycling if recycling requires more 
effort and that a larger household is not only more likely to recycle, but also to generate 
more waste than a smaller household.  
Jenkins (1993) gathered data from 14 municipalities in the United States (including 10 
municipalities that charged a unit-based price) over several years. She found an inelastic 
demand for waste disposal, reporting a price elasticity of –0.12. Jenkins concluded that 
waste generation and recycling are positively influenced by the size of the household. 
However, she also found the effect to be statistically insignificant. 
Miranda et al. (1994) used data from a 21-city sample to estimate the effects of introduc-
ing a unit-based price. They found that unit-based pricing provides residents with a 
strong incentive to both reduce waste and recycle it. They note, however, that most mu-
nicipalities implement a unit-based price in combination with an aggressive recycling 
program. In the one municipality that introduced unit-based pricing on its own, the ex-
periment failed. Households turned to private waste collectors and illegal disposal in-
creased significantly. Therefore, this municipality chose to return to the flat fee-pricing 
system. This evidence, although anecdotal, seems to suggest that a unit-based pricing 
scheme cannot be successful without a recycling program.  
Morris and Holthausen (1994) use a household production model to simulate responses 
to different pricing systems using calibration techniques. They estimate that the elasticity 
of demand for waste disposal services was in the range between –0.51 and –0.6.  
Reschovsky and Stone (1994) employed an econometric model to estimate the actual 
household responses to unit-based pricing. They used data from 3040 households from 
Tompkins County, New York. Based on these data, they estimated income elasticities for 
                                                   
4
  The elasticity of demand is the percentage by which the demand for a product or service (in 
this case a waste disposal service) increases if the price of the product or service increases by 
1%. Obviously, the value of the elasticity of demand will normally be negative. 
Effectiveness of landfill taxation 7 
the demand of collection services equal to 0.23 in case of the introduction of volume-
based pricing and 0.24 in case of the introduction of weight-based pricing. These results 
are quite similar to the results found by Wertz (1976). Reschovsky and Stone try to de-
termine how much waste was illegally disposed of. They found that much of the illegal 
dumping takes place in the form of the use of alternative dumping facilities, such as 
roadside dumpsters. They were unable to determine how often illegal dumping or burn-
ing occurred. They argued that households are not quite as sensitive to the increased 
marginal costs of waste disposal as they are to the increased marginal costs of waste re-
duction. Thus households will only try to reduce waste generation if the marginal costs 
of waste reduction do not increase too greatly. If the marginal costs of waste reduction 
increase too much, households will dump waste illegally to reduce the costs of waste 
disposal. These results suggest that households may have an aversion towards the intro-
duction of a unit-based pricing, indicating that municipalities would be wise to combine 
a unit-based price with recycling programs or subsidies. Introducing a unit-based price 
without such a program would be unpopular and less effective. 
Strathman et al. (1995) estimated the price elasticity of demand for solid waste disposal 
services using data from Portland, Oregon. They used data on the generation of waste 
during January 1984 to December 1991. They found an elasticity of demand of –0.45. 
Strathman et al. note that they may have overestimated the absolute elasticity as they ex-
pect that the propensity of illegal disposal may be somewhat higher in the Portland re-
gion due to the large amount of public land available in this area.  
Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) used household data that were not based on self-reported 
surveys. They gathered data about the weight and volume of municipal solid waste and 
recycling efforts of 75 households four weeks prior to, and following the introduction of 
a volume-based price in Charlottesville, VA. In this municipality, a recycling program 
had already been operational for about a year. They found that the quantity of solid 
waste generated decreased only slightly, but that the volume of the waste collected de-
creased all the more. The density of the municipal solid waste increased significantly, 
from 15 pounds per bag to just over 20 pounds per bag. They estimated that the introduc-
tion of the unit-based price resulted in ten percent less waste, four percent more illegal 
dumping, and 14 percent more recycling. 
Callan and Thomas (1997) found that the implementation of a unit-based price would in-
crease the portion of waste recycled by 6.6 percent. If the introduction of a unit-based 
price was combined with the introduction of a recycling program, the portion of waste 
recycled would increase by 12.1 percent. 
Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) were the first to estimate both the levels of recycling and 
the level of waste disposal simultaneously after the introduction of a unit-based price. 
They estimate that the cross price elasticity of demand5 for recycling is 0.220. Moreover, 
they not only found that an implementation of a $1 unit-based price can decrease the 
quantity of rest waste generated by 415 pounds per person year, but that it would only 
increase the quantity of recyclable waste by 30 pounds per person per year. The differ-
                                                   
5
  The cross price elasticity of demand is the percentage by which the demand for a product or 
service (in this case recycling) increases if the price of another product or service (in this 
case: waste disposal) increases by 1%.  
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ence can be partly explained by increased home composting and prevention, but also 
points towards the increased illegal disposal of waste. 
Although the calculated elasticity of the demand for waste disposal services differs quite 
a lot between different studies, we can conclude that the demand for waste disposal ser-
vices is inelastic. The introduction of a unit-based price will result in a reduction of 
waste. At least part of this reduction, however, may be caused by increased illegal dis-
posal of waste. It is difficult to give definite empirical proof of increased illegal disposal. 
Although survey respondents claim that illegal disposal has increased after the introduc-
tion of a unit-based price, municipalities have not reported increased costs due to illegal 
dumping and littering. 
The empirical studies discussed above report various elasticities of demand for waste 
disposal services. These differences may be partly explained by differences in attitudes 
of the households. Several empirical studies have analyzed why consumers recycle or 
compost at home. In the next couple of paragraphs, a brief overview of these studies is 
given. For a more extended overview, see Fenech (2002).  
Several studies, for example, Hornik et al. (1995), McDonald and Ball (1998), Callan 
and Thomas (1999), Bruvoll et al. (2000, 2002), Tucker and Speirs (2002), Ando and 
Gosselin (2003) and Jenkins et al. (2003), have shown that the opportunity cost of time 
is a significant determinant for recycling of materials. The more households have to do 
to recycle and separate waste, the less willing they are to do so. A majority of the con-
sumers are willing to pay a private company about 20 dollars a year to take away the 
burden of separating waste (Bruvoll et al., 2002). Jenkins et al. (2003) conclude that 
consumers are more likely to recycle materials like aluminum, or paper given that effort 
in recycling these materials is less than other materials such as glass, plastic, and organic 
waste. 
Recycling behavior is influenced by socio-economic factors such as income, education, 
population density, single or multiple family dwellings, household size and average age 
of the head of the household. Most empirical studies, like Jenkins et al. (2003), find that 
income and education are positively correlated with recycling. Population density is 
negatively correlated with recycling and specifically with home composting of organic 
waste. An explanation for this correlation is the growing scarcity of suitable outdoor 
storage of waste as the population density increases. Age and household size have a posi-
tive correlation with recycling. Ando and Gosselin (2003) show that multi-family dwell-
ings are less likely to recycle than single-family dwellings. They find that differences in 
recycling convenience and household demographics are the main reason why this occurs. 
Introducing a unit-based pricing system not only increases recycling of waste, but also 
changes the attitude of households towards waste. Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) dem-
onstrate that the introduction of a volume-based pricing system in Charlottesville, USA 
did not so much decrease the quantity of waste generated, but instead decreased the vol-
ume of the waste generated. Households reduced the number of bags they generated by 
crushing the waste down in size, rather than by preventing or recycling it. Households, 
however, were already participating in voluntary recycling programs before the introduc-
tion of the volume-based price, thus the incremental benefit of the volume-based price 
was low. 
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Sterner and Bartelings (1999) show that the introduction of a unit-based price in 
Tvååker, a municipality in Sweden, led to a significant reduction of the quantity of waste 
collected and that the quantity of waste recycled increased. With an extensive survey of 
about 600 households and focusing on the motivation behind recycling, they demonstrate 
that whilst people are encouraged by economic incentives, this is not the only reason 
why they start to recycle. The amount of time and effort invested in recycling are greater 
than can be purely motivated by savings on their waste management bill. Halvorsen and 
Kipperberg (2003) support this conclusion. Berglund (2003) analyses the effect of moral 
motives on household recycling. He finds that moral motives significantly reduce the 
costs associated with recycling efforts, thus consumers are more willing to recycle even 
when they are not financially compensated for doing so. 
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Taxes or levies on waste going to landfill have been introduced in several EU member 
states. The highest rates are found in the Netherlands (€ 84 per tonne for low density 
waste and € 13 per tonne for non-combustible high density waste), Flanders and Den-
mark (more than € 50 per tonne), Austria and Sweden (more than € 40 per tonne), Wal-
lonia, UK and Finland (more than € 20 per tonne). Ireland, France, Czech Republic, Italy 
and recently Cataluña have introduced landfill taxes of € 7-15 per tonne (CEWEP, 
2004). Denmark and the Netherlands, two countries that implemented landfill taxes early 
on and have set those taxes at relatively high levels, also have the lowest dependency on 
landfill and highest levels of waste recovery (Integrated Skills LTD, 2004). However, 
there is no straightforward correlation between high landfill taxes and low landfill rates 
(see Figure 2.1). Other factors, such as available space and regulations concerning the 
landfilling of waste also play a role, and therefore one should resist the temptation of 
jumping to conclusions regarding the effectiveness of landfill taxes.  
"#$%$
The landfill tax6 in The Netherlands was introduced in 1995 at a level of NLG 29.20 (€ 
13.25) per tonne. Its current rate (2005) is € 84.78 per tonne (a lower rate of € 13.98 ap-
plies to certain categories of waste, including hazardous waste and waste with a density 
of more than 1100 kg per m3).  
In the period 1995-2003 the amount of landfilled waste in The Netherlands decreased by 
around two thirds from 8.215 ktonne to 2.753 ktonne. During the same period, the 
amount of waste incinerated increased by around 75% from 4.695 ktonne to 8.218 
ktonne. The amount of recycled waste increased by around 30% in the same period from 
38.435 ktonne to 49.936 ktonne (MNP, 2005, Bijlage 2). These figures are not only the 
result of the landfill tax: other factors, such as a ban on the landfilling of combustible 
waste, also play a role. This is further investigated in chapter 3 of the present study. 
                                                   
6
  Formally, it is a tax on both landfilling and on incineration, but the rate for incineration is 
zero. 
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The UK landfill tax was introduced in 1996 with the explicit intention of internalising 
externalities associated with landfill. Evidence on its effectiveness is mixed. An early 
evaluation (cited in EEA, 2000) suggested a strong increase in recycling activities after 
the introduction of the tax. Ecotec (2001) concluded that the impacts on municipal waste 
have been rather limited. There was no slowdown in the growth of household waste gen-
erated, and the growth in recycling could be attributed mainly to other factors (such as 
packaging regulations). On the other hand, the tax almost certainly has had a strong im-
pact on construction and demolition waste. The tax rate for the latter category (‘inert’ 
waste) was much lower in absolute terms (GBP 2 per tonne, against GBP 7 to 15 for ‘ac-
tive’ waste), but higher in relative terms (increasing the cost of landfilling for inert waste 
by up to 200%). It was estimated that as much as 36 million tonnes per annum of inert 
wastes might have been diverted away from landfill in the wake of the tax (Ecotec, 2001, 
p. 307). 
According to Martin and Scott (2003), the landfill tax has had a relatively low impact on 
the generation and disposal of waste in the UK. Municipal waste continues to grow at 
rates exceeding economic growth. This is occurring despite the steady increase in taxa-
tion burden. Landfill is still relatively cheap in the UK (ACBE, 2004). The main reason 
for the ineffectiveness has been the incorporation of the landfill tax with other municipal 
taxes into a flat fee. In terms of encouraging other waste management options, the tax 
has been too small (Ecotec, 2001). 
The assessment of the landfill tax by the British government is more upbeat. In its 
Budget 2005 (Box 7.4), the government states that the total volume of waste disposed to 
landfill fell by almost 20 per cent between 1997-98 and 2003-04, and the quantity of in-
active or inert waste fell by 60 per cent over the same period. It concludes that the land-
fill tax has been effective in diverting waste from landfill. In order to further reduce the 
landfilling of biodegradable municipal waste, the rate of the landfill tax on active waste 
will increase annually by at least GBP 3 per tonne to a medium- to long-term rate of 
GBP 35 (€ 52) per tonne.  
Undesirable outcomes of the UK landfill tax include an increase in fly-tipping and a di-
version of waste to unlicensed sites. There is no doubt that there has been a substantial 
and additional burden to local authorities as a result of the tax. Of fundamental concern 
to local authorities is their ability to bring about changes in waste management practice 
and to influence the pace of change. The Local Government Association amongst others 
pointed out that “local authorities are often constrained by long term contracts and it will 
take time for new waste management facilities to become available”. The organisation 
argued that as “householders do not directly bear the costs of the wastes they generate, 
there are no incentives for individuals to reduce their generation and levels of household 
waste continue to show an increase in some areas” (House of Commons, 1998). 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness of landfill taxation 11 
Figure 2.2. Landfill tax rates and percentage of municipal waste landfilled in selected 
EU countries (based on data from Eurostat and CEWEP). 
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Denmark introduced a waste tax already in 1987. Initially, the rate for landfilling and in-
cineration was the same, but since 1993 it is differentiated (with a higher rate for land-
filling). In 1997 the rates were increased substantially; the rate for landfilling became 
DKK 335 (about € 45) per tonne. 
According to Andersen (1998), in the period 1987-1996 Denmark achieved a 26 percent 
reduction in the quantity of waste brought to its municipal landfills and incinerators and 
attained an overall recycling rate of 61 percent. This was the result of a comprehensive 
waste reduction policy with several elements, including the waste tax. More than 80 per-
cent of the reduction occurred in areas not subject to regulation, such as construction ma-
terials and garden waste, where the establishment of new recycling facilities played a 
prominent role. Particularly in the case of construction materials, the waste tax may have 
been important in promoting recovery and reuse. Overall, municipal waste authorities 
were more responsive to the waste tax than were corporate and institutional leaders, 
which is surprising as the former are in a position to simply pass the tax on to local resi-
dents. A possible explanation offered by Andersen is the fact that waste management is 
the primary focus of municipal authorities, whereas for most firms and institutions it is a 
side issue that attracts limited attention from top management. 
Dengsøe and Andersen (1999) report that after the large increase in waste tax rates in 
1997, the amount of taxable waste delivered at municipal waste treatment plants (land-
fills and incineration plants) decreased by at least 0.5% from 1996 to 1998, despite an 
economic growth of 7% and despite the fact that more types of waste became taxable. 
They also noticed that due to the significant differentiation in tax rates between  
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landfilling and incineration, the latter had become a popular alternative to recycling. 
Householders did not have a financial incentive to increase recycling, because the waste 
tax was not reflected in the waste collection fees. This lack of transmission of the price 
signal of the waste tax in financial transactions in the waste sector, especially house-
holds, was assessed to constitute one of the decisive barriers to a decrease in taxable 
waste amounts. 
"*
In Austria, the landfill tax was introduced in 1989 with the aim of raising revenues for 
the clean up of contaminated sites. Since 1996, its rates are differentiated according to 
the technical quality of the landfill site and to the type of waste. Landfills with state-of-
the-art technology pay a much lower rate than sites without any anti-pollution provi-
sions, e.g. against leakage of landfill gas. Since 2004, the standard rate for landfills with 
state-of-the-art technology is € 21.80 per tonne, whereas for other landfills it is € 65 per 
tonne (to be increased to € 87 in 2006). According to the Austrian Federal Environment 
Agency, this differentiation has been a clear incentive to modernise the Austrian land-
fills: whereas in 1996/97 21 sites did not meet the latest technological standards, in 1999 
this was true for only 4 sites (Umwelbundesamt, 2000).7 On the other hand, there is little 
evidence to suggest that the tax has had an impact in reducing waste or on the share of 
waste going to landfills. Between 1989 and 1999 the share of household waste whose fi-
nal deposit was landfill fell from 75% to 43%, but it is unclear to what extent this can be 
attributed (if at all) to the landfill tax or more to the various regulations, and awareness 
meaures to encourage recycling and composting (Ecotec, 2001).  
In 2004, the ‘Deponieverordnung’ introduced stringent restrictions on landfill authorisa-
tions. Henceforth, only pre-treated and harmless waste is allowed to be landfilled. 
"+,
The Finnish tax on waste landfilling was introduced in 1996. Since January 2005, its rate 
amounts to € 30 per tonne. According to Kautto and Melanen (2004) economic intru-
ments (including the waste tax) have stimulated companies to increase the recovery of 
waste, although in most cases the costs of waste management were relatively low. The 
authors argue that this can be at least partly explained by the fact that many of the com-
panies they studied were located in municipalities in which the municipal waste charges 
had traditionally been low. When the charges had grown relatively rapidly in the late 
1990s and the national waste tax had been implemented in 1996, this had given the firms 
a signal concerning anticipated developments, making them search for new ways to 
minimise wastes. Many of their interviewees also felt that taxation and other economic 
instruments are appropriate tools for enhancing eco-efficiency and sound waste man-
agement. 
                                                   
7
  In Norway (not an EU Member State) a similar kind of differentiation in landfill tax rates 
was introduced on 1 July 2003. The rate for landfills that fulfil EU requirements became 
NOK 327 (€ 39) per tonne and for those that do not it became NOK 427 (€ 51) per tonne 
(OECD, 2004). Information on the impact of this differentiation is lacking. 
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Currently, a study is being carried out for the Finnish Ministry of Environment on the ef-
fectiveness of the landfill tax.8 
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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In Sweden, a tax on the landfilling of waste was introduced in 2000 at a rate of SEK 250 
(about € 27) per tonne. In 2002, the rate was increased to SEK 288 and simultaneously 
requirements concerning the separation of combustible waste and a ban on dumping 
separated combustible waste entered into force. In 2003, the tax rate was further in-
creased to SEK 370 (about € 40) per tonne. The aim is to halve the amount of waste 
landfilled by 2005 from 1994 levels (OECD, 2004). A report by the Swedish Environ-
mental Protection Agency (Naturvårdsverket, 2003) stated that although the amount of 
waste going to landfill had actually decreased, there was much doubt as to the quantified 
effects of the landfill tax. This was because the tax was evaluated when it had only been 
in place for a short time, there was limited access to the data that could be used for the 
evaluation, and waste management policy includes a number of other instruments along-
side the landfill tax. At the time of writing, it was too early to evaluate the effect of the 
increase in the tax rate of 2003. 
".,	
The French landfill tax was introduced in 1993 at a level of FRF 20 per tonne. The rate 
increased to FRF 60 (€ 9.15) per tonne in 1995, which is still the standard rate for mu-
nicipal and comparable waste. Since 2003, sites with EMAS or ISO 14000 certification 
pay a reduced rate of € 7.50 per tonne. Non-authorised landfills pay a rate of € 18.29 per 
tonne of municipal waste, which is also the rate for special industrial waste.9 Since 1999, 
the tax is part of the TGAP (Taxe Générale sur les Activités Polluantes). 
Although the tax rate is relatively low and landfilling is often still the cheapest option, 
the combination of the landfill tax with regulations (including a ban on the landfilling of 
untreated waste in 2002) has contributed to the fact that the percentage of landfilling in 
total waste treatment is not increasing (FEAD, 2003). According to Ecotec (2001), the 
share of landfilling in waste disposal in France has decreased from 63 to 59% over the 
period 1993-1997. Although municipalities typically have fixed-term contracts with 
landfill operators, some have switched to incineration and sorting/recycling since 1997. 
"/01,2
The region of Flanders has a complicated system of landfill (and incineration) taxes. The 
rates depend on the type of waste and the type of landfill. Relatively low rates (between 
€ 0.32 and € 7.73 per tonne) apply to specific waste from mining and mineral industries, 
and to recycling and soil sanitation residues. The rate for inert waste and for inert asbes-
tos is € 10.83 per tonne. For free asbestos and fly ash from thermal power plants the rate 
amounts to € 18.54 per tonne. For municipal waste it is € 58.73 if the landfill gas is used 
                                                   
8
  Personal communications, Mr Timo Parkkinen (Ministry of Environment) and Ms Riita Kojo 
(Suunnittelukeskus Oy), 07.04.2005. 
9
  Source: http://www.douane.gouv.fr (accessed 13.04.2005). 
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for energy production, and € 61.82 otherwise. The rate for landfills operating without a 
license is € 123.63 per tonne (source: OVAM; rates are for 2005). Since 2000, there is a 
ban on the landfilling of untreated municipal waste (with some exemptions). 
Since a few years, the amount of household waste in Flanders has ceased increasing. In 
2002, it decreased by 0.2% and in 2003 by 3.4%. In 2003, 70% of the household waste 
was collected separately and most of it was re-used, composted or recycled. Major fac-
tors behind these figures are the widespread availability of separate collection facilities 
and the application in almost all Flemish municipalities of some kind of differentiation in 
waste collection charges. Of the remaining (non-separated) waste, only 16.3% was land-
filled (compared to 52.6% in 1991). Both the restrictions on landfilling and the tax 
(which makes landfilling more expensive than incineration) are held responsible for this 
decrease (Sanders et al., 2004).  
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If landfill taxes are to be effective in terms of reducing the amount (and the share) of 
(municipal) waste going to landfills, the price signals that they convey should be trans-
ferred to the source of the waste, i.e. households and firms producing comparable types 
of waste. This can be done by introducing unit-based pricing systems for waste disposal 
services. Such systems are in accordance with the ‘polluter pays principle’ and can con-
tribute to an efficient allocation of resources, because they imply a non-zero marginal 
cost of waste and thus stimulate recycling and waste prevention. However, unit-based 
pricing systems also have some disadvantages. They sometimes involve high transaction 
costs, and tend to stimulate the illegal disposal of waste. Factors that seem to improve 
the effectiveness of unit-based pricing systems are: 
• Embedding unit-based pricing systems in a mix of instruments that promotes preven-
tion and recycling; 
• Keeping the charges modest; 
• Including a distinction between different types of waste; 
• Designing the system in a way that rewards recycling and source separation. 
In general the conclusion is that experiences with such systems in different countries are 
mixed. 
There is also a large variety of estimates for the price sensitivity of waste supply. The 
elasticity of demand for waste disposal services is generally found to be somewhere in 
the range between –0.1 and –0.5. In some cases, relatively large reductions in waste sup-
ply have been recorded following the introduction of ‘pay-as-you-throw’ schemes, but 
these may be partly attributable to an increase in illegal waste dumping. On the other 
hand, part of the recycling behaviour observed in households seems to be unrelated to 
the cost of waste disposal and may be better explained by attitude factors. 
High landfill taxes are associated with higher levels of waste recovery across the EU (In-
tegrated Skills LTD., 2004) but this may well be related to other policies as well, such as 
landfill bans on certain waste streams and regulations on recycling. All countries that 
have introduced high landfill taxes also apply bans or other restrictions on landfilling, 
which makes isolation of landfill taxes as a factor behind the decrease in landfilling 
problematic. However, putting it the other way round, embedding a landfill tax in a mix 
Effectiveness of landfill taxation 15 
of policy instruments that promote prevention and recycling seems to be an important 
success factor or at least a best practice. Another factor that influences the effectiveness 
of landfill taxes is the tax level. Low levels do not seem to be effective (Case UK). Also 
fixed-term contracts between waste producers an landfill operators may be an obstacle 
for the effectiveness of a landfill tax (Case France). The Austrian experience suggests 
that differentiations in landfill tax rates (taking account of the environmental features of 
the landfill) may be effective in speeding up the modernisation of landfills. In general 
this short survey of experiences with landfill taxes in several countries shows that scien-
tific research on the effectiveness of landfill taxes is scarce. A final conclusion is there-
fore that an exploration at European level of the instrument landfill tax as suggested in 
the Communication ‘Towards a thematic strategy on waste prevention and recycling’ 
would definitely benefit from more research into conditions for effective landfill taxes. 
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In 1995, the landfill tax was introduced in the Netherlands. In this chapter, we try to 
evaluate ex post the role of the landfill tax in the Dutch waste market. The following re-
search questions (numbered 1a through 1d in Chapter 1) are addressed: 
• Has landfilling become a relatively more expensive waste treatment option compared 
to alternatives such as incineration and recycling? 
• Has the landfill tax led to a relative increase in waste supply for incineration and re-
cycling, and to a relative decrease in waste supply for landfilling? 
• Has the landfill tax led to a better utilisation of the existing infrastructure for incin-
eration and recycling, both in The Netherlands and abroad? 
• Has the landfill tax led to investments in new capacity for incineration, separation 
and recycling, both in The Netherlands and abroad? 
Actually, we limit our scope of the waste market to waste from households and from 
other economic sectors that have comparable waste flows, such as the service sector.10  
In this ex-post assessment we try to identify the impact of the landfill tax on different 
kinds of developments in the waste (disposal) sector, such as waste supply and disposal 
choice. In fact, the landfill tax is merely an additional cost component of landfilling 
waste, and the focus of the ex-post assessment is on the costs comparison of disposal op-
tions. Moreover, next to the landfill tax, the waste sector has been affected by a number 
of regulations and developments in the last decades, such as the landfill ban on combus-
tible and recyclable waste, and the ban on export of particular types of waste.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2, we present a general overview 
of the waste market in the Netherlands, including waste supply, waste disposal options, 
waste policy measures, economic and demographic developments, and the total capacity 
of incinerators and landfill sites. Secondly, we discuss the methodology how we identify 
the main determinants (including waste disposal costs) of the waste supply and the waste 
disposal options in Section 3.3. For convenience, the analysis of the impact of the land-
fill tax on disposal options is divided into two stages, namely recycling versus waste dis-
posal (incineration or landfilling), and incineration versus landfilling of waste. In both 
cases, the landfill tax is part of the landfilling costs. Section 3.4 discusses the data used 
in and the results of the analysis applied to household waste and service sector waste. Fi-
nally, Section 3.5 concludes.  
                                                   
10
  The service sector includes wholesale and retail market sector, hotel and catering industry, 
financial and insurance industry, transportation, and non-commercial services, such as public 
management, health care, education etc.  
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Figure 3.1 shows (on a per capita basis) the developments in the total amount of waste 
generated in the Netherlands and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the Netherlands 
in the period 1995-2003. In this period, the total amount of waste generated in the Neth-
erlands increased from 52.8 to 61.8 Mton. Figure 3.1 shows that the total amount of 
waste per capita has been declining since 2000. As the total amount of waste per capita 
declined, GDP per capita still grew until 2001.  
Figure 3.1 Development of waste and GDP per capita in the Netherlands in the period 
1995-2003 (base year is 1995) (Source: AOO and Statistics Netherlands). 
 
Figure 3.2 Amount of waste per waste disposal option in the Netherlands in the period 
1995-2003 (Source: AOO). 
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Figure 3.2 shows the amounts of waste per waste disposal option. Roughly 70-80% of 
the total amount of waste in the Netherlands is recycled. Here, recycling is used in a 
broad fashion, because it includes reuse of products, ‘pure’ recycling of waste and com-
posting organic waste. The total amount of landfilled waste more than halved in the pe-
riod 1995-2003. In 1995, 8.2 Mton waste was landfilled, while in 2003 the amount of 
landfilled waste declined to 2.8 Mton. The share of landfilling in the waste disposal op-
tions dropped from more than 15% in 1995 to 4.5% in 2003. For incineration, the oppo-
site development is observed. In 1995, 4.8 Mton of waste was incinerated, and the 
amount increased to 8.2 Mton in 2003. As is mentioned below, however, the domestic 
incineration capacity in the Netherlands amounts to 5.3 Mton, so that a substantial part 
of this 8.2 Mton waste has to be exported for incineration.  
Table 3.1 Share of disposal option for household and service sector waste in the  
Netherlands, 1995-2003. 
Year Household waste  Service sector waste 
 Recycling Incineration Landfilling Discharge  Recycling Incineration Landfilling Discharge 
1995 40.0% 25.5% 34.6% 0.0%  38.5% 18.3% 43.2% 0.0% 
2000 44.8% 40.3% 14.9% 0.0%  55.7% 17.4% 26.9% 0.0% 
2001 44.5% 41.7% 13.8% 0.0%  52.6% 17.8% 27.5% 2.2% 
2002 47.5% 41.1% 11.3% 0.1%  53.2% 29.5% 15.7% 1.6% 
2003 51.2% 41.2% 5.9% 1.7%  53.5% 33.0% 11.2% 2.3% 
Source: own calculations on data from Milieucompendium (http://www.milieucompendium.nl) 
and MNP (2005). 
Since this study particularly focuses on household waste and waste of the service sector, 
Table 3.1 shows the shares of waste disposal options for those two waste categories. The 
total amount of household waste increased steadily from 7.3 Mton in 1993 to 9.1 Mton 
in 2002. In 2003, the amount of household waste declined slightly. Table 3.1 shows that 
the shares of recycling and incineration have increased between 1995 and 2003. In 2003, 
more than half of the household waste was recycled (or composted) and 41% was incin-
erated. The share of landfilling declined from 35% in 1995 to 6% in 2003. The latter fig-
ure reflects the exemptions from the general landfill ban on recyclable and combustible 
waste, which was introduced in 1995. These exemptions are caused by a shortage of in-
cineration capacity in certain regions such as the province of Limburg.  
The amount of waste of the service sector increased from 3.1 Mton in 1995 to 3.7 Mton 
in 2002. In 2003, the amount of service sector waste declined slightly. The share of recy-
cling grew rapidly, and at least since 2000 more than half of all waste generated by the 
service sector is recycled (or reused). Until 2002, the share of incineration was fairly 
constant at about 17%, but afterwards it increased to 33%. One explanation for this boost 
is the increase in exports of disposable (combustible) waste abroad. Simultaneously, the 
share of landfilling, which was 27% in the period 2000-2001, dropped to 11% in 2003.  
)		$%$
The number of landfills declined from 46 in 1995 to 30 in 2003 (see Table 3.2). Over the 
same period, the total amount of cumulated landfill capacity decreased from 79 to 51 
mln m3. Next to the current landfill capacity, there are still applications for permits to ex-
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tend existing sites and to open up new sites in progress. The capacity of these permit ap-
plications amounts to another 16 mln m3.  
In 1995 and 1996 the last incineration plants were built, and from that time the govern-
ment maintained a moratorium for ‘traditional’ grate incineration plants. New plants us-
ing more energy efficient technologies (such as co-incineration or gasification) were al-
lowed, but no new incineration plants became operational until 2003.11 So, the total 
number of waste incineration plants was constant at 11 in the period 1997-2003. In this 
period the annual capacity fluctuated within the range of 5.1 to 5.7 Mton due to annual 
fluctuations in maintenance activities. The last column of Table 3.2 shows that the effi-
ciency of use of the waste incineration plants (i.e. amount of waste incinerated divided 
by the capacity) fluctuated between 77% in 1996 and 95% in 2002. There seems to be a 
positive trend in the efficiency of use of incineration plants, which is best illustrated by 
the observation that in the period 2002-2003, the efficiency of use has exceeded the level 
of 90%. 
Table 3.2 Characteristics of waste incineration plants and landfill sites in the  
Netherlands, 1995-2003. 
Year Landfill sites Waste incineration plants 
 
Amount of 
waste* 
Number 
of sites Landfill capacity 
Amount 
of waste 
Number 
of 
plants 
Capac-
ity 
Capacity 
utilisation 
 Gross Net  Present 
In proce-
dure     
 Mton Mton  mln m3 mln m3 Mton  Mton % 
1995 9.9  46 79.3 28.1 2.8 7 3.4 83.9 
1996 8.5  47 76.3 17.1 3.5 9 4.6 76.7 
1997 7.4  44 73.7 14.2 4.4 11 5.1 86.1 
1998 7.1  41 69.4 6.6 4.5 11 5.3 86.3 
1999 7.6 6.3 38 63.4 6.6 4.9 11 5.4 90.0 
2000 6.6 5.6 36 56.7 17.8 5.0 11 5.7 86.9 
2001 6.5 5.7 32 56.5 16.2 4.9 11 5.7 84.7 
2002 5.2 4.3 30 54.2 16.9 5.1 11 5.3 95.2 
2003 4.8 3.4 30 51.0 16.9 5.2 11 5.6 91.8 
* The net amount of waste landfilled is the total (or gross) amount of waste landfilled that is 
corrected for the amount of construction waste landfilled. This construction waste is applied 
in a useful way, such as improvements of the infrastructure of the landfill or as a cover of the 
landfill (AOO, 2004a). 
Source: AOO. 
"4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In the last decade, a number of environmental policy measures have been undertaken 
that have affected the waste market. The policy measures listed below each have the po-
tential to have a profound effect on the waste market and the supply and disposal of 
waste. In this subsection we will describe the potential effects of the policy measures.  
                                                   
11
  Nevertheless, at the time of writing a number of new incineration plants are under construc-
tion. 
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Table 3.3 Environmental policy with respect to waste management12. 
 1994 Harmonisation of waste trading in EU (implementation Waste Shipment  
Regulation, WSR) 
 1994 Separate collection of organic municipal solid waste 
 1995 Landfill ban: prohibition of landfilling recyclable waste and combustible waste 
(still with many exemptions) 
 1996 Implementation of the landfill tax on recyclable and combustible waste 
 1998 Establishment of a new after-care system for landfills under provincial responsi-
bility), financed by a charge on landfilling at province level, see AOO (2000b) 
 1999 Implementation of an advanced disposal fee on new electric and electronic house-
hold equipment 
 2000 Provincial self-sufficiency for waste incineration abolished resulting in a national 
incineration market 
 2001 Source separation responsibility for producers (e.g. for waste paper) 
 
  
Figure 3.3 Export of notified waste. Figure 3.4 Import of notified waste. 
Harmonisation of waste trading in the EU 
In 1994, the European Waste Shipment Regulation (WSR, 259/93) came into force. With 
the WSR, the procedures of shipping waste between EU countries are harmonized. The 
WSR demands a notification of waste for disposal and hazardous waste at the competent 
authorities in the importing and exporting countries involved. Figure 3.3 and 3.4 show 
the development of exports and imports of notified waste13 in the Netherlands for the pe-
riod 1998-2003. The Netherlands is a net exporter of waste, and the export of waste is 
still growing. In 2003, approximately 85% of exported waste was recyclable waste. The 
trade in non-hazardous waste for recycling, which is more or less free, is of a much lar-
ger scale. Put into perspective: Import and export in The Netherlands of waste paper, an 
important waste stream in this category, amounts to approximately 2.5 million tonnes per 
                                                   
12
  Table 1.1 of Dijkgraaf (2004) summarizes several policy measures including some EU direc-
tives. In this study, however, we will focus only on the Dutch policy measures. 
13
  The imports and exports of waste in these figures only refer to the waste products for which 
the report of transportation is compulsory. Transports of recyclable products, for instance, do 
not have to be reported. 
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year. A large part of the non-hazardous waste is is exported for recycling to South-East 
Asia.14  
Separate collection of organic and municipal solid waste 
Since 1994, municipalities have the obligation to collect organic waste and rest waste 
separately. This gave an enormous boost to the amount of household waste composted. 
Since the year 2000 several municipalities, especially the large ones like Utrecht and 
Rotterdam, have asked for and got an exemption from this law. They do not have to col-
lect waste separately in some parts of the municipality if the quality of collected organic 
waste is too low. 
Landfill ban 
Since the 1st of October 1995 there exists a ban on the landfilling of recyclable and com-
bustible waste.15 This should have reduced the amount of landfilled waste substantially. 
However, the available capacity of alternative waste disposal options, incineration in 
particular, was insufficient in particular parts of the Netherlands (Limburg), so that the 
government had to allow municipalities and producers to landfill combustible waste de-
spite the ban. In later years, when the capacity of the alternative options was increased it 
became less easy to get an exemption on the landfill ban.  
Landfill tax 
The landfill tax was introduced in 1995. Since 1998 there is a high rate for combustible 
waste, and a lower rate for non-combustible waste. Table 3.4 shows that the high rate 
started at a fairly low level and has been increased substantially over the last decade. In 
2000 the high landfill tax rate was more than doubled, so that the price of incineration 
became lower than the price of landfilling. 
Table 3.4 Landfill tax in € per tonne. 
Type of waste 1995-1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Combustible 
waste 
13.25 29.13 29.75 64.28 65.44 78.81 81.65 83.61 84.78 
Non-
combustible 
waste 
13.25 13.25 13.53 12.38 12.61 13.00 13.47 13.79 13.98 
Source: Wet belastingen op milieugrondslag (Environmental taxes act), art. 18. 
Provincial responsibility of landfills 
On the 1st of April 1998 the provinces instead of the national government became re-
sponsible for preventing environmental leaks caused by landfills after the closure of 
landfills. With a view to this responsibility, the provinces introduced a charge on land-
filling (see AOO, 2000b). The revenues of the charges are put into a fund and are used to 
prevent environmental damages after a landfill closes. Since the charge will probably 
                                                   
14
  See FNOI website: www.fnoi.nl. 
15
  The definition of combustible waste is rather technical. By definition, all solid household 
waste is combustible.  
Effectiveness of landfill taxation 
 
23 
 
raise the price of landfilling (landfill sites are free to include the charge in the landfill 
price) it can potentially lower the demand for landfilling. 
Advanced disposal fee on electr(on)ic household equipment 
Since 1999, consumers pay a certain advanced disposal fee (‘verwijderingsbijdrage’) 
when they purchase new electric and electronic equipment. Retailers are obliged to take 
back the ‘disposed’ product when the consumer purchases a new product. Consumers 
can also bring the product to a recycling centre or municipality free of charge. By for-
malizing the recycling process of electronic household equipment it becomes easier to 
recycle these products. Simultaneously with the implementation of the advanced disposal 
fee, a ban on landfilling and incineration of electronic household equipment came into 
force. In 2003, the advanced disposal fee amounted to €17 for freezers and refrigerators 
and €5 for washing machines. 
Provincial self-sufficiency for waste incineration abolished 
Since 2000, the regulation on the provincial cross-border transportation of recyclable and 
combustible waste has been relaxed. (see AOO, 2000b). Municipalities and producers 
have more freedom to choose an incineration plant or recycling firm regardless of the lo-
cation. This could mean that the difference in waste disposal costs will become less be-
tween different provinces.  
Source separation responsibility for producers 
In 1999, the program separation responsibility for producers started. In 2001 the rules of 
this program were formalized in the National Waste Management Plan (LAP). Producers 
are obliged to separate all feasible waste materials. They should at least separate hazard-
ous waste, paper and electronic appliances.  
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In order to estimate the impact of waste disposal costs on total waste supply, we have to 
identify the main determinants of waste supply. Total waste supply is regressed on de-
terminants, such as economic growth and population growth and the level of costs of 
waste disposal options. Also, we carry out a similar analysis for household waste and 
service sector waste. In the case of household waste, additional explanatory variables 
will be the household waste (disposal) charge rate and the growth of single person 
households. In the case of service sector waste, we include the relative costs of landfill-
ing (including the landfill tax) over incineration, the number of firms in the service sec-
tor (instead of population growth), and the share of service waste collected by munici-
palities.  
The regression model will look as follows: total waste supply is regressed on economic 
growth, population growth and the relative price of incineration and landfilling. 
 Yi,t = i,t + X Xi,t + W Wi,t + P Pi,t + i,t, (3.1) 
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Where Yi,t is total waste supply at time t for sector/region i, Xi,t includes demographic and 
economic determinants, such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), population growth and 
other, Wi,t includes indicators of other policy measures such as the (rest) capacity of 
waste disposal options, and Pi,t is the (relative) price of waste disposal option at time t 
for sector/region i. The coefficients to be estimated are , X, W and P, while i,t is the 
residual. Specifically, the coefficient P indicates what the impact of (relative) prices of 
disposal options is on the total waste supply in the Netherlands. If P refers to the price 
of landfilling, and P <0 and significant, then a higher landfill price (due to the landfill 
tax for instance) decreases the total waste supply.  
This analysis will be applied on the household and service sector. Before we will analyse 
the determinants of waste supply for both sectors, we briefly summarize the develop-
ments of waste supply and the economic and demographic developments. In the case of 
the service sector we replace population growth by the growth in the number of firms for 
instance.  
In the case of the households, we have household data at province level, which seems an 
appropriate division taking into account the ban on provincial cross-border waste trans-
portations in the last decade. In the case of households, we will replace waste disposal 
costs by the waste disposal charge, since households are confronted with this charge and 
not with landfill taxes directly. Especially, only if a municipality levies a unit-based 
waste disposal charge, the landfill tax can be of direct influence on the supply of house-
hold waste.  
For the service sector, we cannot make a geographical division of waste, because the in-
formation on the supply of service waste is unavailable at province level. In the analysis 
of the waste of the service sector, the (relative) prices of disposal options (landfill costs 
versus incineration costs) are important, because a substantial part of the firms have con-
tracts with waste disposal companies. Obviously, we will include the number of firms 
instead of population.  
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From Section 3.3.1, we get insight into the determinants of total waste supply (per sec-
tor), and the impact of waste disposal prices (including landfill taxes) on the total waste 
supply (per sector). However, we now take a closer look at the impact of the landfill tax 
on the choice between recycling and the waste disposal options.  
Most ideally, we would like to analyse this impact at the level of agents (specialized col-
lection companies such as ROVA and SITA, or municipalities) that are responsible for 
choosing recycling or waste disposal options. However, information is not available at 
such a detailed level. Therefore, we use similar kind of data at the same level as in the 
waste supply analysis described in Section 3.3.1.  
This analysis is divided into two phases. Firstly, we start with the analysis of the ‘choice’ 
between recycling and waste disposal (the total of incineration and landfilling). The 
share of recycling is regressed on a number of determinants such as the price level of 
waste disposal options. In this way, we identify the impact of waste disposal prices on 
the share of recycling in total waste supply.  
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 Si,t = i,t + X Xi,t + W Wi,t + P Pi,t + i,t, (3.2) 
 where Si,t is the share of recycling in the total waste supply at time t for sector/region i, 
Xi,t is a set of geographical/sectoral information and economic determinants, and Wi,t is a 
set of indicators for policy measures such as the rest capacity of waste disposal options 
and the law on separated collection of waste, import-export of recyclable waste and the 
implementation of the disposal surcharge on electr(on)ic household appliances. In addi-
tion, Pi,t is a set of financial indicators such as the costs of disposal options, including 
landfill taxes. In the case that the costs of landfilling are included, a positive coefficient 
of this variable means that ceteris paribus the share of recycling increases if the landfill 
tax is increased. This analysis is explored for both sectors (households and service sec-
tor), and the set of explanatory variables differs between both sectors.  
Secondly, we model the choice between incineration and landfilling in order to analyse 
the impact of the landfill tax (and landfilling costs) on the waste disposal choice.  
 Di,t = i,t + X Xi,t + W Wi,t + P Pi,t + i,t, (3.3) 
where Di,t is the total amount of waste supplied to a specific disposal option (incineration 
or landfilling) at time t for sector/region i. The set Xi,t includes relevant geographi-
cal/sectoral information, and the set Wi,t consists of indicators for policy measures such 
as the rest capacity of waste disposal options, the landfill ban and the opening of prov-
ince borders for waste transport (in fact, the regulations of cross-border transportations 
were relaxed). In the case of the latter two, there are no quantity indicators for these pol-
icy measures. We therefore use dummy variable indicators for periods in which particu-
lar policy measures were present. Note however that we do not have the intention to es-
timate the impacts of other policy measures, but we try to obtain unbiased estimates for 
the characteristics we can quantify in the analyses. 
In addition, Pi,t is a set of financial indicators such as (relative) price of recycling and 
different waste disposal options, including landfill taxes, provincial taxes, and transpor-
tation. If the costs of landfilling are included and the coefficient has a negative sign, this 
means that a higher landfill tax (which increases the price of landfilling) reduces the 
share of landfilling. This analysis is explored for both sectors (households and service 
sector), and the set of explanatory variables differs between both sectors.  
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For the ex-post assessment, we composed two separate data sets for household waste and 
waste from the service sector. The household data are collected at province level, and the 
service sector data at sub-sector level. Variables reflecting monetary values are ex-
pressed in the price level of 2000. In the case of disposal costs, i.e. the costs of landfill-
ing and the costs of incineration, we ignore transportation costs, because there are no re-
liable data on transportation costs. Dijkgraaf et al. (2001) summarize transportation costs 
for incineration plants, but these estimates are highly aggregated. Also AOO (2003e and 
2004a) present incineration costs including and excluding transportation costs although 
not systematically. We tried to derive a time series on transportation costs, but this time 
series was inconsistent. Moreover, we do not have transportation costs for landfilling. 
Furthermore, the transportation costs reported in AOO (2003e, 2004a) indicate that the 
transportation costs account for a small proportion of the total disposal costs. Since there 
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are more landfills present than incineration plants, we presume that the transportation 
costs of landfills will not exceed the transportation costs of incineration. 
Both data sets consist of sectors/regions with time series of observations. Therefore, we 
apply panel data regression techniques, such as Fixed Effects (FE) estimation or Random 
Effects (RE) estimation. We choose these techniques, because these estimation tech-
niques are straightforward, and both estimation methods take into account heterogeneous 
(un)observed effects. As a consequence, we can obtain unbiased estimates for the coeffi-
cients of the variables that are included in the analyses. Determinants that are constant 
over time for regions (surface of regions for instance) or sectors (location of firms, for 
instance) cannot be taken into account. FE estimation corrects for region or sector spe-
cific information over time while RE also takes into account differences in information 
across regions or sectors. Altough the RE estimation seems more complete, the choice of 
the panel data estimation technique is not straightforward, because each analysis has dif-
ferent requirements. Hsiao (1986) argues that the choice between FE and RE has to be 
based on intuition. Intuitively, FE estimation is more suitable if there are autonomous re-
gional or sectoral differences in the data. RE estimation is suitable if there is no reason to 
assume those differences.  
In the case of the household waste analysis, it is likely that there are regional differences 
due to differences in available disposal capacity and strict regulation of waste transports, 
for instance. For the service sector, there might be differences in recycling (glass in the 
hotel and catering industry), for instance, but these sectoral differences are less clear. RE 
estimation will suffice. Moreover, due to lack of data FE turned out to be infeasible.  
In order to to correct for trends in population and number of firms, we analyse per capita 
and per firm waste indicators for the household data analysis and the service sector 
analysis respectively.  
"(5$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The household data are collected for 12 provinces over the period 1995-2003. Thus the 
dataset contains 108 records. Table 3. 5 shows the variables in the dataset for household 
waste. The dataset consists of information on the number of sites/plants, (rest) capacity, 
the amount of waste disposed and tariffs of the disposal options at province level. If nec-
essary, indicators at higher aggregation level can be constructed. For instance, some 
provinces do not have waste incineration plants within their borders and despite the strict 
regulation on transportation of waste over the province borders, provinces with insuffi-
cient incineration capacity can get exemptions to transport combustible waste to incin-
eration plants or to landfill combustible waste.  
The socio-economic variables include volume deflators of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), population and the number of (single person) households, all at province level. 
Although we would have preferred final private consumption (FPC) as an economic in-
dicator instead of GDP, the indicator FPC is not available at the level of provinces. Addi-
tionally, we have the number of municipalities with and without any form of unit-based 
pricing including the average waste disposal charge. However, we only have this infor-
mation for the period 1998-2003. For the earlier period, we use national averages of 
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waste disposal charges.16 With the use of year dummies we can correct the regression re-
sults for this omission. For the waste disposal charge we know the average at national 
level for the period prior to 1998.  
Table 3.6 presents the estimation results of household waste generation and disposal op-
tions. All equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) are estimated with a Fixed Effects (FE) regres-
sion, which takes into account the possible (unobservable) heterogeneity between prov-
inces. For convenience, we ignore the coefficients of the fixed effects themselves, and 
focus on the other determinants. 
The first column of Table 3.6 presents the determinants of the generation of waste per 
capita as in eq. (3.1). In this regression we included waste disposal charge instead of ac-
tual disposal costs, because the generation of household waste does not directly depend 
on the costs of disposal options. Merely, the generation of the household waste is more 
likely to depend on the level of the waste disposal charge. However, if the waste disposal 
charge follows a flat fee scheme (not depending on a characteristic of supply, such as 
frequency, volume, or weight), then it is unlikely that the waste disposal charge has any 
effect on the generation of household waste. In the case of a unit-based pricing scheme, 
the disposal costs can affect the unit-based price, and consequently this might affect the 
generation of waste. On average, the disposal charges in municipalities with a unit-based 
pricing scheme are lower than in municipalities with flat fee pricing schemes (AOO, 
2003e). Moreover, Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2004a) argue that the amount of waste 
generated is less as well for different kinds of unit-based pricing schemes. They esti-
mated the impacts of different kinds of regimes of waste disposal charging with a regres-
sion model using data of Dutch municipalities. For this reason, we include the share of 
municipalities with a unit-based pricing scheme into the analysis.  
The determinants of household waste generation per capita are analysed with Eq. (3.1). 
As mentioned above, the generation of household waste is not directly affected by costs 
of disposal options, and the impact of the waste disposal charge is likely to occur if a 
province has a large share of municipalities with unit-based pricing schemes. The results 
in the first column of Table 3.6 are in line with our expectations. The waste disposal 
charge has no effect on waste generation, while provinces with higher shares of munici-
palities with unit-based pricing regimes tend to generate less waste per capita. Further-
more, higher levels of GDP per capita lead to higher total amounts of household waste 
per capita. Finally, the number of singles has a positive effect on household waste per 
capita. 
To explain the share of recycling as in Eq. (3.2), we include the level of disposal costs 
explicitly, because we are analysing the disposal option recycling versus incineration and 
landfilling. The disposal costs (costs of incineration and landfilling including landfill 
tax) are simply defined as the unweighted average of those two costs. Furthermore, we 
constructed disposal capacity, which is the total capacity of incineration and landfilling. 
Since landfilling capacity is measured in volume, we use the weight per volume of 1,250 
kg per cubic metre.  
                                                   
16
  Before 1998, there was only a small number of municipalities that had introduced unit-based 
pricing regimes. 
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The second column of Table 3.6 shows that the share of recycling in household waste in-
creases with the level of per capita GDP, and there are some autonomous changes 
throughout the period. The share of recycling was higher in the 1995 and in the period 
1996-1997 if we correct for the other determinants. Note that this does not mean that the 
total amount of recycled waste declined, which is only the case if the total level of 
household waste increased at a lower pace than the reduction in the recycling share.  
The third and fourth columns show the explanation of the amount of landfilled and in-
cinerated household waste respectively according to the regression in Eq. (3.3). In these 
analyses, we include the relative price of landfilling over incineration.  
GDP per capita has a positive effect on the total amount of landfilled household waste, 
and in 1995 the amount of landfilled household waste was significantly higher. Prov-
inces with a higher share of municipalities with a unit-based pricing regime have a sig-
nificant lower level of waste landfilling. The relative price of landfill costs has no sig-
nificant effect.  
From the incineration analysis, we observe a significant positive effect of waste incinera-
tion by provinces with a higher share of municipalities with a unit-based pricing regime. 
Moreover, the availability of incineration capacity encourages waste incineration as well. 
This indicates that if there is sufficient incineration capacity available, municipalities 
will incinerate household waste instead of dumping it in landfills. Municipalities have a 
preference for incineration over landfilling because of the ban on landfilling household 
waste and the existence of long-term supply contracts between municipalities and waste 
incineration plants. In addition, municipalities often hold shares in waste incineration 
plants, see AOO (2000a). Furthermore, the relative costs of landfilling have no signifi-
cant effect on the amount of household waste landfilled or incinerated. The waste dis-
posal choice of municipalities or their contracted collectors is not affected by the higher 
landfill costs due to the high landfill tax.  
The results of Table 3.6 indicate that waste disposal charges did not affect the generation 
of household waste, and the costs of disposal options did not affect the amount of waste 
recycled, landfilled or incinerated. Basically, there is no effect, because changes in dis-
posal costs are not internalised in the waste disposal charges as displayed in Figure 3.5. 
Figure 3.5 shows the developments in the real costs of landfilling (including landfill tax) 
and incineration in comparison with the average waste disposal charge paid per tonne of 
waste per household. The costs of landfilling show a steeply increasing trend caused by 
the development in the landfill tax. The incineration costs show a gradually increasing 
trend. Remarkably, the waste disposal charge is fairly constant over the period 1995-
2003, despite simultaneous growths in the household waste per capita (see Figure 3.1), 
and in the disposal costs. This implies that the disposal costs are not fully internalised in 
the waste disposal charges. This is confirmed by the findings of AOO (2004a) that there 
is no statistical relationship between disposal costs and waste disposal charges. Note 
however that waste disposal charges are used for financing municipal waste management 
costs which also include costs of waste collection. Moreover, AOO (2003e) argues that 
95% of the municipal waste management costs is covered by the revenues of the waste 
disposal charges. This ratio is fairly constant in the period 1995-2003.  
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Figure 3.5 Development of incineration costs, landfilling costs (including landfill 
tax) and waste disposal charge in real terms in euros (2000) per tonne. 
"(		
The dataset for the waste supplied by the service sector is smaller than the household 
dataset. In contrast with the household waste data, we distinguish 5 sub-sectors17 within 
the service sector instead of spatial division, namely:  
• Retail and wholesale market (including repair industry); 
• Hotel and catering industry; 
• Transportation and communication; 
• Financial services and insurance industry; and 
• Other services (public management, health care, education and cultural services). 
Table 3.7 presents the summary statistics of the database on the service sector waste. The 
data cover a period of 8 years from 1995 to 2002. The amounts of waste per disposal op-
tion of the sub-sectors are derived from information on a broader definition of the ser-
vice sector, which partly includes the manufacturing industry. As a consequence, the ra-
tio between incineration and landfilling waste is similar for all sub-sectors. Therefore, 
we analyse the amounts of waste landfilled and incinerated instead of the share of land-
filling and incineration.  
Table 3.8 presents the estimation results of the service sector. The waste generation is es-
timated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), while for the other indicators we use the 
Random Effects (RE) panel data estimation. Sector-specific features are now included as 
a stochastic term instead of a dummy variable as in the Fixed Effects estimation. Pref-
erably, all equations were estimated with Fixed Effects estimation to correct the estima-
tion results for unobserved heterogeneous effects. However, in the case of the waste  
                                                   
17
  Instead of the five sub-sectors distinguished in this study, AOO (2004b) distinguishes 7 sub-
sectors (viz. separate sectors for wholesale market, retail market sector and repair industry). 
Due to the lack of economic data for these 7 sub-sectors, we had to merge these sub-sectors. 
Originally, AOO (2004b) used the SBI’74 classification for the sub-division of the service 
while we prefer the more up-to-date SBI’93 classification. Fortunately, the SBI’74 and 
SBI’93 classifications of the sub-sectors of the service sector do not differ much. 
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supply regression estimation (3.1), both FE and RE estimation were rejected. In the other 
cases, Equations (3.2) and (3.3), FE estimation was rejected while RE estimation was 
not. The main reason for rejecting FE estimation is the limited numer of observations in 
this analysis (N=40). Again, we are not specifically interested in sector-specific effects 
but we are interested in unbiased estimates of the other determinants. 
The waste generation equation, as in Eq. (3.1), shows that except for the sector dummies 
the employment per firm is the only significant determinant. Higher levels of employ-
ment imply higher levels of waste generation per firm. In the estimation of the recycling 
share of the waste sector according to Eq. (3.2), the level of the disposal costs (average 
of incineration costs and landfilling costs) has a significant positive impact on the share 
of recycling. Higher levels of disposal costs imply a higher share of recycling in the ser-
vice sector.  
From the estimations of the amount of landfilled and incinerated waste as in Eq. (3.3), 
we observe that the relative price of landfill costs over incineration costs has a negative 
effect on the amount of waste landfilled, and a positive effect on the amount waste incin-
erated. Higher levels of landfill tax will increase the relative price of landfill costs over 
incineration prices, and as a consequence, the service sector will use the incineration op-
tion more and the landfill option less.  
"
	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This chapter discusses the possible impacts of the landfill tax on household waste and 
service sector waste. Within an ex-post assessment, four research questions were ad-
dressed. First of all, has landfilling become a more expensive alternative of waste dis-
posal than incineration and recycling? Although the landfill tax was introduced in 1995, 
landfilling became more expensive than incineration only around the year 2000 as a re-
sult of the increased tax rate. Whether or not landfilling is more expensive than recycling 
is less clear, because there are various types of recycling (such as glass, paper, textiles, 
etc). Moreover, the choice between recycling and disposing waste is taken at a different 
level, i.e. the waste generator and not the waste disposer. This is especially true in the 
case of household waste. Households choose between recycling or disposing waste, 
while municipalities choose between incinerating and landfilling. For the service sector, 
individual companies take both decisions. 
The second question was if the landfill tax has led to larger amounts of waste to be in-
cinerated and recycled, and to less waste to be landfilled. With the regression techniques, 
this question was handled. The results of the analysis of household data are uniform. The 
landfill tax did not have a significant direct impact on the generation of household waste, 
nor did it affect the choice for waste disposal options. In the case of household waste 
generation, the increases in the waste disposal costs, such as the landfill tax, are not in-
ternalised in the waste disposal charges in the case of flat fee regimes. In the case of 
unit-based pricing regimes, the disposal costs are more likely to be internalised in the 
waste disposal charges. However, to analyse this indirect effect requires an additional 
analysis of the impact of waste disposal costs on the tariffs of unit-based pricing regimes 
at the level of municipalities. The presence of a unit-based pricing regime decreases 
household waste generation. In addition, it decreases the amount of waste landfilled, 
while it increases the amount of waste incinerated. This latter result is somewhat surpris-
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ing, as it is not the households themselves who decide on the choice between landfilling 
and incineration, but rather the municipalities (or their contracted collectors of household 
waste). Moreover, in the case of household waste the functioning of the market mecha-
nism is restricted by the landfill ban and existing long-term contracts on waste supply 
with waste incineration plants.  
For the service sector, the level of disposal costs is not affecting the generation of waste, 
although it affects the waste disposal choice. In particular, higher costs for landfilling 
and incineration increase the share of recycling. Moreover, if the relative increase of 
costs of landfilling exceeds the relative increase of costs of incineration, firms from the 
service sector will landfill less waste and incinerate more. In this sense, the landfill tax 
can play a crucial role in the decision making of firms from the service sector with re-
spect to disposing waste 
The third question dealt with the efficiency of use of the waste incineration plants and 
recycling infrastructure. On the one hand we observe that the capacity of incineration has 
been fairly constant since 1997. The number of waste incineration plants was constant, 
and only little fluctuations in capacity were observed. On the other hand, the total 
amount of waste incinerated increased slightly in the corresponding period, so that the 
efficiency (capacity utilisation) of waste incineration plants shows a positive trend from 
80% in 1995/1996 to more than 90% in 2002/2003 (see Table 3.2). In addition, the re-
sults of the regression analysis showed that the relative price of landfilling tariffs and in-
cineration costs had a positive effect on the amount of service sector waste that has been 
incinerated. This means that higher costs of landfilling due to higher landfill tax levels 
will increase the demand of the service sector for the incineration of waste. Due to a con-
stant capacity and a slightly growing incineration of waste, the efficiency of use of waste 
incineration plants shows a slightly positive trend. In the case of recycling, we observed 
a moderate growth in the case of household waste, and a strong growth of recycling in 
the case of the service sector waste. We were not able to link these findings to the effi-
ciency of the use of recycling infrastructure.  
Finally, until 2003 the landfill tax has not led to new investments in new incineration 
plants in The Netherlands. However, export of waste for incineration and use as a secon-
dary fuel has increased (see Section 3.2.1). So, the landfill tax in the Netherlands might 
have contributed to a more efficient use of foreign waste incineration capacity and/or 
new foreign incineration capacity. More research into developments of the European 
waste market is needed to come to a reliable conclusion on this issue. If the landfill tax 
has led to investments in recycling infrastructure is ambiguous, because different kinds 
of recycling options require their own infrastructure. In future research, the development 
of recycling options could be mapped in more detail. The large and increasing export of 
waste paper to South-East Asia (cf. Van Beukering, 2001) suggests that global transport 
and recycling industries benefit from the source separation efforts of consumers and 
companies in The Netherlands (and Europe as a whole). 
The evaluation of impacts of the landfill tax has resulted in different results for different 
sectors, because many aspects play a role. If the disposal costs are reflected in the costs 
charged to the waste suppliers, as is the case in the service sector, the landfill tax turns 
out to be an effective instrument. Higher levels of the landfill tax will imply lower levels 
of waste landfilled and higher levels of waste incinerated or recycled. If changes in dis-
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posal costs are not incorporated in the charges to the waste generators (as is the case of 
households), the landfill tax seems to be ineffective, especially if there is a landfill ban 
imposed as well. In that case, higher landfill taxes are not or delayed internalised in 
waste disposal charges. The introduction of unit-based pricing for household waste col-
lection might provide the correct incentive in which higher landfill taxes are internalised.  
Table 3. 5 Summary statistics of dataset on household waste, 1995-2003. 
Variable description N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
      
Remaining landfill capacity per province (in million 108 0.3 17.7 5.4 3.9 
Landfill tariffs including landfill tax (euros per ton) 108 54.4 119.2 97.3 18.0 
Landfill tax (euros per ton) 108 0 74.3 44.3 24.0 
Waste incinerated per province (kton) 108 0 1798 372.8 534.8 
Incineration capacity per province (kton) 108 0 1875 353.9 546.5 
Rest capacity of incineration plants (kton) 108 254 1075 658.0 228.1 
Incineration tariff (euros per ton) 108 91.8 115.6 102.8 7.5 
Household waste per province (kton) 108 126 1810 706.1 485.3 
Disposed household waste (kton)      
Landfilled  108 0 677.6 80.4 127.1 
Incinerated 108 0 1105.2 241.6 294.3 
Recycled or composted 108 27.2 947.9 406.7 239.9 
Population (x 1000) 108 272.8 3451.9 1323.0 961.7 
Population density 108 172 1225 475.0 323.7 
Total number of households (x 1000) 108 103.8 1541.7 566.2 426.5 
Number of single person households (x 1000) 108 25.2 574.5 189.5 160.9 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in mln euro 108 3951 100270.4 31273.7 25440.1 
Annual volume growth of GDP in % 96 -2 9.4 2.5 2.4 
Annual deflation of GDP in % 96 -2 11.3 2.6 1.9 
Number of municipalities per province 72 6 95 43.0 27.1 
Without unit-based schemes 72 5 92 33.2 23.8 
With unit-based schemes 72 0 36 9.8 11.3 
Average waste disposal charge in euro (2000) per 
household 108 158.3 228.1 192.3 14.6 
Sources: CBS, AOO, RIVM. 
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Table 3.6 Results of the regressions of household waste per capita, share of recycled 
household waste, landfilled household waste per capita, and incinerated 
household waste per capita (standard errors in parentheses). 
  Eq. (1)  Eq. (2)  Eq. (3)  Eq. (3)   
 FE 
 
FE 
 
FE 
 
FE  
 Waste  
supply 
 Recycled 
waste 
(share) 
 Landfilled 
waste 
 Incinerated 
waste 
 
Intercept 2.974 
 
1.507 # 0.429 
 
0.443 
 
 (6.058)  (0.854)  (0.583)  (0.495)  
GDP per capita 0.014 ** 0.015  0.018 * -0.003  
 (0.003)  (0.01)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
Share of mun. with unit-based pricing scheme -0.087 ** -0.008  -0.148 * 0.164 ** 
 (0.027)  (0.086)  (0.061)  (0.058)  
Wast disposal charge (x € 1000) 0.168        
 (0.257)        
Price level of disposal costs in €   -2.393      
   (1.828)      
Relative price of lanfdilling over incineration     -0.045  0.018  
     (0.108)  (0.105)  
Share of single persons 1.774 * -4.007  -2.352  -0.936  
 (0.894)  (2.808)  (1.859)  (1.605)  
Landfill capacity (x 1000)     1.701    
     (1.141)    
Incineration capacity         
         
Incineration rest capacity (x 1000)       0.015 ** 
       (0.004)  
Total disposal capacity   0.001      
   (0.001)      
Trend -0.002        
 (0.003)        
1995   0.144 ** 0.113 ** -0.027  
   (0.039)  (0.038)  (0.037)  
Period 1996-1997   0.125 ** 0.019  0.051 * 
   (0.03)  (0.204)  (0.019)  
Period 1995-1998 -0.029 **       
 (0.01)        
R2 within 0.69 
 
0.69 
 
0.64 
 
0.37 
 
N 12  12  12  12  
T 9  9  9  9  
K 20  20  20  20  
F( k-1,N-k) = 33.67 ** 28.14 ** 22.26 ** 7.49 ** 
F-test on fixed effects F(N-1,N-k) = 28.56 ** 50.18 ** 15.17 ** 27.27 ** 
** at 1% significance level, * at 5% significance level, and # at 10% significance level. 
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Table 3.7 Summary statistics of dataset on waste supplied by the service sector, 
 1995-2002. 
Variable description N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
Total waste (in kton)) 40 186 1668 696.4 461.9 
Waste collected separately (in kton) 40 67 810 293.3 227.5 
Waste not collected separately (in kton) 40 93 891 403.1 243.4 
Waste for recycling (in kton) 40 84.3 740.8 293.4 200.4 
Waste incinerated (in kton) 40 37.3 538.8 159.8 113.4 
Waste landfilled (in kton) 40 61.3 602.9 243.2 165.6 
Total amount of waste landfilled in the NL in Mton 40 5.2 9.9 7.3 1.3 
Landfill capacity in mln cubic meters 40 54.2 79.3 66.2 9.3 
Number of landfills in NL 40 30 47 39.3 6.0 
Landfill tariff including landfill tax in euros (2000) 40 48.9 127.9 93.0 21.3 
Landfill tax in euros (2000) per ton 40 0 78.8 40.8 24.8 
Incinerated waste in kton 40 2811 5088 4385.4 765.2 
Incineration capacity in kton 40 3350 5732 5067.8 742.1 
Rest capacity of incineration plants 40 254 1075 682.4 232.4 
Number of incineration plants in NL 40 7 11 10.3 1.4 
Incineration tariff in euros (2000) per ton 40 91.8 108.9 101.2 6.4 
Value added (VA) in mln euro 40 5254 108545 48281.6 32369.3 
Annual volume growth of VA in % 35 -3.7 10.4 3.7 3.2 
Annual deflation of VA in % 35 -4.8 10.3 2.5 3.0 
Employment in thousand men years 40 130.7 1672.0 792.9 507.5 
Number of firms 40 27,595 205,545 105,904.5 63,618.3 
Sources: AOO, CBS, RIVM. 
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Table 3.8 Results on the regressions of service sector waste per firm, share of recycled 
waste from the service sector, landfilled waste per firm, and incinerated 
household waste per firm. 
 Eq. (1)  Eq. (2)  Eq. (3)  Eq. (3)  
  
OLS 
 
RE 
 
RE 
 
RE 
  
 Waste 
supply 
 Recycled 
waste (share) 
 Landfilled 
waste 
 Incinerated 
waste 
 
Intercept 0.003 
 
0.088 
 
0.006 ** 0.002 * 
 (0.002)  (0.061)  (0)  (0)  
Value added per firm (x 1000)   -0.072  -0.026 * -0.016 * 
   (0.229)  (0.01)  (0.007)  
Employment per firm 0.931 * 0.414  -0.032  -0.020  
 (0.355)  (1.308)  (0.038)  (0.029)  
Price level of disposal costs 0.004  3.373 **     
 (0.015)  (0.612)      
Relative price of landfilling over 
incineration (x1000)       1.045 * 
       (0.48)  
Disposal capacity   -0.003      
   (0.007)      
Incineration capacity       0.003  
       (0.002)  
Landfill capacity     0.454 *   
     (0.195)    
1995   -0.029 ** 0.250  -0.034  
   (0.01)  (0.183)  (0.182)  
Period 2000-2002   0.006  0.136  0.166  
   (0.0101)  (0.154)  (0.151)  
Sector 130 0.002 **       
 (0)        
Sector 150 -0.006 *       
 (0.002)        
Sector 160 -0.006 **       
 (0.001)        
Sector 170 -0.010 **       
 (0.003)        
Adjusted R2 0.84     
  
  
  
  
  
R2 within   0.74 
 
0.64 
 
0.28 
 
N 5  5 
 
5 
 
5 
 
T 8  8 
 
8 
 
8 
 
K 7  7 
 
7 
 
7 
 
F( k-1,N-k) = 34.9  0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
F-test on fixed effects F(N-1,N-k) =    
 
 
 
 
 
Wald Chi2 (k-1)     94.1 ** 72.48 ** 23.19 ** 
** at 1% significance level, * at 5% significance level,and # at 10% significance level. 
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The ex-ante analysis presented in this chapter addresses the following research questions 
(introduced as questions 1e, 1f, 3a and 3b in Chapter 1): 
• What are the conditions that the waste market has to fulfil in order to apply the land-
fill tax as an effective instrument? 
• What is the desired or optimal rate of the waste tax in order to make the suppliers of 
waste choose alternative waste treatment options (incineration and recycling)? In par-
ticular, should the rate be differentiated according to certain aspects such as type of 
waste, treatment option and waste supplier? 
• What are the financial consequences (in the short and the long term) of landfill taxa-
tion, landfill bans and legal obligations (for landfills and incineration plants) to ac-
cept waste, both for the waste suppliers and the waste treatment companies? 
• Which instrument will (in the short and the long term) lead to the lowest costs of 
waste treatment for the waste suppliers? 
In order to answer these questions, a number of scenarios are specified. These scenarios 
differ in terms of landfill tax rate and in terms of other waste market features, such as in-
ternational trade in waste. The implications of each scenario are analyzed using a general 
equilibrium model. The model used is based on the model presented in Chapter 4 of 
Bartelings (2003). To evaluate the effectiveness of the landfill tax, production of waste 
by producers and international trade has been added to this model.  
Section 4.2 describes the model. In Section 4.3, the dataset, the scenarios and the results 
of the model simulations are presented. In Section 4.4, the same model is used to com-
pare the impact of a landfill tax to the impact of a ban on landfilling. Section 4.5 contains 
conclusions.  

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The model presented here is a general equilibrium model in the Negishi format. General 
equilibrium models are economy-wide models in the sense that they cover all major eco-
nomic transactions. The reason for modeling all relevant markets simultaneously is the 
existence of complex interactions in an economy. Partial models are based on the ceteris 
paribus condition, i.e. the remainder of the economy is assumed to be constant during 
policy simulations. As long as the ceteris paribus condition holds, partial models are 
fine, and the complications and data-requirements of general equilibrium models can be 
safely avoided. If, however, there are significant linkages between different markets, a 
partial analysis may lead to inaccurate and perhaps biased results due to the existence of 
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indirect effects18. In an extreme case, the indirect effects, as captured by general equilib-
rium models, may outweigh the direct effects, as captured by partial models. This can re-
sult in opposite policy recommendations (Thissen, 1998). 
General equilibrium models can be built in different formats, such as the Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) format, the Negishi format, the full format, and the open 
economy format. Each of these formats has its strengths and weaknesses (for more in-
formation see Ginsburgh and Keyzer, 1997). The model presented in this report is writ-
ten in the Negishi format, which is especially suitable for the implementation of exter-
nalities, such as environmental pollution and waste generation; and price rigidities, like a 
zero marginal price for waste collection. Note that a format is just a way to build a gen-
eral equilibrium model. The choice of a format does not influence the optimal solution, 
only the way of finding it. 
In this Chapter we will first present a general overview of the model. Then we will ex-
plicitly go into the model techniques concerning international trade in waste and flat fee 
pricing of waste collection. Finally we will present the complete model structure. 
(7	$
In a simplified economy, two types of actors are distinguished: households and firms. 
Households consume goods and supply capital and labour; firms produce goods with the 
use of capital, labour and intermediate goods. Consumers are differentiated into two 
types: private consumers and the government. Five different production sectors are dis-
tinguished, together producing thirteen unique goods. These sectors are: (1) an extraction 
sector producing virgin material; (2) a production sector producing eight types of ser-
vices and goods: ‘Wholesale market and auctions’, ‘Retail market’, ‘Repairment indus-
try’, ‘Hotel and Catering industry’, ‘transport services’, ‘Financial services’, ‘other ser-
vices’ and a sector producing all other goods in the economy called: ‘rest economy’; (3) 
a recycling sector producing recycling services; (4) a collection sector producing waste 
collection services and (5) a waste treatment sector producing incineration services and 
landfilling services. The hypothetical economy is shown in Figure 4.1.  
All firms use capital and labour, which are bought from the consumers, to produce mate-
rial goods or services. The production sector of consumption goods also uses virgin ma-
terial or recycled material. Consumption and production leads to waste generation. Pro-
ducers can recycle waste by investing more capital and labour in the production process. 
Waste that is generated has to be transported to an incineration plant or landfilling site.  
Consumption of services by private households leads to the generation of municipal 
solid waste. Waste must be either recycled or collected by the municipality. We differen-
tiate two types of municipalities in this model. One municipality charges a flat fee for 
waste collection; the other municipality charges a unit-based price for waste collection. 
Comparing the results for the two different types of municipalities will show how the ef-
fectiveness of a landfill tax is influenced by the pricing mechanism for waste collection. 
                                                   
18
  The indirect effects capture the interactions between different markets. Any change in one  
market can result in a change within another, which in turn can affect a change in the original 
market.  
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Figure 4.1 Representation of the economy. 
We assume that collected rest waste is not separated and recycled after collection, but is 
instead sent immediately to an incineration plant or landfill unit. We are primarily inter-
ested in the choice the consumer makes: the consumer can, for example, choose to sepa-
rate organic waste, paper, or glass from rest waste. The consumers will have to incur 
costs in order to separate or recycle these materials. Recycling will, for example, cost the 
consumer both time and storage space. This is modeled as if the consumer buys ‘recy-
cling services’. By buying recycling services, they generate recyclable waste; this waste 
is sent to a recycling unit where it is turned into recycled material. In the rest of this 
chapter we will use the term recycling for various activities the consumer can undertake 
to prevent rest waste: this includes waste separation in rest waste, glass, paper, and or-
ganic waste and composting.  
Consumers can prevent waste by recycling more or, to a lesser extent, by substituting 
waste extensive goods for waste intensive goods. In reality, consumers have the possibil-
ity of two kinds of substitution, namely substitution within a sector and substitution be-
tween sectors. Substitution within a sector makes it possible to choose between two 
products that are basically the same except for waste intensity. Substituting between sec-
tors would mean changing consumption patterns. For example, Linderhof et al (2001) 
show that households in Oostzaan not only bought more products containing less pack-
aging, an example of substitution within a sector, but also began to use diaper services 
instead of disposable diapers, an example of substitution between sectors after the intro-
duction of unit-based pricing. Waste prevention through substitution within a sector 
would add a certain degree of complexity to the model, as different products within the 
same sector and their associated 'waste intensity' would have to be explicitly modeled. 
We have chosen to include only the more straightforward channel of waste prevention 
through substitution between sectors. As a consequence, the possibility of waste preven-
tion may, therefore, be underestimated.  
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The available incineration capacity in the model will be limited. The total available in-
cineration capacity will be insufficient to fully treat all municipal and production waste. 
Firms and municipalities, however, will have the option of exporting combustible waste 
and waste to be landfilled. Thus the limitations of available capacity can be avoided and 
firms and municipalities will have the option to incinerate all their waste. Transporting 
costs and international prices of incineration will of course play a role in the decision 
whether or not to export waste. 
(",				
Most municipalities have chosen to charge a fixed amount of money for waste collec-
tion, the so-called flat fee. In a flat fee-pricing scheme, the amount of money paid for 
waste collection is independent of the quantity of waste actually generated. The per-
ceived price for waste collection, in economic terms the marginal perceived costs of 
generating waste, equals zero in such a case. If the price of a good equals zero the equi-
librium demand for that good can no longer be determined through the normal demand 
and supply functions. In the general equilibrium framework in particular, where it is as-
sumed that some equilibrium price will ensure that demand equals supply, the zero price 
poses a problem. To implement a zero price in a general equilibrium model, we thus re-
quire an indirect approach. It is possible to implement a zero perceived price by using 
subsidies that compensate households for the cost of waste generation.  
Households pay a fixed lump-sum transfer to the government for the collection of waste, 
based on the flat fee. This lump-sum transfer takes away part of the households’ income. 
Therefore, the total expenditure of the households declines. The expenditure pattern, i.e. 
the percentage of income the households spend on a certain product will, however, not 
be affected.  
In the model presented here, private households demand waste collection services and 
pay an equilibrium price for these services. To introduce the zero perceived price, the 
government reimburses these costs to the consumers in the form of a subsidy, which 
equals the equilibrium price for every unit of waste collection services exactly. Thus, the 
perceived price of waste collection for the households equals zero. If the revenue of the 
lump-sum transfer is lower than the amount spent on the subsidy, the government ex-
penditure decreases (in this case there is a net subsidy on waste generation). If the reve-
nue of the flat fee is higher than the total costs, government expenditure increases. The 
idea of the subsidy-cum-lump-sum transfer scheme is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
Section 4.2.6 shows how the subsidy-cum-tax scheme can be implemented in a general 
equilibrium model.  
((
The incineration capacity in the Netherlands is not sufficient to treat all combustible 
waste. This causes waste that could be incinerated to be landfilled. By opening the coun-
try borders for combustible waste the limits on incineration capacity are removed. Figure 
4.3 shows how international trade of combustible waste can be introduced in a general 
equilibrium model. 
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Figure 4.2  The subsidy-cum-tax scheme. 
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Figure 4.3 Export of waste. 
Another country will be added to the model. This country consists of a consumer, a pro-
duction sector, and an incineration plant. In this country consumers maximize utility by 
consuming the production goods just like in the original country. Country A will be an 
exporter of waste. This means that this country will import incineration services. The 
price of the imported incineration services is equal to the costs of producing these ser-
vices and the transport cost. In a general equilibrium analysis, it is essential that the trade 
balance restriction is fulfilled. This means that the value of exported goods must be equal 
to the value of imported goods. Therefore the values of the imported waste incineration 
services must be offset by the value of exporting goods. Of course the same specification 
can be used to open the borders for all types of waste, including waste to be landfilled. 
(*8	
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In the Negishi format, total welfare is maximized subject to utility, balance, and produc-
tion possibility constraints (Ginsburgh and Keyzer, 1997). The total welfare function is 
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shown in equation 1.1. Total welfare (TWF) equals the sum of weighted utilities (ui) over 
consumer i ( i=1,...,n).19  
,
( ) ( )i i i i g
i
TWF Max u xα α=   (4.1) 
Consumers derive utility from the consumption of goods provided by the service sector 
(xig) where g= ‘Wholesale market and auctions’, ‘Retail market’, ‘Repairment industry’, 
‘Hotel and Catering industry’, ‘Transport services’, ‘Financial services’, ‘Other services’ 
and ‘Rest economy’. The utility of each consumer is weighted by a factor αi, the so-
called Negishi weights20.  
Consumers generate waste by consuming products. Waste generation is dynamic; not all 
products will be transformed into waste immediately after consumption. Durable goods, 
for example, can continue to function properly for several years. If one looks at an infi-
nite time scheme, every good will turn into waste. At any point in time, however, only 
part of the products will be transformed into waste. To include this dynamic aspect in a 
comparative static model, waste is determined as a fraction β g of the consumption prod-
uct21. Total waste generation per consumer (Wi) is equal to a fixed percentage of total 
consumption. The fraction of waste contained in a product differs for the three types of 
consumption goods. Agricultural and industrial goods are relatively waste intensive and 
thus β will be positive for these goods; consumption of services does not generate waste 
and thus β is equal to zero in this case. The government only consumes the goods ‘rest 
economy’ and we assume that the government does not generate waste; therefore, in the 
following equation a subset c is used, which encompasses only the private households22. 
,c g c g
g
W xβ=  (4.2) 
All waste that is generated has to be dealt with. Private households can chose to either 
recycle the waste by demanding waste recycling services (xc,r) or to allow the waste to be 
collected by demanding waste collection services (xc,w).  
                                                   
19
  In the model application presented in the next Chapter we will distinguish only two consum-
ers and the government, the model structure however is such that it is easy to distinguish 
many more consumers. 
20
  In the Negishi format, the equilibrium solution is found with the help of an iterative process. 
Given initial values for the Negishi-weights based on the income of a consumer, the model is 
solved and prices for each commodity are calculated as shadow prices. Subsequently, the 
budget constraint for each consumer is checked. If one or more consumers in the model 
spend more or less than their income, the Negishi weight for that consumer is adjusted. The 
model is then solved again with the adjusted Negishi-weights. The process continues until the 
budget constraints of all consumers hold. See for more information Negishi (1972) or  
Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997).   
21
  Implicitly this means that part of the used material accumulates in a stock of durable goods. 
This stock is not constant, new materials enter the stock and other materials leave the stock as 
waste. Therefore, at any given moment in time the material inflow does not have to be equal 
to the material outflow in the model.  
22
  Because the focus of this reseach is on householdwaste and waste from the service sector, we 
decided to disregard the possibility of the government producing waste for the case of sim-
plicity. 
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, ,c c r c rW x x= +  (4.3) 
4		
All production sectors can use two primary production factors, namely capital (k) and la-
bour (l) and 5 intermediate inputs, namely ‘rest economy’ (re), virgin material (mv), re-
cycled material (mr), incineration services (wi) and landfilling services (wl). All produc-
ers generate commodities yj within their given production set Yj. The production set for 
the 7 consumption goods, is given by a nested Leontief-CES production function, which 
depends on the input of capital, labour, rest economy, virgin material, recycled material, 
and waste treatment services23. 
, ,{ ( , ; ( , ); },
   
( , ; )
 service sector, rest economy
), ;
,
kl is ls
j j j j
j j
v r vr
j j
is ls kl wt
j
CES CES k l CES w w
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σ
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=
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(4.4) 
Where A stands for the technology level. 
Producers can recycle waste by substituting capital and labour for waste collection ser-
vices. The costs of recycling is determined by the relative ease of substitution, that is the 
substitution elasticity kl,wt. 
The production set for the producer of recycled material is given by a nested CES-
function, which depends on the input of capital, labour, and recyclable waste: 
{ }( , ; ),                    j  ;klj j j j prrY A CES CES k l X for recycling servicesσ σ= =    (4.5) 
Where Xr is the total quantity of recyclable waste generated by the private households. 
The production set for the producer of collection services is indicated by a nested Leon-
tief-CES-function, which depends on the input of capital, labour, incineration services, 
and landfilling services: 
{ }( , ; ), (     j  , ; )klj j j j is ls ilj jY A min CES k l CES w for collection serviceswσ σ= =    (4.6) 
                                                   
23
  The notation z=CES(x,y;σ) reflects the following function:
( ) ( )1 1 1
z x y
σ
σ σ σ
σ σ
− −
− 
= +  
 
 If a 
good is produced with production factors that are completely complementary (), a  
Leontief production function can be used as a special case of the CES-production function. 
The standard notation for a Leontief production function is: z=min(x,y). A CES function can 
be nested. This means that, for example, the variable x in the equation above actually repre-
sents another function. In this chapter, several nested CES functions are used.  
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The production sets of all other production sectors are defined by CES-functions, which 
only depend on the input of capital and labour.  
0	9
As in any general equilibrium model, demand for commodities should be equal to the 
supply of these commodities. This is ensured by the following balance equations. First of 
all, total demand for consumption good g by consumer i and total demand for intermedi-
ate good g by producer j must not exceed the total supply (yg) of good g, where g is an 
index of the six goods produced by the service sector: ‘Wholesale market and auctions’, 
‘Retail market’, ‘Repairment industry’, ‘Hotel and Catering industry’, ‘Financial ser-
vices’, ‘other services’ and the sector ‘Rest economy’. The prices of the commodities 
can be determined from the balance equations by calculating the shadow price of the 
balance equation. In the following equations, this is symbolized by the ‘ ⊥ ’ and a price 
variable p. 
, ,
                   i g j g g g
i j
x x y p+ ≤ ⊥   (4.7) 
Total demand of all firms j for the intermediate goods: ‘virgin material’ (mjv), and ‘recy-
cled material’ (mjr), must not exceed total supply of these materials (y). Since virgin ma-
terials and recycled materials are intermediate goods only, i.e. not demanded by the con-
sumers, the only demand comes from firm j.  
                             
v
j v v
j
m y p≤ ⊥  (4.8) 
                             
r
j r r
j
m y p≤ ⊥  (4.9) 
Total demand for the services: ‘recycling services’ (xrs) and ‘waste collection services’ 
(xw) by consumer c must be equal to or less than the total supply of these services. 
,
                             c rs rs rs
c
x y p≤ ⊥  (4.10) 
,
                             c w w w
c
x y p≤ ⊥  (4.11) 
Total demand for the intermediate good: ‘waste treatment service’ (wj,d), where d is a 
subset of j including incineration and landfilling services, must be equal to or less than 
total supply of these waste treatment services. To use the waste treatment services, the 
waste has to be transported to the waste treatment plant. These transport costs are repre-
sented by the transport matrix (T).  
, ,
                             j d j d d d
j
w T y p≤ ⊥  (4.12) 
Total demand of primary factors must be equal to or less than total supply of these fac-
tors ( ,K L ). The total supply of capital and labour is equal to the sum of initial supply of 
capital and labour of each consumer. 
                         j í k
j i
k K p≤ ⊥   (4.13) 
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                           j i l
j i
l L p≤ ⊥   (4.14) 
Prices for all commodities are calculated as the marginal value of the associated balance 
equations. The consumer obtains income by selling production factors, capital, and la-
bour and spends his income on the six goods produced by the service sector, recycling 
services and waste collection services.  
Incineration capacity in the Netherlands is limited. There is not enough incineration ca-
pacity available to incinerate all municipal solid waste and all waste of the service sector. 
To simulate this, we will put an upper limit on the available capital for the incineration 
sector. 
is isk K≤  (4.15) 
If the demand for incineration services is higher than the maximum available supply, the 
price of incineration will rise above the marginal production costs. The incineration sec-
tor will in this case make a profit. This profit is divided over the consumers and increases 
the income of the consumers. 
The government derives its income from both a lump-sum transfer24 paid by the con-
sumers (LS). The government spends its income on the consumption of the ‘rest econ-
omy’ good. The value of government consumption is kept constant at its benchmark 
level. This means that the lump-sum transfer must be variable. If, for example, the in-
come of the government increases due to an increase of the landfill tax, consumers will 
be reimbursed by the government through a decrease in the lump-sum transfer.  
, , ,
,
g c g rs c rs w c w c k c l c c
g
g gov g c
g c
p x p x p x LS p K p L profit
p x LS
+ + + = + +
=

 
 
(4.16) 
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Up till now the model described has no distortions or imperfections. Thus the equilib-
rium solution will be first-best. In this Chapter we will show how the market distortion 
flat fee pricing can be introduced. Due to this distortion, the solution found by the model 
including the flat fee can only be a second-best equilibrium.  
To implement the subsidy-cum-tax scheme, as discussed in Section 4.2.3, a subsidy term 
is added to the objective function (equation 4.1)25. This subsidy term works like a benefit 
on the allocation of production output. Maximum social welfare now depends on the 
weighted utility of consumer i on the one hand and on the total benefits of the subsidy 
(ξxwXw) on the other, where Xw stands for the total quantity of waste generated and ξ 
stands for the subsidy wedge, which is the total amount of money spent on the subsidy 
                                                   
24
  A lump-sum transfer will only affect the income level of the consumer and thus the total ex-
penditure of that consumer. It will not result in a change of the consumption pattern of that 
consumer. 
25
  See Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997) for details on this procedure. 
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per unit of waste. In the same way a tax on landfilling of waste can be included by add-
ing a tax term (ξtlTL) to the welfare function (where TL is the total amount of waste land-
filled and ξtl stands for the tax wedge). 
,
,
( ) max ( )
0 ,   0,      0    ,       
xw tl
i i i g w
i
i g i i j
TWF u x X TL
x w r all i y all j
α α ξ ξ= + +
≥ ≥ ≥

 
(4.17) 
As shown by Ginsburgh and Keyzer, the only way to introduce subsidies and taxes in the 
Negishi format is by adding the subsidy/tax to the social welfare function. This is done 
solely to change the perceived price of waste collection. It does not imply that introduc-
ing subsidies would positively influence social welfare of a region. The social welfare 
calculated by this model is not comparable with the social welfare calculated by the 
model presented in Section 4.2.5. The presence of the subsidy in the welfare function is 
for technical reasons and specific to the Negishi format of the model. If the model were 
written in another format, the subsidy would not have been made explicit in the welfare 
function.  
The subsidy wedge (ξw) is defined as the difference between the equilibrium price for 
waste collection (pw) and the perceived price (pc,w). In the present case, the perceived 
price of waste collection equals zero, thus the subsidy wedge is equal to the equilibrium 
price of waste collection. The tax wedge (ξtl) is equal to the landfill tax26. 
The balance equation for waste collection services (equation 4.11) is rewritten as fol-
lows: 
                        w w wX y p≤ ⊥  (4.18) 
, ,
                   c w w c w
c
x X p≤ ⊥  (4.19) 
In equation 1.17 the shadow price of waste collection has been calculated. This price 
equals the marginal production costs. In equation 4.18, the shadow price of waste collec-
tion, as consumers perceive it, is calculated. This price equals the equilibrium price mi-
nus the subsidy27.  
The balance equation for the demand of landfilling services (equation 4.12) is similarly 
rewritten as: 
                                   ls lsTL y p≤ ⊥  (4.20) 
                                                   
26
  Just like the Negishi weights, finding the optimal subsidy and tax wedge is an iterative proc-
ess. For each run op the model the subsidy and tax wedge are updated according to the prices 
calculated in the previous run. Only if the budget constraint of each consumer holds will the 
equilibrium subsidy and tax wedge be found. 
27
  Note that mathematically speaking, the introduction of the total waste demand variable is ir-
relevant. 
,
c
c wwX x=  can be substituted in the balance equation in the equilibrium solution. 
The distinction of Xw, however, enables the separation of the equilibrium price for waste col-
lection and the perceived price. 
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,
                             
ls
j tax ls
j
w TL p≤ ⊥  (4.21) 
The new budget constraint for the private households is defined as follows: 
, , , ,
c cg c g rs c rs c w c w c c k l c
g
p x p x p x F LS p K p L profit+ + + + = + +      (4.22) 
Private households spend their income on the consumption of consumer goods, recycling 
services and collection services (bear in mind that pc,w is zero, so the costs of consump-
tion of waste collection services are equal to zero) and pay a flat fee (F) to the govern-
ment for the collection of waste.  
The new budget constraint of the government is defined as follows: 
,g gov g c c j
g c c j
p x S LS F TAX+ = + +        (4.23) 
The government spends its income on consumer goods and the subsidy costs (S). Since 
the government does not generate waste, it does not need to spend any income on the 
collection of waste. We assume that the government owns primary factors and earns in-
come both from selling these primary factors, benefits of the flat fee and income from 
the landfill tax (TAX). 
The size of the subsidy costs / tax benefits depends on the total amount spent on the sub-
sidy for waste collection / waste landfilled, which is calculated as follows:  
, ,
                 TAX=  xw lwc w j ls
c j
S x wξ ξ=    (4.24) 
The total transfer equals the subsidy wedge (ξ) multiplied by the total demand for waste 
collection services. The subsidy /tax wedge is calculated as follows: 
, ,
                 
xw lw
w c w ls tax lsp p p pξ ξ= − = −  (4.25) 
The subsidy wedge is equal to the real price of waste collection minus the perceived 
price of waste collection.  
(-)	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International trade is added by adding another country, which produces waste treatment 
services and a consumption good. In this simplified foreign country we distinguish 1 
consumer who consumes the consumption good ‘rest economy’. The social welfare func-
tion is now calculated by maximizing the sum of the utility of consumers i in country n. 
, , , ,
, , , ,
( ) max ( )
0 ,   0,      0  ,    ,       
xw tl
i n i n i g n w
i n
i g n i n i n j
TWF u x X TL
x w r all i n y all j
α α ξ ξ= + +
≥ ≥ ≥

 
(4.26) 
Countries can trade both incineration services and the consumption good ‘rest econ-
omy’28. The balance equation for these sectors changes to: 
                                                   
28
  In one of the scenarios presented in the next chapter, trade in landfill waste is also allowed. 
The model will be adjusted accordingly. 
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, , , , , ,
( )                            isj n j n is n z n is n is n
j
w T z T y p for each country n+ ≤ ⊥  (4.27) 
, , , , ,
( )                               i rest n rest n rest n rest n
i
x z y p for each country n+ ≤ ⊥
 
(4.28) 
Where z is the net trade, note that if z is negative the country is a net importer of that 
good and if z is positive the country is a net exporter of that good. The trade balance 
needs to be added to the model, which insures that the value of exported goods is equal 
to the value of imported goods. 
, ,
0                                  j n j n
j
p z for each country n=  (4.29) 
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The model presented in the previous Chapter is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
landfill tax in the Netherlands. We use data for the Netherlands from the year 2002 in 
this evaluation. The data is gathered from CBS and the waste management council 
(AOO). 
#$ 	$
	
The social accounting matrix of the economy is presented in Table 4.1. Supply or pro-
ducers’ output, capital and labour are given as positive values; demand or producer in-
puts and consumption are given as negative values29. To keep the model as simple as 
possible, government income is dependent on a lump-sum transfer instead of an income 
from taxes on labour and consumer goods. This has been added to the social accounting 
matrix.  
Since the service sector only makes up a small part of our total economy, it is unlikely 
that changes in demand for the intermediate good ‘rest economy’ and ‘virgin material’ 
will have a large impact on the price of these goods. Therefore we assume that the gov-
ernment consumes a large part of the good ‘rest economy’ and that a large part of the 
available virgin material is used in the production of the good ‘rest economy’. 
                                                   
29
 The entries in the column times the corresponding prices add up to zero to ensure that the zero 
profit condition holds: value of inputs equals value of outputs. The entries in the column of 
each consumer times the corresponding price add up to zero to ensure that the budget con-
straint holds: each consumer spends exactly its income on the consumption of goods and ser-
vices. The entries in each row times the corresponding prices add up to zero to ensure that 
each market clears: total demand for each commodity must equal total supply. In Table 4.1 
the rows and columns may not add up to zero exactly due to the rounding off of several num-
bers. 
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Waste generation 
In total, consumers and the service sector generated 6121 ktonne of rest waste in 2002. 
About 80% of the rest waste stream was incinerated, the rest landfilled. We assume that 
all waste collected separately is recycled. The service sector in total separated about 
1670 ktonne of waste. Municipalities collected 4439 ktonne of separated waste. 
Consumers are divided into 2 types. The first type lives in a municipality that charges a 
flat fee for the collection of waste, the second type lives in a municipality that charges a 
unit-based price for the collection of waste. The share between consumer 1 and con-
sumer 2 is determined based on the number of households living in ‘flat fee municipali-
ties’ and the number of households living in ‘unit-based pricing municipalities’. Data 
from AOO shows that consumers living in ‘unit-based pricing municipalities’ generate 
less rest waste and more recyclable waste than households living in ‘flat fee pricing mu-
nicipalities’.  
Consumers that pay a fixed amount of money for the collection of rest waste, the so-
called flat fee, face a zero marginal price for waste generation. This is modeled as if 
these consumers pay the equilibrium price for waste collection (0.357 million euro per 
ktonne) however, the government reimburses these costs to the consumers in the form of 
a subsidy, which is exactly equal to the equilibrium price for every unit of waste collec-
tion services. Thus, the marginal price of waste generation for the households equals 
zero. The consumers pay a total amount of 1343 million Euros for the collection of 
waste. On average, the fee paid by the consumers covers only 95% of the real costs 
(AOO, 2002a). This means that the real costs of waste collection and thus the amount 
spent on the subsidy on waste collection equals roughly 1414 million Euros. 
The two consumer types only differ in the price they face for the collection of waste. 
Their consumption preferences are exactly the same. 
Prices and landfill tax 
Data from AOO (2003) shows that the consumers would pay on average 357 euro per 
tonne of waste (0.357 million per ktonne), given a 100% cost-coverage rate. This price is 
shown in table 4.1 in the price column. Because prices of recycling and recycled material 
proved impossible to find we need to establish them with a kind of modeling trick. We 
know that consumer 2 faces a unit-based price for the collection of waste. If recycling 
would be a cheaper option than demanding collection services, it can be expected that 
this consumer would recycle more. Therefore we can assume in the benchmark case that 
the price of recycling and therefore also the price of recycled waste is the same as the 
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price of waste collection30. The prices of all other products have been normalized to 1, 
according to the Harberger convention31. 
 
                                                   
30
 Note that this deduction of recycling prices is only possible if we assume that consumers have 
full information and base their decision to recycle solely on differences in price level of 
waste collection and recycling.  
31
 Following standard practice, we adopted the Harberger convention in the benchmark data for 
all unknown prices. The Harberger convention consists of normalizing prices to unity. Quan-
tities in the benchmark data represent expenditures, or how much of that good or factor one 
can buy for €1. It should be noted that an Arrow-Debreu economy only depends upon rela-
tive prices. Doubling all prices doubles both money profits and income, which results in the 
same equilibrium outcome.  
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Table 4.1 Benchmark data input-output model (waste sectors in ktonne, other sectors in million euro). 
 Wholesale Retail Catering Repair-
ment 
Transport 
sector 
Financial Other Rest 
economy 
Virgin 
material 
Recycled 
material 
Recycling 
Services 
Collection 
waste 
Landfill Incin-
era-
tion 
Consumer 
1 
Consumer 
2 
Govern-
ment 
Price 
Wholesale sec-
tor 
18136 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -14872 -3264 0 1,000 
Retail sector 0 11010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -9028 -1982 0 1,000 
Catering sector 0 0 3679 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3017 -662 0 1,000 
Repairment sec-
tor 
0 0 0 5238 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4295 -943 0 1,000 
Transport sector 0 0 0 0 34376 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -28188 -6188 0 1,000 
Financial sector 0 0 0 0 0 32965 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -27032 -5934 0 1,000 
Other sector 0 0 0 0 0 0 5859 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4804 -1055 0 1,000 
Rest economy -77 -86 -47 -27 -34 -82 -77 10429 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -10000 1,000 
Virgin material 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -5000 5000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 
Recycled mate-
rial 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2642 0 2642 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 
Recycling Ser-
vices 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4439 0 0 0 -3464 -975 0 0,357 
Recycled waste 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4439 4439 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,357 
Collection waste 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4614 0 0 -3959 -654 0 0,357 
Landfill -131 -143 -109 -49 -53 -134 -160 0 0 0 0 -692 1470 0 0 0 0 0,049 
Incineration -205 -224 -171 -78 -84 -210 -251 0 0 0 0 -3922 0 5145 0 0 0 0,117 
Capital -2817 -2386 -715 -1636 -18730 -4585 -1060 -787 -4750 -266 -797 -447 -35 -546 32441 7137 0 1,000 
Labour -15199 -8490 -2879 -3559 -15593 -28253 -4668 -2000 -250 -791 -2373 -670 -43 -61 69536 15264 0 1,000 
Transport cost -3 -4 -3 -1 -1 -3 -4 0 0 0 0 -47 13 53 0 0 0 1,000 
Fee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1343 0 1343 1,000 
Subsidy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1414 0 -1414 1,000 
Tax -11 -11 -9 -4 -4 -11 -13 0 0 0 0 -46 0 0 0 0 118 1,000 
Lumpsum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -8161 -1791 9952 1,000 
Note:  ‘Fee’ is the flat fee consumers pay to the government for collection of waste, ‘Subsidy’ stands for the total amount of money the government 
gives for collection of waste as a subsidy to the consumers. ‘Lumpsum’ stands for a lumpsum transfer from the consumers to the government. 
The price column gives the prices of all commodities. 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 
 
52
 
Production 
Data about production costs of the seven service sectors is gathered from CBS (Statline). 
The value of production shown in table 4.1 is the value of production sold to households. 
Intermediate deliveries between service sectors are not taken into account in this model. The 
intermediate deliveries from the sector ‘rest economy’ can be seen as material inputs into 
the production. The total amount of waste generated by the sector is directly linked to the 
amount of material input into the production process. 
Recycling by the different service sectors is modeled as a substitution between capital and 
demand for waste treatment services. Recycled waste is directly reused by the production 
sector. Part of the benchmark capital demand is reserved for recycling. Table 4.2 shows the 
benchmark recycling data  
Table 4.2  Service sector recycling. 
Service sector Recycling (kton) 
Wholesale 333 
Retail 385 
Catering 137 
Repairment 111 
Transport sector 162 
Financial 376 
Other 274 
Transport costs and economies of scale 
The transport costs of transporting a tonne of waste to a waste treatment unit depends on the 
distance traveled. It is here assumed that a larger unit will be located further from the mu-
nicipality than a smaller unit. In Table 4.3 the transport distances are presented. These dis-
tances are based on the average distances from a municipality to an incinerator or a landfill 
site in the Netherlands (AOO, 2003d). 
Table 4.3  Transport distances. 
Size of waste treatment unit Distance from municipality (in km’s) 
Incinerator 40 
Landfill 35 
Substitution elasticities 
The amount of recycling by the service sector is determined by the substitution elasticity be-
tween capital and labour on the one hand and waste treatment services on the other hand. 
Based on information about the actual amount of waste recycled and the costs of waste 
treatment in the period 1995-2003, we estimated the substitution elasticities for the seven 
service sectors. These substitution elasticities are shown in table 4.4. Higher substitution 
elasticities mean that these sectors are more sensitive and responsive to price changes. For 
example the transport sector has increased waste separation and recycling relatively more 
than the catering sector over the past 10 years. Given the same price change of landfilling 
for these two sectors, we can conclude that the transport sector is somewhat more sensitive 
to price changes and therefore has a slightly larger substitution elasticity. 
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Table 4.4  Substitution elasticities. 
 substitution elasticity waste treatment/ recycling (σkl,wt) 
Wholesale sector 0.37 
Retail sector 0.38 
Catering sector 0.29 
Repairment sector 0.37 
Transport sector 0.43 
Financial sector 0.42 
Other sector 0.31 
Substitution elasticities between labour and capital for the different production sectors, be-
tween recycled material and virgin material, and between landfilling and incineration are 
given in Table 4.5. The production sectors use capital and labour as inputs for production. 
They can substitute between the use of capital and labour. Based on Draper and Manders 
(1996), we choose a substitution elasticity of 0.8. 
Table 4.5 Other substitution elasticities. 
 production sectors municipality 
Sub.elas. labour & capital (σkl) 0.8 0.8 
Sub.elas. recycled material &  virgin  
material (σvr) 
2  
Sub.elas. landfilling & incineration (σil) 2 2 
Limitation incineration capacity 
To simulate the limited capacity of incineration plants, we put an upper limit on the avail-
able capital for incineration. This upper limit on capital use is equal to 1.1 times the avail-
able capital in the benchmark data set. Due to longstanding contracts between municipali-
ties and incineration plants, we can safely assume that incineration plants will first treat 
municipal solid waste and will only treat waste from other sources if there is still capacity 
left. To simulate this, we will keep the price of incineration for municipalities equal to the 
benchmark level. The service sector will compete for the limited capacity that is left and 
price of incineration for the service sector will increase if the demand for these services in-
creases. 
(")	$	
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Based on the benchmark data described in the previous Chapter we will determine how ef-
fective the landfill tax is. We will vary the landfill tax from very low to very high and show 
how different variables are affected. We will look specifically at the variables: 
• Amount of waste landfilled; 
• Amount of waste incinerated; 
• Amount of waste recycled; 
• 
 Welfare economy (in terms of total consumption). 
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The effectiveness of the landfill tax will be influenced by several characteristics of the 
waste market. In three scenarios we will analyze how these characteristics influence the re-
sults by comparing these results to the benchmark scenario.  
,			
In the benchmark scenario we based the share of ‘flat fee municipalities’ and ‘unit-based 
pricing municipalities’ on the actual number of households living in ‘flat fee municipalities’ 
and ‘unit-based pricing municipalities’ in 2002. In this scenario we will vary this share from 
hardly no ‘flat fee municipalities’ to hardly no ‘unit-based pricing municipalities’ and ana-
lyze whether a changing landfill tax will affect the amount of recycled waste, landfilled 
waste and incinerated waste considerably compared to the benchmark scenario.  
"	  
In the third scenario we will introduce the possibility of international trade in combustible 
waste. By allowing export of combustible waste we will release the assumption of limited 
incineration capacity and we will analyze whether the behavior of the service sector is no-
ticeably different if they have the option of increasing the amount of waste they incinerate. 
In this scenario we will assume that the amount of waste exported is not sufficient to change 
the price in the importing country32.  
( $	   
In the fourth scenario we will also allow the possibility of international trade in waste to be 
landfilled. In contrast to the previous scenario we will assume that the export of waste is 
large enough to change prices of incineration and more importantly landfilling in the im-
porting country. 
("";$6 	$
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By using the ex-ante model we will try to predict how industries and households react to a 
raise of the landfill tax. Therefore, we will vary the landfill tax from a very low level to a 
very high level and we will analyze how much waste will be landfilled, incinerated, and re-
cycled.  
In the ex-ante model, we do not take into account the external cost of waste treatment. 
Therefore, the introduction of a landfill tax will always result in a lower social welfare 
(measured in total utility from consumption) since a landfill tax will raise prices of produc-
tion goods and services. We will compare the benefits of a landfill tax, measured in tonnes 
of waste recycled or incinerated instead of landfilled, against the social costs of the landfill 
tax measured in loss of consumption. 
Figure 4.4 shows how the total amount of waste landfilled or incinerated is affected by the 
landfill tax rate. The marginal benefits of the landfill tax are especially high in the begin-
ning. Going from a low landfill tax rate to a slightly higher one results in a big decrease in 
                                                   
32
  Note that this scenario is basically the same as introducing sufficient incineration capacity. 
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waste landfilled. The amount of waste incinerated does not increase as much as the amount 
of waste landfilled decreases, indicating that households and industries do increase recy-
cling. The current tax rate on landfilling (2005) amounts to 84.78 Euro per tonne. Due to the 
limited capacity of incineration plants, incineration can not increase after a certain level. 
Given a landfill tax of about 100 euro a ton, the complete incineration capacity is filled and 
therefore incineration can not increase anymore. 
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Figure 4.4  Waste treatment and the landfill tax. 
Figure 4.5 shows the amount of waste treated for households and industries individually. 
The difference between household behavior and industries is quite noticeable. Municipali-
ties, who collect household waste, switch from landfilling to incineration. If the landfill tax 
is very high, almost all household waste will be incinerated. The service sector also increase 
incineration and decreases the amount of waste landfilled. However, figure 4.5 shows that 
the amount of waste landfilled increases again when the tax rises above 100 euro per ton. 
This is caused by the limited capacity of incineration plants. Municipalities offer such a 
large quantity of waste to the incineration plants that the remaining capacity is to small to 
incinerate all the waste offered to it by the service sector. As a result, the service sector is 
forced to start landfilling the waste again. 
Since industries hardly have the option of switching to incinerating waste instead of land-
filling, due to the restriction put upon the available incineration capacity, it can be expected 
that industries will start to recycle more waste. The amount of waste recycled by the indi-
vidual industries in the model is shown in Figure 4.6. Especially the sector ‘transport sector’ 
increases recycling a lot.  
Figure 4.6 also shows that the service sector especially increases recycling when the landfill 
tax rises above 100 euro per ton. As explained above, this is due to the limited capacity of 
incineration plants, making it very costly to incinerate service sector waste.  
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Figure 4.7 shows the amount of waste generated and the amount of waste recycled in mu-
nicipalities. We distinguish between municipalities that introduced unit-based pricing for 
waste collection and municipalities that still ask a flat fee for waste collection. 
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Figure 4.5  Landfilling and incineration of household waste and waste from industries. 
In the municipalities that introduced a unit-based pricing system for waste collection, we 
see that households are affected by a higher landfill tax. Since the price they pay for waste 
collection will increase due to the higher landfill tax, they will increase their recycling ef-
forts. Households living in a municipality that charges a flat fee for waste collection are not 
affected by the landfill tax.  
Please note that we assume a benchmark level of recycling in both types of households. 
Data shows that households do recycle some of their waste independent of the costs of 
waste collection. It is clear that other concerns like environmental responsibility play a role 
in the decision whether or not a household will recycle. Recycling levels in a unit-based 
price municipality are generally higher than recycling levels in a flat fee municipality. Only 
if the landfill tax is between 0-20 euro per tonne, will the price incentive be so small that the 
recycling levels of both municipalities are comparable. 
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Figure 4.6  Recycling by different industries(index current tax=100). 
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Figure 4.7  Waste generation and recycling in municipalities (index current tax=100.). 
Figure 4.8 shows the loss of welfare due to the introduction of a landfill tax. The higher the 
landfill tax, the higher the loss of welfare in society.  
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Figure 4.8  Social welfare and the landfill tax (index current tax=100). 
Finally we make an analysis of the impact of the landfill tax. In order to compare the de-
crease in waste landfilled to the decrease in welfare, we divide the marginal decrease in 
waste landfilled by the marginal decrease in welfare of society due to an increase in the 
landfill tax. The impact is shown in Figure 4.9. 
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Figure 4.9  Impact of the landfill tax. 
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Going from a low to a slightly higher tax has a large impact on the amount of waste land-
filled but not such a large impact on the welfare of the society (measured in consumption). 
However this impact rapidly decreases as the landfill tax increases. There is a discontinuity 
in the impact function around a landfill tax of 100 euro/ton. This is caused by the limited in-
cineration capacity. Around a landfill tax of 100 euro per tonne all available incineration 
capacity is used and therefore the landfill tax cannot induce the service sector to substitute 
landfilling for incineration. 
("(;$$	
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In the second scenario we will investigate how the flat fee pricing scheme for collection of 
municipal solid waste influences the effectiveness of the landfill tax. In Section 4.3.3 we 
showed that households living in a municipality that charges a flat fee for the collection of 
waste, are not affected by the landfill tax. They will not increase recycling or waste separa-
tion because there is no direct link between waste generation and the costs of waste collec-
tion. Municipalities themselves, however, are affected by the landfill tax regardless of the 
price they charge for the collection of municipal solid waste. They will increase the quantity 
of waste incinerated and decrease the quantity of waste landfilled due to a raise in the land-
fill tax.  
In this scenario we will compare two situations:  
1. Full unit-based price: All municipalities charge a unit-based price for waste collection; 
2. Partial unit-based price: 18% of the municipalities charge a unit-based price for waste 
collection, this is similar to the benchmark scenario as presented in the previous Chap-
ter. 
In Figure 4.10 we show the effect that a raise in the landfill tax will have on the total 
amount of municipal solid waste recycled. We only show in this figure how the quantity of 
waste recycled will increase if the landfill tax is raised from its present value (of about 80 
euro). In Figure 4.10 we will compare the total amounts of waste recycled and waste offered 
as rest waste in the benchmark scenario (partial unit-base price) to the amounts of waste re-
cycled and offered as rest waste in the new scenario (full unit-based price).  
In the full unit-based pricing scenario, more waste is recycled. However, in both cases the 
increase in recycling is not very large. If we go from a landfill tax rate of about 80 euro to a 
rate of 300 euro, the quantity of waste recycled will increase with about 4% in the full unit-
based price scenario and with about 2% in the partial unit-based pricing scenario. 
	"	  
In the third scenario we will show how the limited capacity of incineration plants influences 
the effectiveness of the landfill tax. By allowing export of combustible waste to Germany, 
we can increase the incineration capacity. Incineration prices in Germany vary between 66 
and 340 euro per tonne of waste (Landtag von Baden-Württemberg, 2002). In this scenario 
we will not include export of combustible waste to Belgium as there is no capacity available 
for foreign waste. In the next scenario we will allow some export of waste to Belgium. 
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Figure 4.10  Recycling and rest waste in scenario 1: effect of unit-based pricing. 
Note: recycling and waste production in the partial unit-based price are similar to the  
benchmark scenario. 
Considering the large range of incineration prices in Germany, it is difficult to determine 
just what the average price of incineration of foreign waste in Germany would be. We will 
assume in this scenario that incineration on average is priced the same in Germany as in the 
Netherlands. The only price difference is caused by the transportation costs to the incinera-
tion plant. This of course is probably not completely realistic: if the price of incineration in 
Germany is higher than the price of incineration in The Netherlands we may overestimate 
the effects of opening the borders for combustible waste somewhat. However, the trend that 
we will show in the results in the next paragraph will not change. It only may take a slightly 
higher landfill tax to stimulate firms to export their waste instead of landfilling it. The dif-
ferences in waste landfilled, incinerated, or recycled between the scenario where export is 
allowed and the benchmark scenario where export is not allowed is shown in Figure 4.11.  
Due to the possibility of export of combustible waste we see that far more waste is inciner-
ated. Landfilling decreases with nearly 80% if the landfill tax is increased to 300 euro. In 
contrast, if export is not allowed, landfilling hardly decreases due to the limited capacity of 
incineration plants. However, the option of export influences not only the choice between 
incineration and landfilling but also the choice between incineration and recycling. Since 
incineration becomes more readily available, we see that recycling declines a bit. Without 
export, the service sector will increase recycling with about 18% if the landfill tax is in-
creased to 300 euro. With the possibility of export, recycling increases with about 11% 
given a landfill tax of 300 euro. 
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Figure 4.11 Impact of export of combustible waste: results for the Service sector. 
Note: the results for recycling and incineration in the no export scenario are similar to the benchmark 
   scenario. 
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Figure 4.12 Impact of export of combustible waste: results for the Service sector compared 
to the results of the households (index current tax=100). 
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Figure 4.13 shows that all our landfill waste will be exported when the price of landfilling 
including the landfill tax exceeds the price of landfilling in Belgium and Germany. Since 
landfilling in either Belgium and Germany is less expensive than incineration in the Nether-
lands (even given transportation costs) there will be no substitution between landfilling and 
incineration anymore. The service sector will also not increase their recycling efforts any-
more as shown in Figure 4.14.  
Landfilling in Belgium is less expensive than landfilling in Germany. However, the capacity 
of the landfill sites in Belgium is limited. Therefore only part of the waste is exported to 
Belgium. The rest is exported to the more expensive landfill sites in Germany. 
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Figure 4.13 Results scenario 4: export of waste to be landfilled. 
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In 1995, the government in the Netherlands introduced a landfill ban, quickly followed by a 
landfill tax. In principle, the landfill ban means that it is prohibited to landfill recyclable or 
combustible waste in the Netherlands. Only if waste cannot be reused and the capacity to 
incinerate the waste is not sufficient, it is allowed to landfill recyclable and combustible 
waste. Up to 2002, due to the lack of capacity of waste incineration plants, industries and 
municipalities could relatively easily obtain exemptions from the landfill ban, especially in 
the early years following the introduction of the landfill ban. In 2002, there was a noticeable 
decrease in the amount of combustible waste landfilled, as can be seen in figure 4.15. Espe-
cially municipalities greatly decreased the amount of waste landfilled. 
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Figure 4.14 Results scenario 4: impact of waste export on recycling of waste from the ser-
vice sector. 
Economic theory favours the use of ‘positive’ policies, like taxation instead of ‘negative’ 
ones, like bans. By internalizing the external costs of landfilling in the price of landfilling 
through taxation, actors in the economy can make an informed choice whether they want to 
recycle, landfill, or incinerate their waste. A landfill ban, however, forces actors to recycle 
or incinerate all their waste regardless of whether this situation is optimal (in terms of least 
costs) or not. This suggests that a ban on landfilling can only be optimal if the government 
is sure that the optimal level of landfilling is equal to zero and recycling and incineration 
capacity is large enough to treat all the waste that would usually be landfilled. 
In this Chapter we will discuss the effectiveness of the landfill ban as compared to the land-
fill tax. By introducing a landfill ban in the ex-ante model, we can compare the social costs 
of a landfill ban as opposed to the social costs of a landfill tax.  
Within a general equilibrium framework, the introduction of a landfill ban is similar to set-
ting a landfill tax that is so high that the total demand for landfilling declines to zero. We 
use the same model as described in Section 4.2. To analyze whether a tax or a ban is more 
cost-effective, we need to assume that the incineration capacity is large enough to incinerate 
all waste. If we would not make this assumption, the ban could not be effective because 
some combustible waste would need to be landfilled due to capacity constraints. Figure 4.16 
shows how large the production loss will be if sectors have to recycle and / or incinerate all 
their waste.  
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Figure 4.15  Landfilling of combustible waste in the Netherlands in the period 200-2004. 
(Source: AOO). 
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Figure 4.16  Production loss due to a positive landfill tax or landfill ban. 
If the landfill tax equals about 750 euro per ton, almost none of the waste generated will be 
landfilled (which is effectively a landfill ban)33. To reduce landfilling to zero, the service 
sector will have to incur considerable costs. The production loss for example is equal to 
                                                   
33
  With a CES aggregation function it is not possible to reduce landfilling completely to zero. 
However the amount of landfilling is so low, it can be discounted.  
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around 1300 million euro in this case. Figure 4.16 shows that reducing the amount of waste 
landfilled to zero is quite inefficient. Reducing the amount of waste landfilled by about 90% 
costs about 600 million euro in production loss, while reducing the amount of waste land-
filled by 100% costs about 1,300 million euro in production loss.  
It is clear that in our model the landfill tax is more effective. A landfill tax of about 80 euro 
reduces landfilling of waste with about 66% against a relatively slight production loss. Sec-
tors that have relatively high costs of recycling will be able to landfill some of their waste, 
sectors that can recycle waste relatively cheap will hardly landfill waste. 
In Chapter 5 we will also show that the external costs of landfilling are less than the exter-
nal costs of incineration. Recycling and reuse are also not without costs to the environment. 
The optimal level of landfilling may therefore not be equal to zero. A landfill tax can be 
used to reach the optimal amount of landfilling. The landfill ban strictly enforced will not be 
able to reach this optimal level of landfilling. 
"
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The results of the benchmark scenario show that a landfill tax has a significant effect on the 
amount of waste landfilled. The higher the landfill tax the more waste will be recycled or 
incinerated. The model predicts that municipalities will start to incinerate all their waste if 
the landfill tax becomes too high. Only in municipalities that charge a unit-based price for 
waste collection will the behavior of households be influenced. In these municipalities, 
households directly notice the effects of the landfill tax by an increase in the price for waste 
collection and thus will start to recycle more waste. In municipalities that charge a flat fee 
for waste collection, the model shows that households will not have an incentive to recycle 
more waste. Recycling efforts, however, are low regardless of the pricing system for waste 
collection. It is important to remember that the increase in the landfill tax will only provide 
a small price incentive to recycle. Most of the municipal solid waste is already incinerated 
so the price increase of waste collection due to the landfill tax will be slight.  
The service sectors, in contrast to the municipalities, choose (according to the model calcu-
lations) to recycle more waste. Some sectors slightly increase their demand for waste incin-
eration services but the biggest difference in the service sectors is the amount of waste that 
is recycled. This is mostly caused by the fact that, similar to the Dutch situation, the incin-
eration capacity in the model is too low to accept both an increased amount of municipal 
solid waste and an increased amount of service waste. If export of combustible waste is al-
lowed, then the service sector will also increase the amount of waste they incinerate. Export 
of combustible waste will slightly reduce the recycling effort of the service sector.  
The model shows that while export of combustible waste will only stimulate producers to 
incinerate more waste, export of waste to be landfilled has more far reaching effects. If the 
price of landfilling (including the landfill tax) in the Netherlands exceeds the price of land-
filling in the neighbouring countries, the model calculates that all landfill waste will be ex-
ported. As a consequence, producers will no longer have a price incentive to recycle or in-
cinerate waste. Thus the landfill tax will no longer be effective. 
An increase in the landfill tax will decrease the welfare of our society, measured in terms of 
consumption. The question remains how large a decrease in welfare is acceptable. The im-
pact analysis shows a relatively large decrease in waste landfilled combined with a rela-
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tively low decrease in welfare if the landfill tax is increased from a low level to a slightly 
higher level. If the landfill tax is higher (for example higher than 100 euro per tonne) the 
decrease of waste landfilled is much lower compared to the loss of welfare. 
A landfill ban can also be used to reduce the amount of waste landfilled. The model shows 
that compared to the landfill tax, the ban is not nearly as cost-effective. To reduce landfill-
ing to zero may involve higher costs than would be socially optimal. Besides, the optimal 
level of landfilling may not be equal to zero. A landfill tax can be used to reach the optimal 
amount of landfilling. The landfill ban strictly enforced will not be able to reach this opti-
mal level of landfilling. 
Returning to the research questions that had to be answered by the ex-ante analysis, we can 
conclude as follows: 
• What are the conditions that the waste market has to fulfill in order to apply the landfill 
tax as an effective instrument? 
The analysis suggests a number of important conditions. There should be no restrictions on 
the availability of incineration capacity (both within The Netherlands and abroad). The lim-
ited capacity of incineration plants poses a barrier to the effectiveness of the landfill tax be-
cause it limits the options producers have to get rid of their waste. Producers cannot in-
crease incineration and therefore only have the option of recycling more waste (which may 
be a more expensive option). Allowing export of combustible waste and thus effectively 
solving the capacity problems increases the effectiveness of the landfill tax, assuming that 
there is sufficient capacity available in neighbouring countries. Flat fee pricing of waste col-
lection also influences the effectiveness of the landfill tax. Households will not increase 
their recycling efforts if they do not ‘feel’ the higher cost of landfilling. However, even in 
municipalities that ask a unit-based price for waste collection the increase in recycling effort 
is slight. Therefore in this case one can question whether it is necessary to introduce unit-
based pricing as the costs of introducing such as system may be higher than the benefits 
provided by higher recycling efforts. Finally, allowing waste export to be landfilled abroad 
will restrict the effectiveness of the landfill tax if this effectiveness is measured in terms of 
‘the reduction in the total amount of waste landfilled’. However, if effectiveness is meas-
ured in terms of ‘the reduction of the amount of waste landfilled in the Netherlands’, allow-
ing waste export for landfilling in other countries would turn the landfill tax into a very ef-
fective instrument. 
• What is the desired or optimal rate of the waste tax in order to make the suppliers of 
waste choose alternative waste treatment options (incineration and recycling)? In par-
ticular, should the rate be differentiated according to certain aspects such as type of 
waste, treatment option and waste supplier? 
At the present landfill tax rate of more than € 80 per tonne it is already attractive for a lot of 
waste suppliers to turn to alternatives. However, due to other restrictions (such as a lack of 
incineration capacity or a ban on the export of waste) they may be forced to landfill their 
waste anyway. In the absence of such restrictions, higher levels of the landfill tax rate 
would lead to less landfilling, but at the expense of relatively high social costs. The analysis 
in this chapter does not allow us to draw conclusions on the impact of a differentiation of 
the tax rate by type of waste, treatment option or waste supplier. However, economic theory 
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tells us that any differentiation should only be based upon differences in external costs of 
the waste and the treatment option (see Chapter 5), and not on the type of waste supplier.  
• What are the financial consequences (in the short and the long term) of landfill taxation, 
landfill bans and legal obligations (for landfills and incineration plants) to accept waste, 
both for the waste suppliers and the waste treatment companies? 
In economic terms, a landfill ban is similar to a prohibitively high landfill tax rate (about € 
750 per tonne). Our analysis shows that the social costs of reducing the amount of landfilled 
waste to zero would be very high. Reducing the amount of landfilled waste (from the ser-
vice sector) by about 90% costs about 600 million euro in production loss, while reducing it 
by 100% costs about 1,300 million euro in production loss. A similar calculation could not 
be made for the case of legal obligations to accept waste, but it is obvious that such an obli-
gation would also imply welfare losses (assuming that it would force waste treatment com-
panies to undertake unprofitable operations). 
• Which instrument will (in the short and the long term) lead to the lowest costs of waste 
treatment for the waste suppliers? 
A well-designed system of environmental taxes34 will minimize the total social costs of 
waste treatment, provided that there are no market distortions. This means that waste sup-
pliers should have the opportunity to choose between alternative treatment options (domes-
tically or abroad) and that the tax rates reflect the external costs of the treatment option 
(landfilling as well as incineration). The latter issue is the subject of the next chapter. 
 
                                                   
34
  Alternatively, tradable landfill permits could be considered. This instrument, which is already 
applied in the UK, combines the efficiency advantages of a tax with the certainty of a cap on the 
total amount of landfilled waste. 
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In economics, environmental and social effects are generally defined as external effects. 
An external effect, or externality, is said to exist if an economic agent’s decision has an 
influence on another agent’s well-being or production possibilities and the former does 
not (properly) take these effects into account. The classic example of an external effect is 
that of an upstream factory polluting a river that has a negative impact on catches in a 
downstream fishery. A (negative) externality exists if, in deciding upon how it will pro-
duce and consequently how much pollutant it will emit to the river, the upstream factory 
does not take this effect into account. 
Because of its unwanted nature, solid waste is often considered an externality. The extent 
to which solid waste actually is an externality depends, however, on the method by 
which it is processed. Clearly, if waste is littered or illegally dumped, the externality will 
be substantially larger than if the waste is recycled or re-used in a sustainable manner. 
Policy makers generally use the level of externalities to determine the preferred ranking 
of waste management options. In the Netherlands, landfilling is considered an environ-
mentally less-favourable option than incineration. Whether the level of externalities of 
landfilling exceeds those of incineration in the Netherlands is unclear, however.  
The present chapter addresses the following research questions (questions 2a through 2c 
as formulated in Chapter 1): 
• 
 What are the social costs and benefits of the following treatment options for house-
hold waste and comparable waste from firms: 
• Landfilling all waste; 
• The present situation; 
• Terminating the landfilling of combustible waste by shifting it to waste incinera-
tion; 
• Terminating the landfilling of combustible waste by shifting it to co-incineration 
(in power plants); 
• Terminating the landfilling of combustible waste by optimizing/maximizing  
recycling. 
• To what extent can the current level of the Dutch landfill tax rate be regarded as an 
internalisation of the environmental costs of landfilling? 
• From a social cost-benefit perspective, what is the optimum way of waste treatment 
for household waste and comparable waste from firms? 
The main objective of this component of the study is therefore to determine the level of 
externalities of waste incineration (including co-incineration) and landfilling in the 
Netherlands. This objective serves two purposes. First, it allows Dutch policy makers to 
test the premise that landfilling is less desirable than incineration, as is assumed by the 
waste hierarchy. Second, because the externalities are expressed in monetary terms, the 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 
 
70 
 
analysis allows for the comparison of the the total social costs of landfilling and incin-
eration, being the sums of private and external costs. Such a comparison facilitates Dutch 
policy makers in designing waste management policies, taking into account economic, 
environmental, as well as social effects. 
Externalities are converted into economic effects using the method of ‘economic valua-
tion’. In the context of waste management, the foundations of this method are strongly 
based on the impact pathway approach (COWI, 2000). This approach proceeds sequen-
tially through the lifecycle or pathway of an economic process, linking impacts to bur-
dens, and subsequently valuing these impacts economically.  
It should be emphasised that the results are associated with considerable uncertainty. 
Therefore, the outcome should be treated with great caution. These uncertainties result 
from necessary assumptions that underlie many of the calculations. Also, certain effects 
have been excluded from the analysis, due to the lack of data. We do confirm, however, 
that the most important effects have been included in the study. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2 , the main external effects, as well as 
the methods available to value these external effects are explained. In Section 5.3 and 
5.4, the actual external effects for landfilling and incineration are derived. Section 5.5 
compares the external costs estimates of this study with foreign estimates and also com-
pares the total social costs of landfilling and incineration. Section 5.6 addresses co-
incineration. Conclusions are presented in Section 5.7. 
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In this study, economic valuation is adopted as the method to quantify the waste-related 
externalities. The main reason to express external effects in monetary values is that it al-
lows for the comparison between private costs of various waste management options and 
the environmental and social costs and benefits related to these options. In this approach, 
the change in well-being is the basis for valuing external effects. Welfare is expressed in 
terms of social costs. Social costs are those costs borne by all households and firms in an 
economy, that is, the private (internal) costs and the external costs of an activity. If an 
externality is present, the marginal private costs and the marginal social costs of an eco-
nomic activity do not coincide. This results in an inefficient allocation of resources. A 
condition for an efficient (optimal) allocation of resources in an economy is that the 
marginal social costs of an activity equal its marginal social benefits. 
As mentioned, economic valuation assigns a monetary value to a good or service. One 
monetary measure of economic value is the Willingness-to-Pay (WTP), which is defined 
as the maximum amount of money a person is willing to pay to obtain a good or service. 
An individual’s WTP for a good is a reflection of his preferences for this good relative to 
other goods. An alternative measure of economic value is the Willingness-to-Accept 
(WTA). WTA is defined as the minimum amount of money an individual requires as 
compensation in order to forego a good or service. In practice, researchers have encoun-
tered serious difficulties in estimating the WTA for the loss of some environmental good 
(Bateman and Turner 1992). Therefore, WTP is most common in valuation studies. 
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Ideally, economic valuation forms an integral part of the overall environmental assess-
ment. An example of such a step-wise approach is the ‘impact pathway approach’ 
(COWI, 2000). Figure 5.1 illustrates the overall procedure of the impact pathway ap-
proach. First, overall emission levels and other external effects are determined in physi-
cal terms. Then, the impacts of these effects on economic activities and human well-
being are assessed.  Next, these impacts are translated into monetary values.  
An advantage of this approach is that it enables the comparison of the benefits of some 
environmental improvement with the costs to realise such an improvement. Since many 
studies have applied valuation methods, standard values can be derived for most pollut-
ants or impacts. These allow translating emissions directly into costs bypassing the 
elaborate impact pathway approach. A disadvantage of this approach is that the complex-
ity of economic valuation often leads to high degrees of uncertainty of the final results. 
Moreover, attaching monetary values to, for example for human health, is a politically 
sensitive issue. 
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Figure 5.1 Economic valuation and the impact pathway approach. 
The valuation of external effects encounters various problems. First, because external ef-
fects, by definition, occur outside the market, market values for these effects are gener-
ally absent. Therefore, special techniques are required for the estimation of external val-
ues. Second, external effects of recycling-related processes occur at various locations. It 
is impossible to value these effects at each individual location. Therefore, estimated val-
ues need to be transferred to other locations. In the following, valuation and transfer 
techniques are explained in more detail. 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 
 
72 
 
<	$9
For the valuation of external effects, various techniques exist. Some values can be di-
rectly based on market values. For example, if emissions of air pollutants from a coal 
fired electricity plant adversely affect agricultural yields in the region, the values of 
foregone crop losses can serve as a measure of the environmental damage of the electric-
ity plant. Other values can be indirectly valued on the basis of market prices for surro-
gate products or services. For example, deforestation may lead to a shortage of fuel 
wood. The alternative fuels, which may need to be imported, may again represent the ex-
ternal environmental costs of deforestation.  
In both examples, market prices are directly or indirectly indicative for the external ef-
fect. For most external values, however, market values do not exist. The techniques for 
the valuation of these non-market effects are generally classified into methods that are 
derived from ‘stated preferences’ and values that are based on ‘revealed preferences’ 
(Freeman 1993). Revealed preference methods calculate external costs and benefits indi-
rectly by using the relationships between environmental goods and expenditures on mar-
ket goods. This category includes, for example, the hedonic pricing method (HPM), and 
the averting behaviour method (ABM). Stated preference methods ask the individuals 
their WTP for the environmental good directly by using structured questionnaires. The 
contingent valuation method (CVM) is the most important technique belonging to this 
category. Because of their relevance for waste related externalities, HPM, ABM and 
CVM are explained in more detail. 
The idea underlying the HPM is that the price of a good is a function of its attributes, in-
cluding environmental attributes (Palmquist 1991). The HPM has been used to analyse 
house prices. House prices are seen as a function of characteristics of the house itself 
(e.g. number of rooms, heating system), neighbourhood characteristics (e.g. proximity to 
schools and shops), and also environmental variables such as ambient air quality, or its 
proximity to a forest. The HPM proceeds by estimating a so-called hedonic price func-
tion by regressing house-price on the relevant characteristics. In the simplest form of the 
method, a measure of the value of an environmental characteristic of interest can be de-
duced by differentiating the hedonic price function with respect to the characteristics of 
interest. If, for example, a landfill causes odour problems in the surrounding neighbour-
hood, the value of this external cost can be measured by the HPM by statistically isolat-
ing the price differential that is due to the nuisance caused by the odour.  
ABM values environmental quality by looking at the expenditure people make for goods 
that can substitute for a decrease in environmental quality. For example, expenditures on 
bottled water can give an indication of the WTP of people for preventing the adverse 
health effects from using polluted water. There are numerous problems with this method 
and in most cases the expenditures on substitute goods will underestimate the true value 
of a decrease in environmental quality.  
The CVM estimates the WTP for a change in the quantity and/or quality of an environ-
mental good by using survey techniques (Mitchell and Carson 1989, Hoevenagel 1994). 
In a questionnaire a hypothetical change is described and the respondent is asked directly 
for his or her WTP for this change. Valuation questions are usually supplemented by 
questions on socio-economic characteristics and relevant attitudes and preferences re-
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garding the good in question. This information is used to estimate a valuation function 
which ‘explains’ WTP as a function of these variables. The valuation function can be 
used for validity checks (for example, testing whether WTP is positively related with in-
come, as theory would predict) and for correcting average WTP in the case of certain re-
sponse biases (for example, an overrepresentation of high income groups).  
In this study, external values generated through various techniques are used. For material 
and crop damage market prices and ABM values are applied. HPM is used to determine 
the disamenity value of incineration and landfilling. Values related to human health are 
mainly derived through CVM. Costs and benefits of global warming, which are gener-
ally determined through extensive climate change impact models, use a mixture of the 
above methods. 
0
Because it is practically impossible to estimate each exposure-response relationship or 
value at the respective time and place of a particular externality, using data from previ-
ous studies focusing on a different region or time period is inevitable. Therefore it is im-
portant to know when data from other studies can be used and under what conditions. 
For the transfer of monetary values, this practice is known as ‘benefit transfer’ (Navrud 
1994). 
Two approaches to benefit transfer can be taken (Bergland et al. 1995). The first is trans-
ferring corrected mean unit values. For example, suppose that a study undertaken in the 
USA has estimated that the mean unit valuation of an extra asthma attack from increased 
concentrations of ground-level ozone is US$500. In the absence of a European study, 
such a unit value could be used to value asthma attacks in a European context by using 
the exchange rate between US$ and Euro’s. If in this example, however, it has been 
found that there is a relationship between income and the value placed on an asthma at-
tack, the unit value can be corrected for differences in income between the USA and the 
European country in question. A second approach to benefit transfer is to transfer the 
complete valuation function determined through meta-analysis. Besides income, most 
studies find that other socio-economic and demographic factors have an influence on the 
valuation. Using statistical techniques (regression analysis) some valuation studies esti-
mate a valuation function, that explains the value placed on a good or service as a func-
tion of these factors. This function can then be transferred to another site and by insert-
ing the local values of the explanatory variables one can calculate an adjusted value. 
The most important variable used in benefit transfer of external values is the income 
elasticity of demand for the environmental good. Equation (5.1) shows how the adjusted 
benefit estimate Bp can be calculated for the country p under investigation. 
ε
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s
p
sp Y
Y
BB
 
(5.1) 
where Bp is the original benefit estimate from the original country s, and Ys and Yp are the 
income levels of country s and p, respectively, and ε is the income elasticity of demand 
for the environmental good in question. For example, a high ε implies that the external 
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value measured in a developed country will be discounted considerably if the value is 
transferred to a developing country. 
Studies report rather different levels of income elasticities for environmental goods. 
ADB (1997) assumes the income elasticity to be one. Krupnick et al. (1996) reject the 
notion that there is a proportional variation between the demand for environmental qual-
ity and income. Kriström and Riera (1996) find an income elasticity of environmental 
improvements of less than one in Europe. Pommerehne (1988) suggests an income elas-
ticity of 0.3. Flores and Carson (1997) conclude that an environmental good that is a 
luxury demand may have an income elasticity of WTP that is greater than one, less than 
one, or perhaps even negative. Given the indecisive empirical evidence, we use a central 
estimate of the income elasticity of one, and alternative estimates of two and five. The 
exchange rates between different currencies will be based on purchasing power parities.   
!	
Table 5.1 demonstrates the main external effects of waste management processes. Most 
waste management processes generate emissions of pollutants to the atmosphere, and 
sometimes to surface and ground water as well. Moreover, landfill sites and incineration 
plants often cause significant nuisance or disamenity effects in the vicinity of the loca-
tions (Smith et al. 1986, Brisson and Pearce 1995). To assess the magnitude and signifi-
cance of environmental effects, a range of criteria are relevant such as location and tim-
ing of the effect, and whether the effect is reversible or irreversible. In this study the 
main focus is on the actual impact of the externality on societies’ well-being.  
In the following Chapters various categories of external effects are discussed. An over-
view of available external values is provided and a selection of the most suitable external 
values is made for application in this study. 
Table 5.1 Translation of environmental effects to the main effects on well being. 
Environmental issues Residual effect on well being 
Air pollution Chronic and acute morbidity 
Chronic and acute mortality 
Occupational health 
Damage to buildings, monuments and materials 
Damage to forest resources and agriculture 
Global warming Mortality and morbidity 
Damage to buildings and materials 
Damage to forest resources and agriculture 
Ground and surface water pollution Safety and availability of drinking water 
Recreational value 
Biodiversity 
Loss of fishery 
(Dis)amenity Odour and visual pollution 
Noise 
Congestion  
Willingness-to-recycle  
Convenience 
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Pollution from waste-related activities can have many impacts on human health, ranging 
from short periods of coughing to premature death. The valuation of human health im-
pacts remains one of the most controversial aspects of any valuation study. Many reac-
tions to the monetary valuation of these impacts are partly caused by the unfortunate 
choice of terminology such as the ‘Value of a Statistical Life’ (VSL).  
Two main types of studies can be distinguished. First, values for mortality impacts are 
mostly based on studies using the CVM and the hedonic wage method (HWM). Using 
CVM, people are directly asked for their WTP to reduce mortality risks. Using the he-
donic wage method, differences in wages between professions with high and low mortal-
ity risks are used to derive a value for these mortality risks. Note that these studies thus 
do not value life but small differences in mortality risks. What they assess, in effect, is 
the amount of money an individual or household would like to pay, as a sort of insurance 
premium, to avoid or reduce a small change in health risk.  
Second, values for health are derived from the costs that are incurred in treating these 
impacts, the so-called cost-of-illness (COI) approach. In theory, WTP estimates are to be 
preferred to COI estimates for the valuation of externalities and cost-benefit analysis. 
However, for many impacts WTP estimates are not available and one has to resort to 
COI estimates. For those impacts where both WTP and COI estimates have been made, 
COI estimates are consistently smaller than WTP estimates. 
An important parameter in the monetary valuation is the VSL, which reflects people’s 
WTP for small reductions in mortality risks for themselves and others. A review of stud-
ies from Europe and the US, covering three valuation methods (CVM, HWM and con-
sumer market surveys) determines the average VSL at € 3.1 million based on 1997 prices 
(EC 1995). Two fundamental objections are raised against the VSL method. First, many 
people whose deaths are linked to air pollution are suspected of having only a short life 
expectancy even in the absence of air pollution. The VSL ascribes the same value to 
someone with a day to live as someone with tens of years of remaining life expectancy. 
Second, the VSL method ascribes the full VSL to air pollution. Air pollution, however, 
is only one factor of perhaps several that determine the time of death. In this study VSL 
estimates are only used to value fatal accidents, mortality impacts in climate change 
modelling, and similar cases where the impact is sudden and where the affected popula-
tion is similar to the general population for which the VSL applies. 
Alternatively, mortality and morbidity can be valued on the basis of ‘years of life lost’ 
(YOLL). For quantification of this value it is necessary to interpret the estimate of the 
VSL as the present value of a number of life years. The YOLL approach is particularly 
recommended for deaths arising from illnesses linked to exposure to air pollution. The 
value will depend on a number of factors, such as how long it takes for the exposure to 
result in the illness and how long a survival period the individual has after contracting 
the disease. The YOLL value of mortality reduces with age, but not on a proportional 
scale. In this study, the YOLL approach is used in cases where the hazard has a signifi-
cant latency period before impact, or where the probability of survival after exposure is 
altered over a prolonged period.  
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The health impacts can be broadly subdivided into three categories. First, premature 
deaths from air pollution are estimated. Second, changes in morbidity result from air pol-
lutants. These effects include respiratory impacts such as coughing, hospital admissions 
for respiratory infections and asthma attacks, and other health impacts. Third, accidents 
may occur as a result of related economic activities. Within these categories, the dose-
response functions further distinguish between acute and chronic impacts. Acute impacts 
are those impacts that occur during or immediately after (within a few days) a period of 
increased pollution levels. Chronic impacts are those impacts that are the result of pro-
longed exposure to elevated levels of air pollution. Another distinction is made between 
health impact occurring at the workplace (i.e., occupational health) and health impacts 
that result for society in general. 
5$$
Toxic emissions are a common cause of damages to human health. Values are derived 
for the classical ‘macro-pollutants’: sulphur dioxide (SO2), oxides of nitrogen (NOx: ni-
trogen oxide, NO, and nitrogen dioxide, NO2), particulate matter (PM10), and ozone 
(O3)35. In addition, values are derived for carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic substances 
(EC 1995, Dorland et al. 1997, Dorland and Jansen 1997). 
Valuation of mortality impacts from emissions are divided into the following categories: 
• Mortality linked to short term (acute) exposure to air pollution; 
• Mortality linked to long term (chronic) exposure to non-carcinogenic air pollutants; 
• Mortality from exposure to hazardous materials in the workplace; 
• Mortality from cancer. 
Valuation of morbidity effects consists of the following categories; 
• Morbidity from short term (acute) exposure to air pollution; 
• Morbidity from long term (chronic) exposure to air pollution; 
• Morbidity from exposure to hazardous materials in the workplace. 
The characteristics of emissions and the local conditions of the receiving area play a cru-
cial role in the monetary value of the pollutants. Therefore, a distinction is made between 
human health impact from emissions from transport and emissions from other processes. 
The latter is depicted for carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic pollutants in Table 5.2. Re-
cycling-related activities are generally extremely transport-intensive. The local and re-
gional (more than 50 km to almost 3000 km from the source) impacts of transport are re-
produced in Table 5.3. These include the indirect impacts resulting from NOx and SO2 
emissions through the formation of, respectively, nitrate and sulphate aerosols. Local 
impacts are an average of various regions in the Netherlands, on urban and rural roads, 
during peak and non-peak hours (Dorland and Jansen 1997). Because local emissions 
occur at a low height the concentrations in the local range are high. Therefore, regional 
damage is considerably less than the local damage (Friedrich et al. 1998). 
                                                   
35
  Ozone is not directly emitted as such but is formed from a number of other emissions. The 
main precursor emissions are NOx and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Because of the 
difficulties in modelling the resulting ozone concentrations, a simplified methodology was 
used to value damages from ozone, or rather from emissions of ozone precursors. 
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Table 5.2 Summary of values for damages to human health by emissions of production 
processes and electricity generation in the lifecycle (in 2005 € per ton). 
Pollutant damage in € per tonne emitted 
SO2 direct impacts 1,132 
SO2 indirect impacts through sulphate aerosols 6,375 
NOx indirect impacts through nitrate aerosols 5,373 
NOx indirect impacts through ozone formation - 1,495 
PM10 (directly emitted) 26,765 
VOC indirect impacts through ozone formation 829 
Arsenic (carcinogenic effects only) 725 – 14,508 
Cadmium (carcinogenic effects only) 6,525 – 43,503 
Chromium (carcinogenic effects only) 145,021 
Nickel (carcinogenic effects only) 1,451 – 14,505 
PAH (benzo-a-pyrene) (carcinogenic effects only) 1,296,110 
Source:  Dorland et al. (2000) updated to price level of 2005 . 
Table 5.3 Damage for local and regional range health impacts for vehicle exhaust 
emissions in € per ton pollutant emitted (in 2005 € per ton). 
Pollutant Local health 
impact 
Regional* 
health impact 
Total health 
impact 
PM10  328,830   92,163   420,993  
CO  2   1   3  
SO2 (direct effects)  2,463   294   2,757  
Benzene (carcinogenic effects only)  633   55   688  
Butadiene (carcinogenic effects only)  23,730   2,260   25,990  
PAH (carcinogenic effects only)  6,217,260   595,510   6,812,770  
DME (carcinogenic effects only)  2,113   203   2,317  
NOx indirect impacts through nitrate aerosols   3,564   3,564  
SO2 indirect impacts through sulphate aerosols   4,476   4,476  
*)  Regional is defined as more than 50 km from the source. 
Source:  Dorland et al. (2000) updated to price level of 2005. 
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Occupational health effects are those health impacts that are inflicted on the worker, 
working on the economic activities that are under investigation. These effects can be 
categorised into accidents and diseases. Occupational accidents have a direct physical 
impact with a clear relation between cause and effects. Occupational diseases generally 
occur as a delayed, long-term response to continuous exposure caused by the related 
economic activities. 
A particular problem in assessing occupational damages is the extent to which these 
costs might be internalised, for example, through insurance, compensation payments, 
higher wage rates, etc. In part, internalisation requires workers to be fully mobile (so that 
they have a choice of occupation) and fully informed about the risks that they face. 
Available evidence suggests that internalisation is rarely, if ever, complete. With a lack 
of data on the extent to which internalisation is achieved, total damages are reported in-
stead. Another difficulty in analysing occupational health effects is that only a limited 
number of case studies have been conducted in the field of waste management. 
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The different types of processes that need to be valued in terms of occupational health 
are recycling, waste collection and landfill management, waste sorting and transporta-
tion. Waste collection, landfilling and incineration have a more pronounced negative im-
pact on the health of the workers than other economic activities (Cointreau-Levine 
1997). A significant relationship between the level of exposure to solid waste and dis-
eases is reported (SWANA 1996, Poulsen et al. 1995b). These estimates, however, can-
not be explained in terms of reduced days at work. For waste related accidents applicable 
data have been found. For example, in Denmark average workforce stays at home for 1.7 
days every year as a result of injuries, whereas the waste workers were unable to work 
for 9.5 days annually as a result of impairment (Poulsen et al. 1995a).  
The value of lost working days due to waste-related activities consists of the direct ‘cost 
of illness’ such as the wage level of the worker, the WTP of the suffering related to the 
injury, and the expenditures on averting and/or mitigating the effects of illness or injury. 
Van Beukering et al. (1998) estimate the overall marginal value of injuries related to 
waste collection at € 2,122 per worker per year. Assuming a worker to process 1,000 
tonnes of mixed waste per year, the occupational injury damage of one ton of waste is 
€ 2.12. This hypothetical value can be considered an underestimation as it excludes the 
damage of diseases and mortality. 
In estimating transport-related accidents, a distinction is made between fatal accidents 
and accidents causing injury. Regional variations occur as a result of variations in risk of 
casualties across countries (Kågeson 1993). By combining information on the distance 
travelled and the risk per vehicle kilometre, the risk per ton of material transported is 
calculated (Brisson 1997). Multiplying the external values for human health and the risk 
of casualties, the mortality and injury costs are determined. Examples for various Euro-
pean countries are presented in Table 5.4 for respectively heavy good vehicles (HGVs) 
with a capacity of 10 tons and passenger cars. 
Table 5.4 External costs from transport (in € per 1000 km). 
 Mortality Serious injury 
 HGVs Passenger cars HGVs Passengers cars 
Belgium 6.59 1.26 0.17 0.08 
Denmark 1.26 0.31 0.01 0.01 
France 7.54 1.00 0.09 0.02 
Germany 2.20 0.63 0.07 0.04 
Italy 2.51 0.63 0.23 0.14 
Netherlands 0.94 0.63 0.03 0.02 
Portugal 7.22 0.63 0.64 0.79 
Spain 4.71 1.57 0.25 0.20 
UK 1.26 0.31 0.05 0.03 
Source: based on Holland et al. (1997) and Brisson (1997). 
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In this Chapter the damage cost of atmospheric emissions on materials, crops, and natu-
ral resources is discussed. Figure 5.2 depicts a simplified cause-effect chain. The meth-
odology that is followed to calculate these damages is analogous to that used to estimate 
damages to human health. The agricultural impact pathway first calculates the incre-
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mental pollutant concentrations through dispersion models. Next, dose-response func-
tions are used to determine the affected crop yield per hectare of the so-called stock-at-
risk. The impacts result through direct and indirect atmospheric processes. The same 
spatial procedure is conducted for forest and materials (i.e. buildings, monuments). Fi-
nally, these physical impacts are valued using market prices. 
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Figure 5.2 Simplified cause-effect chain for material, crop and forest damage. 
Source: modified from Holland et al. 1997. 

The most relevant pollutants causing crop damage are sulphur dioxide (SO2), ozone (O3), 
and nitrogen oxides (NOx). Hydrogen fluoride (HF) can also cause crop losses, but it is 
generally thought that these occur only in the direct vicinity of important sources of HF 
emissions and therefore will be rather small compared to damages from other pollutants. 
Deposition of acidic compounds such as SO2 increases soil acidity which in turn influ-
ences crop yields. To neutralise soil acidity farmers can apply lime, ground limestone or 
magnesium limestone. This is a routine agricultural practice that is not practised solely 
for neutralising deposited acidity from air pollution but also to neutralise soil acidifica-
tion through agricultural methods. Dorland et al. (2000) obtain a damage figure of € 215 
per ton of SO2 emitted. This includes damages to the following crops: wheat, potatoes, 
sugar beets, barley, rye and oats. 
It is unlikely that at present concentrations there is a notable direct effect of NOx on crop 
yield. NOx and VOCs, however, do indirectly affect crop yields through their contribu-
tion to the formation of ozone (O3). Estimation of reductions in crop losses is carried out 
at an aggregated level by combining crop-specific dose-response functions for O3 dam-
ages with aggregate crop production figures for the European Union. These were derived 
from experiments in the USA (Dorland et al. 2000). A damage figure of 
€
 642 per ton of 
VOC is obtained. 
Deposited nitrogen has a beneficial effect on crop yields because it acts as a fertiliser. 
The level of this externality is determined by the value of the yield increase due to the 
deposited nitrogen. Dorland et al. (2000) obtain a value of € -697 per ton NOx (expressed 
as NO2 mass equivalents). This is not a negative but a positive externality from pollu-
tion. It is uncertain whether these fertilisation effects are sustainable in the long term. 
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Soiling of buildings, caused by black smoke, is a main damage cost in the category of 
material damage. The definition of black smoke is based on chemical properties of parti-
cles, rather than on their size. The size composition of black smoke can vary considera-
bly depending on the emission source. Roughly speaking, however, black smoke consists 
mainly of particles with a diameter less than 5 µm. Dorland et al. (2000) determine a 
damage cost of € 662 per ton of particulates emitted in the form of black smoke. This es-
timate of is based on total UK emissions of black smoke and an assessment of the size of 
the UK market for cleaning buildings that is completely attributed to soiling from parti-
cle pollution (Newby et al. 1991).  
Dorland et al. (1997) calculate the damage costs to materials to be € 260 per ton SO2 
emitted from a power plant near Amsterdam. The impact of transport-related emissions 
on materials is calculated separately at
 €
 702 per kg SO2 emitted (Dorland et al., 2000). 
This damage cost is based on estimates of the costs of increased repair and maintenance 
due to incremental concentrations of acidifying pollutants for the following materials: 
galvanised steel, limestone, mortar, paint, rendering, sandstone and zinc. 
*()
Disamenity effects of waste related processes are likely to make up a significant share of 
the externalities caused. Landfill sites or incinerators generate substantial social costs to 
their neighbouring population. Disamenity effects may occur in different forms. The 
trucks that transport the waste to and from the sites may cause noise externalities as well 
as congestion. The landfill site may emit annoying odours and create visual pollution. 
Increased health risk, or at least an increased perception of higher health risk, is caused 
for the people living in the vicinity of an incinerator or landfill.  
A common way to measure these effects is to use variations in house prices as an indica-
tor of the welfare loss caused by disamenity effects. The risk of following this approach 
is the potential double counting of external effects. In this study, it is assumed that vis-
ual, noise and odour effects are the main cause for the reduction in house prices. These 
effects are not covered in other categories of external effects.  
Brisson and Pearce (1995) provide an overview of several American hedonic price 
method (HPM) studies on the value of disamenity effects from waste disposal sites. With 
the exception of one incinerator, the majority of these studies cover landfill sites. Land-
filling and incinerating municipal solid waste cause different effects. Households are re-
luctant to live near an incinerator due to the potential emissions of the highly toxic diox-
ins. Disamenity of landfill is caused by the perception of ground water pollution and the 
visual and odour nuisance. Because no valuation data have been found to distinguish be-
tween the two waste management practices the overall disamenity value for landfilling 
and incineration will be assumed equal. 
All studies have found a significant effect on house prices owing to the existence of in-
cinerators nearby. House prices increase roughly by 3-4 percent per kilometre distance 
from a landfill site within a 5.5 kilometre radius. No effect is felt further than 5.5 kilome-
tres away from the site. Regional and site-specific differences, however, are likely to oc-
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cur. A study on the housing market in a semi-urban area near Milan (Italy) where a large 
landfilling plant is operated measured effects till 7.5 kilometres from the site (Ascari and 
Cernuschi 1996). Studies focusing on shorter distances have found very large declines in 
prices of houses of close proximity to landfills.  
Brisson and Pearce (1995) further review three CVM studies of the disamenities of waste 
disposal facilities. These studies also find that WTP declines with distance to the facility. 
An important determinant of the WTP is income and the perception of the risk of 
leachate leaking into water supplies. Households with a high income whose drinking wa-
ter was at risk are willing to pay substantially more than low-income households de-
pendent on piped city-water. The findings of the CVM studies are consistent with those 
from the hedonic price studies. Based on the literature survey the following linear re-
gression equation is presented that relates house price depreciation to distance from a 
waste disposal site (Brisson and Pearce 1995): 
∆HP = 12.8 − 2.34 × D (5.2) 
where ∆HP represents the percentage change in house price and D represents the dis-
tance (in kilometres) from the waste disposal facility. The equation suggests a maximum 
house price depreciation of 12.8 percent at the site of the facility and that there will be no 
effect on house prices beyond a distance of 5.5 kilometre from the facility. 
Based on the disamenity function the annual value of reduction in the real estate prices is 
calculated. As shown in Figure 5.3, eight categories of household density are combined 
with four levels of house prices (CBS 1996). The overall values are converted to annual 
values by taking 8 percent of the total reduction (Jansen 1988). The variation is substan-
tial. For a landfill which is located in a neighbourhood with a density of 125 houses per 
km2 and an original house price of € 50,000, the reduction in real estate value is € 1.8 
million. For the other extreme, a density of 1000 houses per km2, having an average 
value of € 200,000, the reduction is € 59 million. 
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Figure 5.3 Annual disamenity value of landfill sites. 
To enable the comparison between incineration and landfilling, external costs are calcu-
lated on a per unit basis. This step in the analysis is rather uncommon for the disamenity 
effect. In reality the disamenity is not primarily determined by the amount of waste proc-
essed by the landfill or the incinerator, but by the sheer existence of the site. To facilitate 
comparison, however, the disamenity value is assumed to be proportional to the total 
amount of waste processed. Values reported in the literature vary significantly. A study 
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on landfilling in Minnesota calculated a range between € 1.2 and € 3.1 per ton of land-
filled waste (IIED 1996). The study near Milan (Italy) estimated external costs to be 
€ 10.6 per ton of solid waste (Ascari and Cernuschi 1996).  
Despite these earlier studies, a study into the external effects of landfills and incinerators 
for the European Commission in the year 2000 (COWI, 2000) reported a ‘huge defi-
ciency’ of European studies to measure the disamenity costs of landfills and incineration 
plants. The ‘huge deficiency’ of European studies was partly addressed in 2003 by a 
large UK study on the disamenity costs of landfills for DEFRA (Cambrdige Economet-
rics et al., 2003). This study employed the HPM method for 6,100 operational landfills 
using data on 592,000 housing transactions in the 1991-2000 period. It estimated 
disamenity costs of between € 2 and € 3 per tonne of landfilled waste (in 2003 prices). 
Apart from this central result, the study also presented a number of other interesting re-
sults: 
• Large regional differences in disamenity costs were found. Particularly, the distance-
effect on house prices (see Eq. 5.2) is not stable and depends very much on the char-
acteristics of the property market under consideration; 
• No statistically significant differences in disamenity costs between hazardous and 
non-hazardous landfill sites could be found; 
• Disamenity costs tend to be highest around the opening of new sites and level off af-
ter some time when local residents adjust to the presence of the landfill. After closure 
of the site, disamenity costs tend to vanish rather quickly, as long as there are no 
long-term problems such as water contamination or gas seepage and the area is ap-
propriately landscaped; 
• Disamenity effects were measured within a radius of 0.8 km (half a mile) from the 
site. Beyond that distance, no effects could be measured. This distance corresponds 
relatively well with the suggestion from a recent WHO report that any potential ex-
posure from landfill sites is limited to 1 km from the site by the air pathway (WHO, 
2001).  
The calculations of disamenity costs per unit of waste processed though landfilling and 
incineration are described in Section 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. 
**#6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
Transport is a major cause of negative externalities related to waste management. For 
example, as shown in Table 5.5, incineration involves the transport of various types of 
materials and products over long distances. The majority of the externalities are caused 
by road transport. Externalities of alternative transport modes such as ships and railway 
are negligible. The transport of incineration associated waste involves 15% trains, 25% 
water, and 60% road transport.36 Assuming that the waste is transported with a standard 
diesel 10 ton truck, and taking into account the transport of the residues, such as fly ash 
and bottom ash, an average ton of incinerated waste involves 20 kilometres of road 
transport (i.e. 60% of 34 kilometres). Because landfilling does not involve the transport 
of major inputs or waste residues, the transport intensity is substantially lower. The proc-
                                                   
36
  Personal communication E. Zoontjes, Vereniging Afvalbedrijven, August 2005. 
Effectiveness of landfill taxation 
 
83 
essing of one ton of landfilled waste involves road transport over a distance of 15 kilo-
metres (i.e. 60% of 25 kilometres).  
Table 5.5 Transport characteristics (tonne / year). 
Transported material Distance Quantity 
Municipal waste transport 15 km 465,000 
Lime transport 400 km 1,888 
Fly ash 200 km 9,066 
Filter residue + salt residue 50 km 5,500 
Furnace bottom ash 50 km 120,267 
Source: Van Beukering et al. 1998. 
The externalities related to waste transport include four categories: 
• Climate change caused by the emission of CO2; 
• Health and material damage caused by various air emissions; 
• Mortality and morbidity caused by accidents; 
• Congestion. 
Because the health and material damage externalities have been discussed in the previ-
ous Chapters and climate change externalities will be discussed in Section 5.2.6, only 
congestion will be explained here in more detail. 

Congestion damages occur from three stages of the incineration life cycle: the construc-
tion activities, the daily waste transport activities, and the disposal of residues. The ex-
ternal costs of congestion result from various effects. The most important costs are the 
time costs of delay. Indirect effects include increased emissions levels and danger in traf-
fic (Daniel and Bekka 1998). Table 5.6 summarises two studies that provide measures 
for the marginal costs of traffic congestion (Greene et al. 1997). Newbery (1995) esti-
mates the marginal congestion cost for ‘other rural roads’ and ‘urban central’ roads at 
peak times at 
€
 7 and € 5371 per 100 passenger car unit kilometre (PCUkm), respec-
tively. Newbery suggests that one heavy good vehicle kilometre (HGVkm) is equivalent 
to two PCUkm. Brossier (1996) provides for intercity traffic estimates of marginal con-
gestion costs of trucks averaged over a year on various types of roads and the results 
ranges from
 €
 2.95 and € 17.1 per 100 HGV. 
Table 5.6 Marginal costs of congestion in the UK, 1990. 
 Marginal Congestion Costs (€/100 HGVkm) 
Newbery (1995) 
- rural road 
- urban central peak 
Brossier (1996) 
- rural road 
- motorway 
- national road 
 
7.2 
5373.0 
 
5.85 
2.95 
17.1 
Source: Greene et al. 1997, p.83. 
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It is assumed that all transport of solid waste takes place in a ‘non-central’ area with a 
truck of 15 tonnes during ‘off-peak’ traffic hours. We applied Newbery’s estimates 
(1992) of 0.29 and 0.53 euro per HGVkm for respectively ‘non-central off-peak’ and 
‘central off-peak’ traffic. Given the difference in population densities, we apply the non-
central value for the Western European country and the central value for the Southern 
European country. We assume, as Newbery (1990) suggested, that one HGVkm equals 
two PCUkm. The annualised values are summarised in Table 5.7. Distances for the vari-
ous activities are considered to be equal. Adopting an annual quantity of 5 million tons 
of waste, the congestion costs of incineration in the Netherlands amount to € 0.23 per ton 
of processed waste.  
Because quantities incinerated and landfilled in the Netherlands are similar, Table 5.7 
also provides sufficient basis for the estimation of the congestion costs for landfilling. 
Recognising the fact that the disposal of ashes is not relevant for landfilling, the total 
congestion costs for landfilling amount to € 0.13 per ton of waste.  
Table 5.7 Annual congestion costs for incineration in the Netherlands. 
Congestion costs Annual congestion costs 
(€ per year) 
Congestion costs 
(€ per ton of waste) 
During construction of incinerator     260,892  0.01 a 
During operation of incinerator  601,691   0.12  
During disposal of residues (i.e. ash) 489181.5  0.10  
Total 1,351,764  0.23  
a
 The congestion costs caused during the construction phase are spread equally across the 
waste incinerated during the period of 10 years. 
Source: based on Newbery (1995). 
Note that Newbery’s estimates are valid for road conditions in the United Kingdom. As 
no similar data for other countries in Europe were found, UK data were adopted for the 
Netherlands. One potential modification could be made for the value of delay caused by 
congestion, based on difference in wage levels between European countries. However, in 
this particular case study we assumed, in line with the principles adhered to in the ‘Ex-
ternE’ project (Dorland et al., 2000), one uniform value for the whole of Europe, without 
correcting for wage levels. 
#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On the basis of the above estimates, physical and monetary standard values have been 
derived to determine the overall value of transport related externalities (see Table 5.8). 
The main contributors to transport-related externalities are health effects (i.e. NOx, PM10) 
and congestion. Mortality and morbidity caused by road accidents are negligible. The to-
tal externality caused by the transport of one ton of waste over a distance of 1,000 kilo-
metre is almost € 85. 
*+7 
Global warming is an important impact category in the valuation of externalities related 
to waste management (Walz et al. 1996). Methane (CH4) emissions from landfills con-
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tribute approximately 16 percent to the world’s total methane emissions (WRI 1996). 
Depending on the efficiency of the incinerator and the composition of the burned materi-
als, ‘waste-to-energy’ practices may avoid carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions through sup-
plying electricity to networks.  
Table 5.8 Transport-related externalities. 
Air emissions Ton emission/1000km ton €/ton emission €/1000km ton waste 
CO2 0.128000 10 1.2800 
CO 0.000482 0.71 0.0003 
SO2 transport 0.000138 7,233 0.9982 
NOx transport 0.002040 3,564 7.2706 
HC 0.000322 680 0.2190 
PM10 0.000146 420,993 61.4649 
Serious injuries n.a. n.a. 0.0300 
Mortality n.a. n.a. 0.9400 
Congestion n.a. n.a. 11.3750 
Transport externalities   83.578 
Source:  Dorland et al. 2000, Brossier 1996, Holland et al. 1997, Tol, 2005. 
Comprehensive climate models that are linked to economic models calculate the costs of 
climate change. They include agricultural damage, increased morbidity and mortality, 
damage caused by sea level rise and by extreme events, and loss of species. Various es-
timates of marginal costs of greenhouse gas emissions have been reported, expressing 
the average additional cost of a small change in an exogenous scenario, also called the 
‘business as usual’ scenario. These estimates are usually based on the so-called 2× CO2 
scenario, that is, a doubling of CO2 concentrations relative to pre-industrial concentra-
tions. Due to the still existing scientific lacunas with regard to global warming, the un-
certainties of the results of these estimates are larger than for most other external effects. 
In this study, the marginal costs of greenhouse gas emissions from waste deposited at 
landfills and waste incineration are estimated in the following stepwise approach: 
• First, it is examined how much CO2 and CH4 are emitted from one ton of waste  
processed in Dutch landfills or incinerators; 
• Second, the marginal cost ratio between CO2 and CH4 is examined; 
• Third, the literature is surveyed for estimates of marginal global warming damages of 
greenhouse gases per ton of CO2; 
• Fourth, the net present value of future global warming damages due to the current 
landfilling and incineration of one ton of waste in an average Dutch landfill or  
incinerator is estimated.  
Note that the estimates in each step are surrounded by large margins of uncertainty. The 
final estimate of marginal global warming damage per ton of waste is therefore subject 
to a very large, compounded range of uncertainty. In the following subSections, we will 
provide an indication of the contribution of each step in the calculation of the overall  
uncertainty of the estimate. Only the quantification of the greenhouse gas emissions of 
landfilling and incineration are discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, respectively.  
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The global warming potential (GWP) of CH4 is 21 times higher than that of CO2. Be-
cause of different time-damage profiles of CH4 and CO2 emissions 37 and the fact that 
damages are discounted and GWP is not, this does not automatically imply that the mar-
ginal damage per ton of CH4 emissions is 21 times the marginal damage per ton of CO2 
emissions (Manne and Richels, 2001). The DEFRA study (Enviros Consulting et al., 
2004) reports damage conversion factors in the literature ranging between 11 and 20, and 
suggests a central conversion factor of 16.5. This means that, in terms of damage, the 
emission of one ton of CH4 is equivalent to the emission of 16.5 tons of CO2. However, 
Sygna et al. (2002) suggest that the ratio of marginal damage costs of CH4 to CO2 ex-
ceeds that of their GWP ratio: they suggest that the marginal damage cost of one ton of 
CH4 is 30 times larger than that of one ton of CO2 (Sygna et al., 2002). A recent note of 
the Dutch government also recommends a conversion factor of 30 (Tweede Kamer, 
2004). Most of the literature, however, uses a damage conversion rate of 21 (or close to 
21) between CO2 and CH4. We will use this rate for our ‘best’ estimate. 
8	 
The global warming costs of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions include agricultural dam-
age, increased morbidity and mortality, damage caused by sea level rise and by extreme 
events, and loss of species. Due to the still existing scientific lacunas with regard to the 
effects of global warming, the uncertainties of the results of these estimates are larger 
than for most other external effects. In 1995, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC)38 reported marginal damage costs in a range of $5 to $125 per ton of 
carbon ($/tC).39 The U.K. government recently issued a formal recommendation on the 
unit costing of global warming damage from CO2 emissions of 	 70/tC (= $125/tC)40, 
based on a literature survey by Clarkson and Deyes (2002). In a recent policy paper, the 
European Commission quotes marginal damage figures between € 14-20 per ton of CO2 
at the lower end to € 80 per ton (‘and very possibly much higher’) at the upper end 
(European Commission, 2005).  
                                                   
37
  The average lifetime of CO2 molecules in the atmosphere is over 100 years, while that of 
CH4 is only 13 years (Manne & Richels, 2001).  
38
    
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the United  
Nations to assess scientific, technical and socio- economic information relevant for the un-
derstanding of climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitiga-
tion. 
39
  Prices of 1990. 
40
  Prices of 2000. 
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Tol (2005), on the other hand, concluded on the basis of a survey of 28 studies, that it 
would be “unlikely that the marginal costs of CO2 emissions exceed $50/tC and are 
likely to be substantially smaller than that.” 41 
In today’s prices, the IPCC range would be around € 1 and € 32 per ton of CO2.42 The 
UK recommended unit cost would be € 29 per ton of CO2,43 the European Commissions’ 
range between € 14 and € 80 per ton of CO2, and Tol would argue that marginal CO2 
damages would be less than € 10 per ton.
 
In comparison, the prices at which CO2 emis-
sions permits are currently traded in the European Emissions Trading scheme are around 
€ 19 per ton (www.emissierechten.nl, 23 June 2005). 
It is generally assumed that marginal damages of greenhouse gas emissions increase over 
time. This is because, on the one hand, CO2’s global warming potential increases with 
the total stock of carbon in the atmosphere, and, on the other hand, the monetary value of 
global warming damage increases with growing incomes. Simply put, there will be more 
damage and there will also be more to be damaged. Clarkson and Deyes (2002) suggest 
an annual increase of one pound on their marginal damage estimate of 	 70/tC. 
%4<
To calculate the net present value of the damage costs of greenhouse gas emissions from 
waste over time, damage costs of future emissions have to be discounted. In doing so, 
the time-scale is relevant from two perspectives. First, the time frame of the emissions 
related to a waste management and recycling process varies. For example, in the case of 
landfilling, the activity takes place today but the actual emission of CH4 occurs in a later 
stage. Second, the impact of these future emissions is higher than present emissions. This 
is partly caused by increased radiative forcing of greenhouse gas emissions. Also the 
ecological and economic background systems become more sensitive to climate changes.  
The discount rates used in climate studies vary between 0 to 10 percent. The most com-
monly used discount rate lies between 3 and 5 percent. The official discount rate for 
large infrastuctural projects in the Netherlands is 4 percent (Eygenraam et al., 2000). We 
evaluate discount rates of 3, 4, and 5 percent.  
                                                   
41
  Apart from uncertainty on physical dose-response relationships, the estimates differ because 
of different assumptions on discount rates and on different assumptions on the marginal utiliy 
of income across regions. In addition it is uncertain how people value risks, especially con-
cerning risky events with low probabilities and high impacts. The lower (higher) the discount 
rate, the greater (smaller) the difference in marginal utility of income between rich and poor 
people, and the more (less) risk-averse people’s preferences are, the higher (lower) is the es-
timate of marginal damage. 
42
  CPI index USA 1995-2004 = 1.25; exchange rate Euro:US$ = 0.75115 (March 21, 2005); 
conversion rate C:CO2 = 12/44. 
43
  CPI index UK 2001-2004 = 1.04; exchange rate Euro:UK£ = 1.44263 (March 21, 2005); 
conversion rate C:CO2 = 12/44. 
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Landfilling in the Netherlands has declined significantly in the last decades. At present, 
the Netherlands has 30 active landfill sites which in total process around 4.7 million tons 
of solid waste per annum. Fifteen years ago, 80 active landfill sites still processed 14 
million tons of solid waste. This decline is mainly due to increased recycling and incin-
eration of household waste. Similar to incinerators, landfill sites in the Netherlands are 
strategically distributed across the country to minimise transport costs (see Figure 5.4).   
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Figure 5.4 Operational and closed landfills in the Netherlands. 
In the following chapters, the most important environmental effects of landfills in the 
Netherlands and their economic valuation are addressed. These include: 
• Health; 
• Disamenity; 
• Climate change; 
• Land-use; 
• Avoided emissions by power generation. 
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The potential impacts of landfills on the health of local residents have been subject of a 
relatively large number of studies. Recently, De Bont and Larebeke (2002) of Ghent 
University reviewed the evidence presented in international health research. The reported 
health effects include: increased risks of birth defects, cancer, respiratory and cardiovas-
cular diseases, and various negative effects on physical well-being, such as nausea and 
headaches, insomnia, lower respiratory problems, gastro-enteritis, and psychological 
problems.  
While most of these effects have indeed been observed in empirical studies, De Bont and 
Larebeke (2002) argue that it is in general not easy to determine whether the found 
symptoms are directly caused by exposure to landfill emissions, whether they are caused 
by stress and anxiety of living near a landfill, or whether there are other confounding 
variables (life style, other sources of pollution, and socio-economic factors) that were not 
properly addressed in the empirical studies. In general, too little is known about the 
emissions of specific pollutants from landfills and the level of human exposure to these 
pollutants. Because of the lack of firm dose-effect relationships, it is also difficult to es-
tablish the exact area in which people are at risk: different studies use different study ar-
eas, from 0.4 to 3 km from the landfill site. A recent WHO study suggests that any po-
tential exposure from landfill sites is limited to 1 km from the site by the air pathway 
(WHO, 2001).  
Despite these shortcomings, De Bont and Van Larebeke, Bont conclude from their litera-
ture review that research offers a ‘reasonably certain’ link between the vicinity of a land-
fill and an increased risk of birth defects. For other health effects, this link would be less 
clear. 
Because of the huge uncertainties regarding health effects, we make an illustrative calcu-
lation only, based on the following assumptions: 
1. There is no seepage from Dutch landfills to ground or surface water; the only poten-
tial pathways are air pollution and stress and anxiety; 
2. The only potential health effects are birth defects ( De Bont and Larebeke, 2002), 
particularly a low birth weight. The increased risk of a low birth weight in the vicin-
ity of a landfill is 30 percent (De Bont and Larebeke, 2002).44 The ‘willingness-to-
pay’ to avoid this particular health effect is valued at € 600,000 per case (Enviros 
Consulting et al., 2004);45 
3. The potential impact area is restricted to a distance of 1 km from the site (WHO, 
2001); 
4. We further assume that the fertility and standard (non-landfill related) health status 
of women living in the vicinity of landfills are identical to the fertility and health 
status of women in the entire Dutch population.  
                                                   
44
  This means that the risk of low birth weight in the vicinity of a landfill is 30 percent higher 
than the risk of a low birth rate in the entire Dutch population.   
45
  This is the upper limit of willingness-to-pay for the category ‘all birth defects’, reported in a 
study for DEFRA (Enviros Consulting et al., 2004). 
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The average risk in the Netherlands of giving birth to a child with a low birth weight 
(< 2500g) is 5.7 per cent and the risk of a very low birth rate (< 1500 g) is 0.4 percent. 
The annual number of births per household in the Netherlands is 0.02999.46 A GIS 
analysis carried out for this study showed that a total number of 20,355 houses is located 
within a radius of 1 km from active Dutch landfills (see Appendix II). Simple calcula-
tions show that the expected annual increase in the number of low birth weights due to 
landfills is 10 cases and the expected annual increase in the number of very low birth 
weights due to landfills is 0.7 cases.  
It stands to reason that the willingness-to-pay to avoid a very low birth rate would ex-
ceed the willingness-to-pay for a low birth rate. We do not have enough information to 
differentiate between the two defects, however. Therefore, we will value both low birth 
rate and very low birth rate at the same amount of money: € 600,000. The willingness-to-
pay to avoid low birth due to landfills rate would then be € 6.2 million and the willing-
ness-to-pay for very low birth rate would be € 0.4 million. Per ton of waste deposited 
(4.8 million ton in 2003), the willingness-to-pay per ton of waste would then be € 1.30 
and € 0.09, respectively.  
It is possible, of course, that the assumed willingness-to-pay of € 600,000 to avoid low 
or very low birth rates is an underestimate of the true willingness-to-pay. But the medical 
evidence of the relationship between landfills and birth defects (and other health effects) 
is rather thin, however. It is difficult to determine a ‘best’ estimate: with hesitation we 
pose the average between the two values found, i.e., € 0.70 per ton of waste. 
We also note that some (minor) health effects are probably picked-up by the next exter-
nal effect that is examined in this Chapter: the so-called disamenity effect. 
*"")
Local residents may experience discomfort from living nearby a landfill. As we saw 
above, some studies report an increase in the incidence of physical and psychological 
complaints in the local population. In addition, a landfill may be visually unattractive, 
and may be a source of noise, dust, odour, and vermin. Together, these various negative 
effects on well-being are commonly labelled disamenity effects. A number of studies has 
tried to estimate monetary value of these disamenity costs by measuring the willingness-
to-pay of local residents to avoid living near a landfill. Basically, two valuation methods 
have been employed: CVM and HPM (see Section 5.2).  
In Section 5.2, a relatively large and recent UK study into the disamenity effects of land-
fills has been described (Cambridge Econometrics et al., 2003). Its central estimate of 
disamenity value was between € 2 and € 3 per ton of landfilled waste. 
How can the British disamenity estimate be ‘transferred’ to the Netherlands? There 
might be various differences between the British and the Dutch situation, both with re-
spect to characteristics of the landfills and to characteristics of the population at risk. 
With respect to characteristics of the landfills we have little information on the precise 
                                                   
46
  In the year 2003, 200,297 children were born in a total population of 6,699,686 households 
(CBS Statonline).   
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nature of the differences, as well as on the effects of differences on the disamenity costs. 
As was pointed out above, the British econometric study was even unable to find statisti-
cally significant differences in disamenity costs between hazardous and non-hazardous 
sites.  
We do have some information on the characteristics of the population at risk. We do not 
know whether the basic preferences with respect to living near landfills systematically 
differ between the British and Dutch populations. We might assume, however, that will-
ingness-to-pay to avoid living near a landfill might be systematically affected by income 
(i.e., increase with income). Moreover, even if willingness-to-pay per household would 
be perfectly identical between the UK and the Netherlands, then the total willingness-to-
pay to avoid living near a landfill would certainly depend on the number of households 
affected.  
To implement the benefit transfer function (Eq. .5.1) that was presented in Section 5.2, 
we used Eurostat statistics on capita gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power 
parities (GDP per capita in PPS) for EU Member States. For the year 2003, the ratio be-
tween the Netherlands and the UK was 121/118 (EU25=100), a relatively small differ-
ence. 47 Assuming income elasticities ε of the demand for environmental goods of 1, 2, 
and 5, respectively, the disamenity costs per ton of landfilled waste in the Netherlands 
would be 2.5 %, 5.1%, and 13.4% higher than in the UK. 
In the UK, the housing density near landfills is approximately 79 houses/km2. 48 In our 
GIS-based estimate of housing density near landfills in the Netherlands, we found a 
housing density within a 1 km radius around landfills of 108 houses/km2. Hence, it 
seems that the Dutch population at risk per ton of waste landfilled is 37 percent 
(108/79 – 1) higher than the British population at risk.  
Combining the effects of income and population at risk (and assuming all other potential 
effects to be equal), we find that the disamenity costs per ton of landfilled waste in the 
Netherlands might be 39 percent to 50 percent larger than in the UK. In absolute values 
this would point to disamenity costs of € 3.5 to € 3.8 per ton of landfilled waste. This es-
timate is lower than suggested by the (older) COWI study (COWI, 2000), but in line 
with (and slightly higher than) the estimate suggested by the DEFRA study (Enviros 
Consulting et al., 2004). 
*"(	$
The volume of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from waste is subject to uncertainty. 
Spakman et al. (2003) present the methodology that is used to compute CH4 emissions 
from landfills for the official climate change emissions registration. This methodology 
computes current CH4 emissions from all waste deposited in the past (the results are in 
Table 5.9). For our marginal damage estimate, we are interested in the future emissions 
of waste currently deposited. This methodology is explained in Appendix I. A major as-
sumption for this latter calculation is the rate of CH4 recovery that is currently applied 
                                                   
47
  Eurostat News Release, 145/2004 – 3 December 2004. 
48
  Calculated from data in Cambridge Econometrics et al. (2003). This density is very near the 
average EU density of 80 houses/km2 assumed in the COWI study.   
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and will be applied in the future on currently active Dutch landfills. Due to technical 
progress in the Dutch landfilling industry, this rate of recovery is likely to be larger than 
the historical rate that can be derived from the data in Table 5.9 (about 20 percent in 
2002). Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2004b) use a CH4 recovery rate of ‘best-practice’ land-
fills of 77 percent.49 Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh’s landfill is a ‘best-practice’ landfill, its 
technical performance is therefore likely to exceed the average environmental perform-
ance of all current Dutch landfills (active and closed). We use estimates of ERM Neder-
land that suggest an average recovery rate of between 40 and 43 percent (ERM Neder-
land, 2000). 
The share of methane emissions in the total GHG emissions of the Netherlands is 3 per-
cent, and is therefore considered a ‘major key source’ (RIVM, 2004).50 Table 5.9 pre-
sents data on landfilled waste and CH4 emissions from landfills in the Netherlands from 
1990 to 2002. Although CH4 from landfills is still considered a major key source of 
GHG emissions, Table 5.9 shows that the volume of landfilled waste has decreased over 
the last decade, while the recovery rate of CH4 emissions from landfills has increased, so 
that the net emissions of CH4 to the atmosphere have decreased substantially, from 572 
Gg in 1990 to 345 Gg in 2002 (–43%).  
Table 5.9  CH4 emissions from landfills in the Netherlands, 1990-2002. 
Substance 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Waste (Tg) 14.0 11.8 9.2 6.7 5.5 4.8 4.7 
CH4 emissions (Gg) 572 561 527 483 448 389 345 
CH4 emissions recovered/flared (Gg) 26 45 64 69 54 66 69 
Source:  RIVM, 2004. 
Table 5.10 summarizes the assumptions that are used in estimating global warming dam-
ages from landfills. The table reports ‘low’ and ‘high’ estimates of various assumptions 
and also a ‘best’ estimate. The ‘best’ estimate of global warming damages of landfills is 
based on the ‘best’ estimates of the underlying assumptions. This ‘best’ estimate is 
€ 4.21 per ton of waste. As may be clear from the above discussion, there is still a con-
siderable amount of uncertainty regarding global warming damages that is illustrated by 
the extremely wide difference between the ‘low’ estimate (€ 1.46) and the ‘high’ esti-
mate (€ 54.50 per ton of waste). The difference between the ‘low’ and ‘high’ estimates is 
€ 53.04 per ton of waste.  
                                                   
49
  Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh assume an annual landfill gas production of 148 m3 per ton waste, 
of which 78 m3 is exploited, 36 m3 is flared, and 34 m3 is emitted to the atmosphere. Hence, 
net emissions are 34/148*100 = 23 percent of landfill gas production and the recovery rate is 
100 – 23 = 77 percent.  
50
  A ‘major key source’ is a technical term used by IPCC to rank emissions of GHGs according 
to a number of criteria (RIVM, 2004).  
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Table 5.10  Assumptions in the estimation of global warming damages of landfill.  
Assumption ‘Best’ Low High 
Global warming damage €/tCO2 10 5 80 
Annual increase in damage 1 % 1 % 1 % 
CH4/CO2 damage ratio 21 16.5 30 
CH4 Recovery rate 42.5 % 45 % 40 % 
Discount rate 4 % 5 % 3 % 
Global warming damage €/ton waste 4.21 1.46 54.50 
Figure 5.5 presents the distribution of the sources of uncertainty of the estimate of global 
warming damages per ton of waste over the different assumptions.51 Figure 5.5 shows 
that two-thirds of the uncertainty can be attributed to uncertainty over the damage costs 
of global warming. 23 percent of the uncertainty can be attributed to uncertainty over the 
CH4/CO2 damage conversion ratio. the remaining uncertainty can be attributed to differ-
ent assumptions on the rate of discount and the recovery rate of CH4 from landfills.  
CH4/CO2
23%
CH4 recovery 
rate
4%
Discount rate
7%
Global warming 
damage
66%
 
Figure 5.5 Contributions of individual assumptions to the uncertainty of the global 
warming estimate. 
In comparing global warming damages of landfill across different European countries it 
is also interesting to focus on the CH4 recovery rate alone, as this rate is probably the 
                                                   
51
  The contributions to uncertainty are calculated with a decomposition technique 
called the Shapley decomposition method (Albrecht, Francois, & Schoors, 2002). To 
calculate the Shapley value of a variable, all possible orders of inclusion (permutations) 
of the variable in a formula are calculated and the contribution of the variable to the total 
effect is calculated as the average contribution over all permutations. The total effect is 
the difference between the ‘low’ and the ‘high’ estimate of  
Table 5.10  (€ 54.50 – € 1.46 = € 53.04). With 4 variables, as in Figure 5.5, there are 4! = 24 
permutations. According to Albrecht et al. (2002), the Shapley decomposition is perfect 
(there is no residual), symmetric (the order in which the variables are evaluated has no effect 
on the outcome) and there is no need for additional assumptions. 
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largest potential source of difference between these damages across countries.52  
Table 5.11 shows ‘best’ global warming damage estimates at recovery rates of 25%, 
50%, and 75%, respectively. For the Netherlands, an average recovery rate of 42.5 per-
cent has been assumed. 
Table 5.11 Different assumptions on the efficiency of CH4 recovery (% of recovery). 
Recovery rate Global warming damage (€/ton waste) 
25% recovery 7.84 
50% recovery 5.23 
75% recovery 2.61 
*"*6
In the literature, sometimes a special entry is made for the use of land by landfills. Be-
cause land is a marketable commodity, its cost would ideally be included in the private 
costs of a landfill and would not be labelled as an external cost. If, however, the land 
market is highly affected by government regulation (land use planning), as is the case in 
the Netherlands, some authors (Dijkgraaf & Vollebergh, 2004b) have argued that the 
‘shadow cost’ of land use by landfills should be included in the estimate of the external 
costs of landfills. Conceptually, the ‘shadow cost’ of land use of a landfill is the land rent 
that would be offered by the next-best alternative land use. Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh 
(2004b) assume that the next-best alternative to a landfill would be residential develop-
ment and they argue that the difference between the rent for land used for residential de-
velopment and the rent for land used by a landfill is the appropriate measure for the 
‘shadow cost’ of land use by landfills, and that this ‘shadow cost’ should be included in 
an estimate of external costs. 
The DEFRA study (Enviros Consulting et al., 2004) discusses external or ‘shadow’ costs 
of land use, but concludes that, in the British situation at least, the scarcity of land is 
likely to be reflected in the acquisition costs of landfill sites and that this scarcity would 
therefore not represent an environmental or social externality.  
We also notice that the approach of Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh is not recommended in the 
official guidelines on cost-benefit analysis for large infrastructure projects in the Nether-
lands (Eygenraam et al., 2000). The supplement to these guidelines on indirect costs (El-
horst et al., 2004) discusses the welfare effects of changes in the legal classification of 
land, but does not advocate the valuation of land for infrastructural projects at high 
shadow costs. The supplement on the valuation of nature, water and soil (Ruijgrok et al., 
2004) does take into account potential negative effects on nature and biodiversity of 
land-using projects, but not of land use itself.  
Hence, according to these guidelines the appropriate external cost of land use would be 
loss of positive externalities, such as nature, biodiversity or landscape. We do not di-
rectly see a direct correlation between the monetary value of the loss of these positive 
externalities and the ‘shadow costs’ of Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh. It should be kept in 
                                                   
52
  Another source of difference is the composition of the waste, i.e., the biodegradable fraction 
of the waste. We have no information on the variation of this fraction across EU countries. 
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mind, however, that landfilling can indeed nullify positive externalities of alternative 
land uses. The value of this loss would be highly location-specific. We may assume that 
the marginal landfill would not be planned in the most attractive location. Things would 
change, however, if the number of landfills would increase significantly, so that more at-
tractive locations would have to be sacrificed.  
We included Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh’s shadow cost of land use of € 17.88 per tonne of 
waste in our ‘high’ estimate of external costs, while we assume zero external costs in our 
‘low’ and ‘best’ estimates.53    
*"+:$	
The literature mentions several other external effects of landfilling, including water pol-
lution, NOx emissions, and transport-related externalities.  
3
In the literature, seepage of contaminants to ground and surface water is often mentioned 
as one of the external effects of landfilling. In this study we assume that these effects are 
negligible in the Netherlands, due to strict environmental standards for landfills. 
%:
Because of the use of recovered landfill gas in gas engines to produce electricity, and be-
cause of flaring of landfill gas, NOx is emitted to the atmosphere. The volume of NOx 
emissions from landfills is therefore inversely related to the recovery rate of landfill gas. 
Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh estimate the costs of NOx emissions to be € 0.80 per tonne of 
waste, in case of a recovery rate of 77 percent. Linear extrapolation of this cost to recov-
ery rates between 40 and 45 percent and applying our estimate of NOx damage (€ 3,878 
per kg, see Table 5.2) results in a cost estimate between € 0.49 and € 0.55 per tonne of 
waste, with a ‘best’ estimate (at a 42.5% recovery rate) of € 0.52 per tonne of waste.  
#6
On the basis of the standard values presented in Table 5.8 and an average transport in-
tensity of 15 kilometres for each ton of landfilled waste, it can be estimated that the total 
external costs of transport-related activities amounts to € 1.25 per tonne of waste. Health 
effects are the main contributor to the transport-related externalities of landfilled waste 
(see Table 5.12). 
*"- 
A final external effect of landfills may be a positive external effect, as the electricity 
generated by recovered landfill gas might displace a certain volume of conventionally 
generated power and its associated externalities. Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2004b) as-
sume that their ‘best-practice’ landfills produce 112 kWh of electricity (and no heat) per 
tonne of waste. If one makes the assumption that the additional supply of electricity from 
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  The private costs of landfills do, of course, include the private costs of land.  
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landfill gas has no effect on the market price of electricity, and that the only market ef-
fect is a substitution of the supply of electricity away from conventional power plants 
towards landfills, the avoided externalities of conventional power supply may be attrib-
uted to the landfill sector. 
Table 5.13 shows how the avoided externalities of conventional power production are 
calculated (it is based on Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, 2004b). Table 5.13 includes nine 
pollutants of conventional power supply, and shows how much of their emissions is 
avoided per ton of waste (kg/ton), the unit prices of these emissions (€/kg) in our ‘best’, 
‘low’, and ‘high’ estimates, and, finally, the avoided pollution externalities per tonne of 
waste (€). The physical coefficients of the avoided emissions are based on the average 
power plant operating in the Netherlands, taking into account the fuel mix of Dutch 
power supply (CE, 1996). The row labelled ‘subtotal’ gives total avoided externalities 
per tonne of waste in the ‘best-practice’ landfill. The recovery ratio (average recovery 
rate/best-practice recovery rate) is used to account for the alternative landfill gas recov-
ery rates we used for our ‘best’, ‘low’, and ‘high’ estimates. Finally, the bottom row pre-
sents the values of avoided externalities for the ‘best’, ‘low’ and ‘high’ estimates of land-
fill externalities per tonne of waste (€/t). 
Note that the assumption of no market effects of the extra supply of landfill gas electric-
ity is rather stark. One would need an economic model of the power sector to accurately 
assess the first- and second-order effects on emissions of pollutants of the additional 
supply of electricity from landfill gas.  
*".	
Table 5.14 summarises our estimates of the external costs of landfill. Table 5.14 distin-
guishes between external costs of greenhouse gas emissions, other environmental pollu-
tion, land use effects, health effects, and disamenity effects. For these individual exter-
nalities, a range of marginal damage costs per tonne of waste is presented, including a 
‘best’ estimate, and ‘low’ and ‘high’ estimates. The ‘best’ estimate of marginal external 
costs of landfilled waste is approximately € 10 per tonne of waste. The ‘low’ estimate is 
€ 7 per tonne of waste, while the ‘high’ estimate is t € 80 per tonne of waste.  
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Table 5.12  Transport related externalities for landfilling (€/ton of landfilled waste). 
Effect Landfilling 
Climate change (CO2) 0.01920 
Health & materials (CO) 0.00001 
Health & materials (SO2) 0.01497 
Health & materials (NOX) 0.10906 
Health & materials (HC) 0.00329 
Health & materials (PM10) 0.92197 
Accidents (Serious injuries) 0.00045 
Accidents (Mortality) 0.01410 
Congestion 0.17063 
Total transport-related externalities 1.25367 
The most important external effect of landfilling is climate change (i.e. 41% of the total 
external costs). Moreover, climate change is also the most uncertain effect. The second 
most important externality is the disamenity effect accounting for 34% of the total exter-
nal costs. Taking account of 12% of the external effects, the third most important effect 
are transport related externalities. 
Table 5.14 also presents (as negative entries) the maximum possible avoidance of envi-
ronmental damage costs from the conventional power sector because of the production 
of electricity from landfill gas. By subtracting these avoided effects from the negative 
externalities, the net external costs of landfilling in the Netherlands result. The ‘best’ es-
timate is € 9.04 per ton of municipal solid waste. 
Table5.13 Avoided externalities from displaced power production. 
Pollutant  Best Low High 
 Kg/ton €/kg € €/kg € €/kg € 
CO2 66.7 0.01 0.67 0.005 0.33 0.08 5.34 
CH4 0.4 0.30 0.12 0.08 0.03 2.4 0.96 
SO2 0.05 7.508 0.38 7.508 0.38 7.508 0.38 
NOx 0.09 3.878 0.35 3.878 0.35 3.878 0.35 
PM10 0.02 26.765 0.54 26.765 0.54 26.765 0.54 
Bottom ash* 0.93 0.009 0.01 0.006 0.01 0.075 0.08 
Fly ash 0 1.136 0 1.136 0 1.136 0 
Plaster 0 0.009 0 0.006 0 0.075 0 
Mine waste 10.71 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nuclear waste 0 1.136 0 1.136 0 1.136 0 
Subtotal (€/t)   2.06  1.63  7.64 
Recovery ratio   42.5/77  40/77  45/77 
Total (€/t)   1.14  0.85  4.46 
* External costs of bottom ash is valued at the average external costs of landfilling (see Section 
5.3.8).  
Source:  Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2004b) and Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.14  External costs of landfilling one tonne of waste (€/ton).  
Externality Best es-
timate 
Low estimate High estimate 
Greenhouse gas emissions (CH4) 4.21 1.46 54.50 
Other environmental pollution (NOx) 0.52 0.49 0.55 
Transport-related externalities 1.25 1.25 1.25 
Land use  0.00 0.00 17.88 
Health effects 0.70 0.09 1.30 
Disamenity costs 3.50 3.50 3.80 
Subtotal 10.18 6.79 79.28 
Avoided externalities from the power sector  -1.14 -0.85 -4.46 
Total 9.04 5.94 74.82 
"
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*(	
The Netherlands has 12 incinerators which in total process around 5 million tons of solid 
waste per annum. The incinerators are strategically distributed across the country so as to 
minimise transport costs and impacts (see Figure 5.6). The incineration capacity in the 
Netherlands grew substantially in the 1980s but has been relatively stable in the last dec-
ade. Some expansion of the incineration capacity is expected in the coming years.54   
To estimate the external costs of waste incineration in the Netherlands, elaborate calcula-
tions have been conducted. For disamenity effects and global warming, these estimates 
are based on specific calculations for the Netherlands as a whole. For other effects, such 
as air pollution related externalities, calculations are made for one specific incinerator af-
ter which these results are extrapolated to the Netherlands in general. The waste incin-
erator in Alkmaar was found to be a good representative for waste incineration in the 
Netherlands, both in terms of capacity and environmental performance.  
*(!		$%$
Table 5.15 summarises the main characteristics of the Alkmaar incinerator in the North 
of Holland. The nominal installed capacity for the incineration plant, which has a life 
span of 15 years, will be 486,000 t/a, consisting of 3 incineration lines. The maximum 
capacity for generating power is 42 MWe of which 7 MWe is used internally.  
                                                   
54
  The incinerators in Alkmaar and Amsterdam are currently expanding their capacity with 
650,000 tons. The incinerators in Hengelo, Wijster, Rijnmond, Moerdijk and Roosendaal 
have long term plans to expand their capacity with 1.5 million tons (Website AOO 2005). 
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Figure 5.6 Location of waste incinerators in the Netherlands. 
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This combined heat and power generating installation is equipped with modern emission 
control, including dioxins and NOx reduction, according to the national legislation, 
which is stricter than the EU legislation. Both slag and wastewater emissions are very 
low as most of these materials are recycled. 
Stack height has a substantial impact on the concentration of air pollutants in the short 
distance. Moreover, the lower the temperature of the flue gases, the more concentrated 
the pollutants are in the local range (Dorland et al. 1997; 168). The incinerator in Alk-
maar has a stack of 85 meters and flue gases of 170 °C.  
Finally, incineration involves the transport of various types of materials and products. 
These materials are assumed to be transported with a standard diesel truck. The main as-
sumptions regarding transport were shown in Table 5.5.  
In summary, the external effects resulting from the incinerator include: 
• Air pollution causing increased local and regional health damage; 
• SO2 and NOx emissions cause reduced agricultural yield, damage to ecosystems and 
damage to monuments and materials; 
• Transport and operation increase the risk of accidents; 
• An increase in vehicle movement creates additional congestion; 
• House prices are expected to decline due to residents’ concern for the health effect of 
toxic emissions and visual intrusion from the incinerator. 
• The greenhouse gases resulting from incineration are considered climate neutral. 
Only transport related emissions are included; 
• The generation of heat and electricity prevents emissions from other energy generat-
ing sources. 
The external costs in this case study are valued in monetary terms using three methodo-
logical tools. First, the impact pathway methodology (i.e. ExternE) is used to determine 
the public health costs, and damage to materials, buildings, crops, forests, occupational 
health and accidents. Second is the approach from Brisson and Pearce (1995) by which 
the disamenity costs of incinerators and landfills are estimated. Third, the costs of en-
hanced traffic congestion are determined by using values of Newbery (1992).  
*("5$
In calculating the health damage of incineration in the Netherlands, the underlying as-
sumption regarding the valuation of mortality, play an important role. As explained in 
Section 5.2, mortality can be valued in using the ‘Years of Life Lost (YOLL)’ approach 
or the ‘Value of Statistical Life (VSL)’ approach. To avoid a conceptual debate, both ap-
proaches have been used in the calculations. The core estimates for mortality, as shown 
in the first column of Table 5.16, are obtained with the YOLL approach. The sensitivity 
estimates for mortality impacts, shown in the second column of Table 5.16, are obtained 
with the VSL approach. The consequences of the choice between VSL or YOLL for 
valuing air emission related human health impacts is clearly demonstrated. Clearly, the 
VSL scenario gives much higher estimates. 
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Table 5.15  Details of the incinerator in Alkmaar. 
Technical data Level unit 
Waste capacity 486,000 tonne/annum 
Waste operation 465,000 tonne/annum 
Full load operation time electricity 8,117 hours/annum 
Gross electricity production 42 MWe 
Electricity sent out 35 MWe 
Stack parameters 3  stacks 
Stack height 85 meter 
Inside stack diameter 1.8 meter 
Flue gas temperature 170 °C 
Water consumption 15,128 m3/annum 
Construction period 30 months 
Outputs   
Solid output   
- Slag 120,267 tonne/annum 
- Fly ash 14,566 tonne/annum 
- Recycling rate of solid output 90 % 
Water emissions   
- Temperature rise at discharge point 0 οC 
- Volume 0 m3/s 
Air pollutant emissions    
- SO2 5 mg/Nm3 
- NOx  46 mg/Nm3 
- PM10 0.3 mg/Nm3 
- CO 15 mg/Nm3 
- As - µg/Nm3 
- Cd < 4 * µg/Nm3 
- Cr < 3 ** µg/Nm3 
- Hg < 1 µg/Nm3 
- Ni - µg/Nm3 
- PAH  < 0.5 µg/Nm3 
- Pb - mg/Nm3 
- PCB 0.012 µg/Nm3 
- PCDD/PCDF < 1 pg/m3 
Source:  compiled from Project Appraisal Documents of the EIB (Van Beukering et al. 1998). 
*
  ‘<‘ means ‘smaller than’. The value without the ‘<‘ sign has been used in the analysis. 
** 
 for Western European plant not only Cr but sum of Sb, Pb, Cr, Cu, Mn, V, Sn, As, Co, Ni, Se 
and Te. 
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Table 5.16 Health effect of incineration in the Netherlands (€/ton of municipal waste). 
 Health damage (YOLL) Health damage (VSL) 
Mortality   
- PM10 0.0118 0.0434 
- SO2 a 0.0697 0.2425 
- NOx b 0.8066 2.9653 
- NOx (via ozone) 0.0973 3.4589 
Morbidity 
  
- PM10, SO2 a and NOx b 0.1350 0.1350 
- NOx (via ozone) 0.1728 0.1728 
Occupational health   
- Accumulated 0.0745 0.0745 
Total health damage 1.3678 7.0925 
a
  Mainly impacts due to sulphates formed from SO2 in the atmosphere and direct SO2 impacts. 
b
  Mainly impacts due to nitrates formed from NOx in the atmosphere. 
*((8	
The damage cost of atmospheric emissions from incineration in the Netherlands on ma-
terials and agricultural crops is shown in 5.17. Similar to health damage, NOx is the main 
contributor to the external costs of materials and crops. Still, the level of the damage is 
limited as compared to the health damages caused by air pollution. 
*(*)
Disamenity from waste incineration may be caused by various impacts. The trucks, 
transporting waste to and from the sites may cause noise externalities. Additionally, the 
incinerator may emit annoying odours. Also visual pollution results from incineration. 
An important factor for incineration is the increased fear for health risk by people living 
in its vicinity.  
Table 5.17 Material and crop damage caused by air pollution from incineration in the 
Netherlands (€/ton of municipal waste). 
 Crop & material damage 
Crops  
- SO2 0.0001 
- NOx (via ozone) 0.0826 
Materials  
- Monuments (through SO2) 0.0017 
- Other buildings (through SO2) 0.0420 
Total damage 0.1264 
  
There is only one relevant study that explicitly determines the disamenity impacts of in-
cinerators. Kiel and McClain (1995) conducted a hedonic pricing study in Massachus-
sets, USA. They find that starting at 5.5 kilometre from the plant, the house price drops 
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by approximately € 9,500 (2005 prices) with every kilometre approaching the incinera-
tor.  
Given these findings, we assume that the disamenity effects differ between landfilling 
and incineration. First, the reduction in house prices seems to be more pronounced with 
incineration. This may be due to the fact that incineration is mainly disliked because of 
the perception of air pollution. In the Netherlands, since the negative publicity of the 
emissions of the highly toxic dioxins in the early 1990s, people are more reluctant to live 
near an incinerator. Even if the legal standards are met, the fear will not disappear im-
mediately. Second, due to the importance of air emissions and the height of the stack, the 
impact area of an incinerator is significantly larger than the area affected by a landfill 
site. Therefore, the area of affected houses around the landfill site is limited to a buffer 
of 1 kilometre around the site. The impact area of incinerators in the Netherlands is as-
sumed to reach as far as 5 kilometres from the actual site.  
Our estimation of the disamenity effects in the Netherlands starts with the estimation of 
the number of residential houses within the radius of 5.5 kilometres of the plant. This ra-
dius is subdivided into zones of 1 kilometre (see as an example Figure 5.7). Next, 
through a GIS analysis, the house density has been determined for all active 11 incinera-
tors in the Netherlands. Five buffer zones of 1 kilometre have been drawn around each 
incinerator, after which the total number of residential sites was counted. The GIS pro-
cedure has been elaborately described in the Appendix II. The main outcome of the GIS 
analysis is shown in Table 5.18. 
 
Figure 5.7 Five respective 1-kilometre zones indicating the different levels of  
disamenity impact around the waste incinerator in West-Amsterdam.  
Red and pink polygons represent residential and commercial buildings, 
 respectively. 
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Table 5.18 Number and density of houses located within 5 km from an incinerator in the 
Netherlands. 
Impacted area Number of houses House density 
Zone # #/km2 
1000 meter 15,136 430 
2000 meter 50,534 363 
3000 meter 158,485 508 
4000 meter 260,714 471 
5000 meter 382,813 443 
 Total 867,682 430 
Note:  The house density for the 1000-meter buffer is higher than the one for the 2000-meter 
buffer.This illogical result is explained by the fact that one incinerator (i.e. Afvalver-
werking Rotterdam) has an exceptionally high density in the 1000-meter zone, thereby 
accounting for 94% (14,181 of the 15,136 houses) of the houses in this zone in the Neth-
erlands.    
For landfill we determined disamenity costs of € 3.5 to € 3.8 per ton of landfilled waste 
(see Section 5.3.3). With 4,700,000 tons landfilled per year, this implies a value of be-
tween € 16.5 million and € 17.9 million for the 1 kilometre buffer zone. Next, we assume 
that the same value also exists for the same zone around the incinerators. This is re-
flected in the 1st row of.Table 5.19. The difference with the incinerator is that the impact 
zone stretches as far as 5 kilometres. As shown in the 3rd and 5th column, the impact on 
the house price diminishes in a linear fashion with the distance from the incinerator. By 
multiplying the number of houses in each zone with the house price reduction, the total 
value reduction can be measured (i.e. € 45.4 and € 49.3 million per year). This is con-
verted to disamenity value per ton of waste by dividing the above value reduction by the 
total amount of waste incinerated (i.e. 5 million tons). As a result, the minimum and 
maximum disamenity value are determined at € 9 and € 10 per ton of incinerated waste.    
Table 5.19 Calculation of the disamenity value of waste incineration in the Netherlands. 
Impact area Number houses 
House 
price re-
duction Value reduction 
House 
price re-
duction Value reduction 
Zone # €/house million € €/house million € 
1000 meter             15,136        1,087  16.5       1,180  17.9 
2000 meter             50,534           844  12.8          916  13.9 
3000 meter            158,485           601  9.1          652  9.9 
4000 meter            260,714           357  5.4          388  5.9 
5000 meter            382,813           114  1.7          124  1.9 
Total            867,682  
 
45.4 
 
49.3 
Per ton of waste (€)  
 
9.1 
 
9.9 
*(+	$
Our general approach in estimating the effects of incineration on climate change is to es-
timate the (1) gross emissions of CO2 and N2O (including emissions from transportation 
of waste to the incinerator, and ash from the incinerator to a landfill) and (2) CO2 emis-
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sions avoided due to displaced electricity generation and increased production of steel 
and recycled inputs. To obtain an estimate of the net GHG emissions from incineration, 
we subtracted the GHG emissions avoided from the direct GHG emissions.  
The carbon in municipal solid waste has two distinct origins. Some of the carbon in the 
waste is biomass carbon (i.e. carbon in plant and animal matter that was converted from 
CO2 in the atmosphere through photosynthesis). The remaining carbon in waste is from 
non-biomass sources, e.g., plastics and synthetic rubber derived from petroleum. We ex-
cluded biogenic CO2 emissions from combustion of biomass but included the combus-
tion of the non-biomass components in the solid waste.  
A study for the USEPA (ICF 1997) shows that under the above mentioned assumptions, 
the gross GHG emissions per ton of incinerated municipal solid waste (MSW) are equal 
to 0.12 metric tons of carbon equivalent (MTCE) (see 5.20). Avoided energy and mate-
rial production leads to a decline in emissions of 0.08 MTCE. Assuming that the waste 
composition in the USA is similar to the Netherlands, the net GHG emission from incin-
erating one ton of MSW in the Netherlands is estimated at 0.04 MTCE, which is equiva-
lent to 0.011 ton CO2. 
Table 5.20 Quantification of net GHG emissions from MSW incineration. 
 
CO2 from 
incineration 
N2O from 
incineration 
CO2 from 
transport 
GHG 
Emissions 
CO2  
equivalent 
 MTCE/ton MTCE/ton MTCE/ton MTCE/ton MT CO2/ton 
Gross emissions  0.10 0.01 0.01  0.12  0.033 
Avoided electricity 
generation - 0.07   - 0.07 -0.019 
Avoided material - 0.01   - 0.01  -0.03 
Net GHG emissions     0.04 0.011 
Source:  ICF, 1997, p.86-91. 
Table 5.21 summarizes the assumptions that are used in estimating global warming dam-
ages from incineration in the Netherlands. The table reports ‘low’ and ‘high’ estimates of 
various assumptions and also a ‘best’ estimate. The ‘best’ estimate of global warming 
damages of incineration is based on the ‘best’ estimates of the underlying assumptions. 
This ‘best’ estimate is € 0.11 per ton of waste.  
Table 5.21 Estimates of global warming damages of incineration in the Netherlands. 
Assumption ‘Best’ Low High 
Global warming damage €/tCO2 10 5 80 
Net CO2 equivalent emissions 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Global warming damage €/ton waste 0.11 0.055 0.88 
*(-:$	
#6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
On the basis of the standard values presented in Table 5.8 and an average transport in-
tensity of 20 kilometres for each ton of incinerated waste, it can be estimated that the to-
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tal external costs of transport-related activities amounts to € 1.67. Health effects are the 
main contributor to the transport-related externalities of incinerated waste. 
	$	
Figure 5.8 shows the treatment and disposal of solid residues of incineration, as practiced 
in the Netherlands. Solid residues consist of bottom ash and the more toxic residues from 
flue gas treatment. Bottom ash is produced from the combustion process and comprises 
around 20-30% of the mass of the waste treated at an incinerator. It is possible to recover 
materials such as iron and aluminium from bottom ash. The remainder of the bottom ash 
is generally disposed of to a to a controlled landfill. Under some conditions, however, 
the utilisation of bottom ash in road base materials is allowed. 
Residues generated through the process of flue gas treatment are typically hazardous. 
These residues include fly ash and residues obtained from acid gas cleaning. Dutch in-
cinerators generate around 20 kg of fly ash and 1-20 kg of acid gas cleaning residue per 
ton of waste incinerated (Hjelmar, 1998). Flue gas residues are problematic due to the 
high concentration of heavy metals and are therefore disposed of in controlled landfill 
sites designed for  
hazardous waste, either separately (monofill) or, less frequently, combined with bottom 
ash (landfill). 
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Figure 5.8 Potential treatment and disposal routes for solid waste residues from MSW  
incineration plants. 
Source: COWI, 2000, p.23. 
In our calculations we assume that the incineration of one ton of waste in the average 
Dutch plant generates 258 kg of bottom ash (Van Beukering et al. 1998) and 7.8 kg of 
chemical waste (CE 1996). The relatively harmless bottom ash which in the Netherlands 
is generally used as road and construction material, in the ‘best’ scenario is valued at 
zero external costs. In the ‘high’ cost scenario, the cost of bottom ash is valued at the ex-
ternal costs of landfilling in the Netherlands, exclusive of the costs of greenhouse gas 
emissions, because bottom ashes do not contain organic materials (see calculation in 
Section 5.3).  
The external costs of chemical waste disposal can be based on two assumptions. On the 
one hand, the fact that chemical waste is hazardous may be a reason to apply high exter-
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nal costs. This is reflected in the estimate provided by CE (1996). On the other hand, if 
the chemical waste is properly stored in a controlled landfill or monofill, the hazardous 
content of the waste does not lead to externalities, unless accidents happen to the landfill 
or during the transport (Ascari et al., 1995). However, no information could be found on 
the probability of such incidents. Therefore, we also estimate the external costs of 
chemical waste assuming that the risk of accidents is negligible because it has been in-
ternalised into in the overall treatment costs. In that case, we value the chemical residues 
at the external costs of landfilling in the Netherlands, exclusive of the costs of green-
house gas emissions. Table 5.22 shows the overall external costs of solid waste residues 
from incineration.    
*(. 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Similar to landfills, incinerators in the Netherlands generate positive externalities 
through the production of heat and electricity. This implies that processing waste through 
incineration displaces the conventional generation of electricity and heat with its related 
negative externalities. We tap several sources of background data to estimate the size of 
these avoided externalities.  
First, Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2004b) assume that their ‘best-practice’ incinerators 
generate 580 kWh of electricity and 299 kWh of heat per ton of waste. Previous calcula-
tions in the ExternE study assume an average output equivalent of 614 kWh per ton of 
waste. We adopt the latter estimates for the calculation of the level of the avoided emis-
sions. Second, the value associated with each air pollutant are applied from both CE 
(1996) and ExternE (EC, 1995) to determine an upper and a lower estimate of the 
avoided externalities. As with landfills, we assume that the additional supply of electric-
ity from incineration has no effect on the market price of electricity, and that the only 
market effect is a substitution of the supply of electricity away from conventional power 
plants towards incinerators, the avoided externalities of conventional power supply may 
be attributed to the incineration sector. It is assumed that the displaced energy represents 
the average fuel mix for power plants in the Netherlands. 
Table 5.22 External costs of solid waste residues of incineration (€/ton). 
Waste residues Quantity Costs per ton of pollutant  External costs per ton of waste 
  ‘best’ ‘low’ ‘high’ ‘best’ ‘low’ ‘high’ 
Unit kg/ton €/ton €/ton €/ton €/ton €/ton €/ton 
Bottom ash 259 0 0 0.02  0 0 5.18 
Chemical waste 21.8 0.005 0.004 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.44 
 
  External costs solid 
residues  
   
0.11 0.09 5.62 
Table 5.23 includes eight pollutants of conventional power supply, and shows how much 
of their emissions is avoided per ton of waste (kg/ton), the unit prices of these emissions 
(€/kg) in our ‘best’, ‘low’ and ‘high’ estimates, and, finally, the avoided pollution exter-
nalities per ton of waste (€). 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 
 
108
 
Table 5.23 External cost estimates for avoided emissions from incineration in the  
Netherlands. 
Pollutant Pollutant Best estimate Low estimate High estimate 
  kg/ton waste €/kg €/ton waste €/kg €/ton waste €/kg €/ton waste 
CO2 365 0 0 0.00a 0.00 0 0.00 
CH4 2.192 0.30 0.67 0.008 0.02 2.4 5.26 
SO2 0.274 7.508 2.06 7.508 2.06 7.508 2.06 
NOx 0.493 3.878 1.91 3.878 1.91 3.878 1.91 
PM10 0.11 26.765 2.94 26.765 2.94 26.765 2.94 
Bottom ash 5.096 0.009 0.04 0.006 0.03 0.075 0.38 
Fly ash 0 1.136 0 1.136 0.00 1.136 0.00 
Mine waste 58.686 0 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Total   7.63  6.96  12.56 
a
 The external benefits of climate change related to incineration are addressed in the previous 
Chapter and therefore not accounted for in this estimate of avoided emissions. 
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The estimates of the external costs of incineration are summarised in Table 5.24, which 
distinguishes between external costs of health, materials, agriculture, disamenity, con-
gestion, and climate change. For these individual externalities, a range of marginal dam-
age costs per tonne of waste is presented, including a ‘best’ estimate, and ‘low’ and 
‘high’ estimates. The ‘best’ estimate of marginal external costs of incinerated waste (not 
taking into account the avoided environmental impacts of energy production) is ap-
proximately € 18 per ton of waste. The ‘low’ estimate is € 12 per ton of waste, while the 
‘high’ estimate is € 25 per ton of waste. 
Table 5.24 Aggregation of external costs of incineration in the Netherlands (€/ton). 
Effect Best estimate Low estimate High estimate 
Health 7.09 1.37 7.09 
Materials & agriculture 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Disamenity 9.09 9.09 9.87 
Transport-related 1.67 1.67 1.67 
Solid waste 0.11 0.09 5.62 
Climate change 0.11 0.06 0.88 
Subtotal 18.20 12.41 25.26 
Displaced effects -7.63 -6.96 -12.56 
Total 10.57 5.45 12.70 
The most important externality of incineration is the disamenity effect (i.e. 50% of the 
total (gross) external costs). The second most important externality is the negative im-
pact on health through air emissions. Health effects account for 39% of the external 
costs. Taking account of 9% of the external effects, the third most important effect is 
transport-related externalities. As opposed to the situation with landfilling, the impor-
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tance of the effects of climate change caused by incineration is minimal. Climate change 
effects contribute only 1% to the overall external costs.    
Table 5.24 also presents (as negative entries) the maximum possible avoidance of envi-
ronmental damage costs from the conventional power sector because of the production 
of electricity and heat from incineration. By subtracting these avoided effects from the 
negative externalities, the net external costs of incineration in the Netherlands result. The 
‘best’ estimate is € 10.57 per ton of municipal solid waste. 
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The external costs of landfill and incineration have been the subject of a relatively large 
number of studies in recent years. Most of these studies focus only on one specific exter-
nality. Only a few studies attempt to aggregate a number of the most relevant environ-
mental effects, thereby allowing for a fair comparison, internationally. In this Chapter, 
we will compare these studies with our findings. 
The first study we address is a study by Ascari et al. (1995) that has been prepared for 
the ExternE Project in which a comparison is made between incineration and landfilling 
in both rural and urban areas. The study takes into account the effects on health (i.e. 
morbidity, mortality), agriculture and materials, climate change and accidents. The study 
excludes several potentially important categories of externalities, such as the disamenity 
impact of incinerators and landfills, and the effect on soil and groundwater. The study 
therefore warns for using these results for the setting of levies and subsidies to waste 
disposal technologies until a number of these missing values are properly assessed.  
The impact of the location (i.e. urban and rural) on the level of externalities is clearly 
visible in Figure 5.9. The external cost of incineration in Italy varies between € 16 and 
€ 27 per tonne incinerated. The external costs of landfilling are substantially lower, vary-
ing between € 3 and € 4 per ton of landfilled waste. 
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Figure 5.9 External costs of incineration and landfilling in Italy (€/ton). 
Source: Ascari et al. (1995). 
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The second study that quantifies the external costs of landfilling and incineration is pre-
pared for a hypothetical location in Europe (COWI 2000). The examples have been de-
signed to reflect respectively old obsolete and new modern waste disposal plants for both 
landfilling and incineration. The examples include the external costs of climate change, 
conventional air pollutants and some airborne toxic substances, leachate and disamenity 
effects. The calculations include external benefits in the form of displaced emissions 
from energy recovery but exclude externalities related to transport of waste and residues.  
Table 5.25 summarises the main results of the COWI study. The first typical finding of 
the analysis is that the modern incinerator actually generates external benefits, rather 
than external costs. Although the gross external costs account for € 28 per ton of inciner-
ated waste, the displaced energy generated external benefits of € 70, thereby leading to a 
net gain of €42 per ton of incinerated waste. With a net externality of € 37, the obsolete 
incinerator is much less environmentally friendly. Both the modern and old landfill, per-
form better than the old incinerator. The main contributors to the external effects are 
climate change for landfilling and air-related health effects for incineration.  
Table 5.25 External cost of incineration and landfilling in Europe (€/ton). 
 
Incineration 
(85% energy 
recovery) 
Incineration 
(25% energy 
recovery) 
Landfilling 
(BAT) 
 
Landfilling 
(old) 
 
Global warming 0.77 0.77 4.91 8.19 
Air emissions 19.82 50.08 0.12 0.00 
Water pollution / leachate 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.52 
Disamenity 7.50 7.50 10.01 10.01 
Total external costs 28.09 58.36 15.04 19.72 
Energy savings -69.66 -20.98 -4.03 0.00 
Net external costs -41.56 37.37 11.01 19.72 
Source: COWI (2000), p.60 & p.63. 
The final study that compares landfilling and incineration is from the Netherlands itself 
(Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, 2004b). On the basis of existing information on technical 
properties of installations, emission levels and monetary estimates, the external costs of 
the average incinerator and landfill site have been estimated (see Table 5. 6). Taking into 
account the external benefits from the displaced energy and materials, incineration gen-
erates slightly less external costs than landfilling in the Netherlands (i.e. € 18 vs € 22).   
The estimates of the externalities of the incinerator are higher than the previous studies. 
One reason for this difference is the high value for chemical waste. Whether this is justi-
fied is uncertain. As mentioned earlier, most studies assume that chemical waste is stored 
properly and therefore does not form a serious environmental threat. The landfill esti-
mates also have an uncommon component: land use. As discussed in Section 5.3, this 
category is usually not considered as an external effect.  
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Table 5. 26 External costs of incineration and landfilling in the Netherlands (€/ton). 
Externality Landfilling Incineration 
Air emissions 5.84 17.26 
Water pollution 0.00 0.00 
Chemical waste 2.63 28.69 
Land use 17.88 0.00 
Sub total 26.35 45.95 
Energy savings - 4.21 - 22.55 
Material savings 0.00 - 5.76 
Total external costs 22.14 17.64 
Source: Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2004b). 
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In the literature, several studies can be found that explicitly calculate the private costs of 
incineration. Generally, these costs are affected by: 
• Costs of land acquisition; 
• Scale (there are significant diseconomies of small scale); 
• Plant utilisation rate; 
• The level of treatment of flue gas; 
• The level of treatment and disposal of ash residues; 
• The efficiency of energy recovery, and the revenue received for energy delivered; 
• The recovery of metals and the revenues received from this. 
A rough cost breakdown for a 200,000 tonne facility is given in Table 5.27. 
Table 5.27 Examples of incineration of solid waste in Europe.  
Cost category Flanders Germany  
Unit € per ton waste € per ton waste 
Capital costs 37.08 63.61  
Operational costs (input independent) 31.76 38.56  
Operational costs (input dependent) 18.04 19.10  
Credits for electricity -11.76 -16.27  
Total costs 75.12 105.00  
Source: Hogg (2001). 
The estimate of the private costs of incineration in the Netherlands used in this analysis 
is based on a study conducted by the Dutch Ministry of Finance (quoted by Dijkgraaf 
and Vollebergh (2004b)). These facts and figures accurately reflect the real costs of in-
cineration at a state-of-the-art technology in the Dutch context. The background data on 
savings on the private costs of generating electricity and materials production are based 
on Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2004b). The costs of electricity production through a gas-
fired power plant in the Netherlands is € 0.036 per kWh (2000 prices). 
It is much more difficult to find reliable data on the true costs of landfill operations. Es-
pecially, the Dutch context is poorly administered publicly (Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh 
(2004b). There is a risk in transferring international estimates to the Dutch context be-
cause the Netherlands has one of the strictest legislations regarding leakage of effluent in 
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the world. Still, considering European studies for this purpose may help to get a better 
idea of the range of landfill costs (see Table 5.28).  
Landfill costs can typically be disaggregated into five components. To indicate the im-
portance of each component, an example from the United Kingdom (excluding energy 
recovery) is added: 
• Acquisition costs (e.g. UK example: € 1.56 per ton); 
• Capital expenditure and development costs (e.g. UK example: € 11.46 per ton); 
• Operating costs (e.g. UK example: € 10.97 per ton); 
• Restoration (e.g. UK example: € 0.78 per ton); 
• Aftercare costs (e.g. UK example: € 4.01 per ton). 
The estimates used in our assessment are based on the only Dutch estimates available as 
well as expert judgements (see Table 5.29). The costs of landfilling in The Netherlands 
(€ 36 per tonne55) seem to be lower than in many other EU Member States (see Table 
5.28). 
Table 5.28 Comparative costs of landfill in different member states (€/ton). 
Country Financial costs 
Austria 67 
Belgium 45 
France 31-85 
Germany 20-51 
Italy 52 
Luxemburg 123-147 
United Kingdom 28 
Average 59 
Source: Hogg (2001), p.64. 
Table 5.29 Private costs estimates for landfilling and incineration (€/ton). 
Cost category Incineration Landfilling 
Gross private costs 125 40 
Displaced costs - energy -21 -4 
Displaced costs - materials  -3 -0 
Net private costs  101 36 
Source:  Dutch Ministry of Finance quoted by Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh (2004b). The private 
costs 
  for incineration are based on expert judgements. 
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The main purpose of the economic valuation of the externalities of incineration and land-
filling in the Netherlands is two-fold. First, we want to find out whether the landfill tax is 
representative for the external costs of landfilling in the Netherlands. At present, landfill 
                                                   
55
  This figure seems to be reasonably reliable. For comparison: a survey among members of the 
Vereniging Afvalbedrijven revealed an average landfilling tariff of € 38 per tonne in 2003 
(personal communication J. Bouman, NV Afvalzorg, August 2005). 
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tax in the Netherlands is almost € 85 per ton. Compared to many other European coun-
tries, this is rather high. Moreover, because of the technical requirements on the man-
agement of landfill sites and restrictions on inputs, gate fees in 2003 are typically € 125 
per ton. These high fees strongly discourage the disposal of municipal solid waste in 
landfills. The last column of Table 5.30 shows the external costs of landfilling in the 
Netherlands. Clearly, the ‘best’ estimate of € 10.33 per ton of landfilled waste is consid-
erably lower than the current level of the landfill tax. As we have argued, however, the 
size of the external effects of landfilling is uncertain, to a large extent because of the un-
certainty of future damage through global warming and of uncertainty of the extent to 
which the opportunity cost of land exceeds its market value. Taking these sources of un-
certainty into account, the landfill tax exceeds the uncertainty range of marginal external 
damage by a small margin only.   
Second, we want to test the validity of the fundament of the Dutch waste policies, the 
‘waste hierarchy’, which identifies incineration with energy recovery as preferred to 
landfilling with energy recovery. In order to fulfil this objective, we estimated the social 
costs by adding up the private and external costs. The results are shown in Table 5.30. 
Taking the ‘best’ estimate as the basis of our calculation, we conclude that, at the mar-
gin, the social costs of incineration (€ 112) exceed the social costs of landfilling (€ 45) 
substantially. However, the range of uncertainty for the social costs of landfilling is rela-
tively large, and the ‘high’ estimates for both types of waste management are quite close 
to each other.    
Table 5.30 Private, external and social costs of incineration and landfilling of munici-
pal solid waste in the Netherlands (€/ton) . 
Cost category  Incineration Landfilling 
 Scenario €/ton €/ton 
Private costs  101.00 36.00 
External costs Best 10.57 9.04 
External costs Low 5.28 5.94 
External costs High 12.65 74.82 
Social costs Best 111.57 45.04 
Social costs Low 106.28 41.94 
Social costs High 113.65 110.82 
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Co-incineration of solid waste residues in coal-fired power plants is becoming increas-
ingly popular in the Netherlands. For example, at present 18% of plastic waste in the 
Netherlands is processed in cement kilns and power plants (Jaarverslag Commissie Ver-
pakkingen, 2003). To be suitable for co-incineration processes, solid waste has to meet 
several criteria. First, the waste should have a high-energy value in order to meet the 
temperature limits of the furnaces and kilns. Second, the solid waste should not contain 
high concentrations of pollutants such as heavy metals to avoid violations of the existing 
air emission standards in the Netherlands. Third, the waste should generate a particular 
quality of bottom ash so that the ash can still be used in alternative applications such as 
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the cement industry. Fourth, also specific physical conditions need to be met to allow for 
grinding of the materials (AOO, 2002b). 
The solid waste residues that meet these criteria include A-wood, B-wood, and paper and 
plastics residues (PPF). Therefore, co-incineration provides only a partial solution to a 
particular type of solid waste in the Netherlands. Because the waste types for the various 
waste management processes varies widely, a straightforward comparison between in-
cineration, landfilling and co-incineration is not fully justified. While landfilling and in-
cineration process a random mixture of household waste, co-incineration handles spe-
cific industrial and institutional waste with high caloric value. Another constraint of 
comparing incineration, landfilling and co-incineration is that especially incineration and 
co-incineration are mutually dependent. The efficiency of incineration can improve by 
extracting waste with high calorific value from the overall waste flow, for example 
through separating waste for the purpose of co-incineration. In other words, strictly 
speaking incineration and co-incineration cannot be analysed independently.  
Due to these fundamental limitations, we only provide an rough approximation of the ex-
ternal costs of co-incineration. We re-emphasize, however, that such a comparison is one 
of comparing ‘apples and oranges’. The results should therefore only be considered as a 
means of improving our understanding of co-incineration as an additional waste man-
agement option, rather than as robust measure of the social desirability of this process. 
Two sources explicitly report on the environmental performance of co-incineration of 
solid waste in coal fired power plants and cement kilns in the Netherlands. Croezen and 
Bergsma (2000) conduct and environmental impact assessment of the processing of 
waste plastics for various incineration processes such as the traditional method of incin-
eration, gasification, and co-incineration as sub-coal in cement kilns and coal fired 
power plants. As shown in Table 5.31, both processing through coal fired plants and ce-
ment kilns generates better environmental scores for all environmental themes except for 
VOCs. In fact, according to their study, co-incineration provides an environmental im-
provement, rather than merely a reduction in environmental pressure. The advantages of 
both processes compared to conventional incineration is that they perform much better 
for climate change, acidification and solid waste. Unfortunately, the results of Croezen 
en Bergsma can not be used to determine the external monetary value of co-incineration 
because their method of valuing the emissions is based on a fundamentally different 
process.   
AOO (2002b) provides the environmental impact of various incineration scenarios in the 
Netherlands. These scenarios involve different levels of co-incineration. Two scenarios 
are relevant for our study. The first is the ‘integrated incineration’ scenario in which 
landfilling and co-incineration are gradually eliminated before 2012 and the incineration 
capacity in the Netherlands is further expanded by introducing novel incineration tech-
niques. The other scenario is labelled ‘co-incineration’ and involves the expansion of the 
co-incineration capacity from 0.5 million tons by 2005 to 2.5 million tons by 2012. This 
expansion goes at the expense of the incineration capacity. The calculated environmental 
impact of both scenarios, and the difference between them, is shown in Table 5.32. 
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Table 5.31 Contribution of different environmental problems to total environmental  
indicator of three processing methods.  
Environmental 
problem 
Conventional 
incineration 
Co-incineration coal fired 
Power plant 
Co-incineration 
cement kiln 
 
Absolute value 
(10-9 per ton 
waste plastic) 
Absolute value 
(10-9 per ton 
waste plastic) 
Relative dif-
ference to in-
cineration 
Absolute value 
(10-9 per ton 
waste plastic) 
Relative difference 
to incineration 
Climate change 
(kg CO2 –eq) 9.3 -2.6 -128% -3.2 -134% 
Acidification 
(kg SO2 –eq) 1.6 -3.4 -313% -0.5 -131% 
Euthrophication 
(kg PO4 –eq) 0.1 -0.9 -1000% -0.1 -200% 
VOCs 
(kg VOCs) -0.9 0.1 -111% 0 -100% 
Air pollution 
(kg poll. env) 0 -0.1 n.a. 0 n.a. 
Solid waste 
(kg solid waste) 17.7 0 -100% 0 -100% 
Total 27.8 -6.9 -125% -3.8 -114% 
Source: based on Croezen and Bergsma (2000). 
Table 5.32 Overview of main environmental impacts of the incineration and the co-
incineration scenarios. 
 Unit Incineration Co-incineration Difference 
Energy GJ/ton 6.2 3.6 -42% 
Waste disposal kg/ton 0 0 n.a. 
CO2 kg/ton 571 580 2% 
NOx kg/ton 0.41 0.68 66% 
NH3 kg/ton 0.02 0.011 -45% 
N2O kg/ton 0 0.004 n.a. 
CO kg/ton 0.15 0.2 33% 
CH kg/ton 0.04 0.18 350% 
PM10 kg/ton 0.0219 0.0172 -21% 
Dioxines kg/ton 3.6E-10 2.1E-10 -42% 
Transport Tonkm 60 91 52% 
Space m2/ton year 0.14 0.22 57% 
Source: based on AOO, 2002b. 
On the basis of the above information in Table 5.32, we are able to modify the earlier 
monetary estimate on incineration, as presented in the first column of Table 5.33. The 
difference for the health estimate is based on a weighted average of NOx and PM10 
emissions. The material and agricultural damage is based on NOx only. The modifica-
tion of disamenity is based on the fact that co-incineration requires substantially more 
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space. The other notable effect is the reduction in displaced energy.56 Ultimately, the ex-
ternal costs in the co-incineration scenario are significantly higher than for the integrated 
incineration scenario.  
Because both studies report opposite results, we feel the monetary estimate for co-
incineration reported in Table 5.33 is not very reliable. Nevertheless, as it is the best we 
can get, we will use this estimate as the basis for our conclusions in the next chapter. 
Table 5.33 Aggregation of external costs of co-incineration in the Netherlands (€/ton) 
Effect Incineration a Change b Co-incineration c 
Health 7.09 +48% 10.52 
Materials & agriculture 0.13 +66% 0.22 
Disamenity 9.09 +57% 14.28 
Transport-related 1.67 +52% 2.53 
Solid waste 0.11 0 0.11 
Climate change 0.11 +2% 0.11 
Subtotal 18.20  27.77 
Displaced effects -7.63 -42% -4.43 
Total 10.57  23.34 
a
  based on estimates from this study (see previous chapter). 
b
  based on difference derived from AOO, 2002b. 
c
  combination of column 1 and 2. 
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		

To wind up this chapter, we return to the research questions that it had to answer: 
• What are the social costs and benefits of the following treatment options for house-
hold waste and comparable waste from firms: 
• Landfilling all waste; 
• The present situation; 
• Terminating the landfilling of combustible waste by shifting it to waste incineration; 
• Terminating the landfilling of combustible waste by shifting it to co-incineration (in 
power plants); 
• Terminating the landfilling of combustible waste by optimizing/maximizing recy-
cling. 
A definitive answer to this question cannot be given, due to lacking and sometimes con-
tradictory information, especially regarding co-incineration and various recycling op-
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  One could argue that in case of co-incineration the appropriate reference situation is a 100% 
coal power plant, rather than the average fuel mix for Dutch power plants (because co-
incineration will usually take place in coal power plants). In that case the absolute value of 
the ‘displaced effects’ would be somewhat higher. Nevertheless, the total external costs of 
co-incinaration would still be much higher than those of incineration.  
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tions. However, if we assume the social costs to be zero for recycling57, while adopting 
the external costs estimated by AOO (2002b) for co-incineration, some preliminary es-
timates can be provided for the above scenarios. For this purpose we utilise the ‘best’ es-
timates of the net social costs for each option, as estimated in the preceding Chapters. 
Next, we need to determine the process mix in terms of physical quantities of each of the 
five scenarios. The most recent source of the allocation of waste management options in 
the Netherlands is provided by the Milieu en Natuur Planbureau in the Netherlands. The 
total amount of household and institutional/office waste involved is 13.788 mln ton 
(MNP, 2005), of which in the present situation 48% is recycled (excluding co-
incineration in power plants), 38% is incinerated, 4% co-incinerated, 8% landfilled and 
2% discharged (liquid waste). Because this latter category is both rather small and ex-
tremely varied in terms of external effects, we exclude the ‘discharge’ category in the 
scenario analysis. It is assumed that in principle all waste from households and compara-
ble waste from firms is combustible.  
Table 5.34 Quantities of household and institutional/office waste processed in the Neth-
erlands in 2003 (in 1,000 tons per year). 
 Household waste Institutional/office waste Total waste Share 
Recycling 4,147 2,498 6,644 48% 
Incineration 3,633 1,645 5,278 38% 
Co-incineration* 363 165 528 4% 
Landfill 519 556 1,075 8% 
Discharge 147 116 263 2% 
 8,809 4,979 13,788  
* Co-incineration is not provided in the original data from MNP. Therefore, we adopted 
the level of around half a million tons of co-incinerated waste reported by AOO (2002b). 
This amount was deducted from the recycled amount as reported by MNP, who apply a 
broad definition of recycling (i.e. ‘useful applications’).  
Source: based on MNP 2005, Table B2.1, p.130. 
The physical flows of the five scenarios are shown in the upper part of Table 5.35. The 
next parts of Table 5.35 show the private, external, avoided energy and the social costs, 
respectively. The lowest social costs are recorded in scenario 1 which hypothetically 
treats all the solid waste through landfilling. The second best option is the maximisation 
of recycling scenario (i.e. scenario 5). Yet, this result is mainly driven by the fact that the 
external costs of recyling are unknown and therefore are assumed to be zero. The highest 
social costs are recorded by scenario 4, in which co-incineration is maximised. Obvi-
ously, the figures presented here should be treated with caution, as they are based on 
marginal social costs and therefore can strictly speaking not be used to calculate total 
social costs.  
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  The external costs of recycling can be positive or negative, depending on the type of the re-
cycled material and on the primary material that it replaces. Similarly, the private cost of re-
cycling can be positive or negative, depending on various specific circumstances (including 
technical factors and prevailing market prices). We consider any other estimate than zero to 
be more arbitrary. 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 
 
118
 
• To what extent can the current level of the Dutch landfill tax rate be regarded as an 
internalisation of the environmental costs of landfilling? 
The calculations made in Section 5.3 strongly suggest that the current landfill tax rate of 
almost € 85 per tonne is at least equal to, but probably substantially higher than the mar-
ginal external costs of landfilling. The ‘best’ estimate of the external costs is about € 9 
per tonne, and even the ‘high’ estimate (€ 75 per tonne) is lower than the current tax rate. 
• From a social cost-benefit perspective, what is the optimum way of waste treatment 
for household waste and comparable waste from firms? 
A definitive answer to this question cannot be given, due to lacking and sometimes con-
tradictory information, especially regarding co-incineration and various recycling op-
tions. Nevertheless, it is clear that the net social costs of landfilling are probably much 
lower than those of (co-)incineration. Some combination of landfilling (with methane re-
covery) and recycling might well be the strategy implying minimum net social costs. 
Obviously, such a strategy would be dependent on the availability of sufficient space for 
(new) landfill sites. 
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Table 5.35 Aggregated private, external, and avoided costs of five waste management 
scenarios in the Netherlands (million € per year). 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
 
Unit 
value 
(€/ton) 
Landfilling 
all 
waste 
Current 
Situation 
 
Switch from 
landfill to 
Incineration 
Switch from 
landfill to 
co-incineration 
Maximize 
Recycling 
 
Quantities  
Million 
tons 
Million 
tons 
Million  
tons 
Million  
tons 
Million  
tons 
Landfilling  13.5 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Incineration  0.0 5.3 6.4 5.3 5.3 
Co-incineration  0.0 0.5 0.5 1.6 0.0 
Recycling  0.0 6.6 6.6 6.6 8.2 
Total  13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5 
Private costs €/ton 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Landfilling 36 487 39 0 0 0 
Incineration 101 0 533 642 533 533 
Co-incineration 101 0 53 53 162 0 
Recycling 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total  487 625 695 695 533 
External costs €/ton 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Landfilling 10.18 138 11 0 0 0 
Incineration 18.20 0 96 116 96 96 
Co-incineration 27.77 0 15 15 45 0 
Recycling 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total  138 122 130 141 96 
Avoided externalities €/ton 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Landfilling -1.14 -15 -1 0 0 0 
Incineration -7.63 0 -40 -48 -40 -40 
Co-incineration -4.43 0 -2 -2 -7 0 
Recycling 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total  -15 -44 -51 -47 -40 
Social costs €/ton 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Mln €  
per year 
Landfilling 45.04 609 48 0 0 0 
Incineration 111.57 0 589 709 589 589 
Co-incineration 124.34 0 66 66 199 0 
Recycling 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total  487 688 758 887 589 
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In this concluding chapter, we return to the three central questions that were formulated 
in Chapter 1: 
1. To what extent is the Dutch landfill tax providing the right incentives to the appro-
priate market parties, and is the waste market functioning sufficiently in order to 
achieve the policy objectives by means of market incentives? 
2. To what extent does the landfill tax cover the external costs of landfilling? 
3. Is the landfill tax the least expensive option to minimize landfilling, or are there other 
(‘command-and-control type’) instruments that are more cost-effective? 
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Has landfilling become a relatively more expensive waste treatment option compared to 
alternatives such as incineration and recovery/re-use/recycling? 
In The Netherlands, landfilling became more expensive than incineration around the year 
2000. Whether or not landfilling is more expensive than recycling is less clear, because 
there are various types of recycling (such as glass, paper, textiles, etc). Moreover, the 
choice between recycling and disposing waste is taken at a different level, i.e. the waste 
generator and not the waste disposer. This is especially true in the case of household 
waste. Households choose between recycling or disposing waste, while municipalities 
choose between incinerating and landfilling. For the service sector, individual companies 
take both decisions. 
Has the landfill tax led to a relative increase in waste supply for incineration and recov-
ery/re-use/recycling, and to a relative decrease in waste supply for landfilling? 
The landfill tax did not have a significant direct impact on the generation of household 
waste, nor did it affect the choice for household waste disposal options. In the case of 
household waste generation, the increases in the waste disposal costs, such as the landfill 
tax, are not internalised in the waste disposal charges in the case of flat fee regimes. In 
the case of unit-based pricing regimes, the disposal costs are more likely to be internal-
ised in the waste disposal charges. However, to analyse this indirect effect requires an 
additional analysis of the impact of waste disposal costs on the tariffs of unit-based pric-
ing regimes at the level of municipalities. The presence of a unit-based pricing regime 
decreases household waste generation. In addition, it decreases the amount of waste 
landfilled, while it increases the amount of waste incinerated. In the case of disposal op-
tions, municipalities (or their contracted collectors of household waste) face the landfill 
ban on household waste and moreover many municipalities have long-term contracts on 
waste supply with waste incineration plants.  
For the service sector, the level of disposal costs is not affecting the generation of waste, 
although it affects the waste disposal choice. In particular, higher costs for landfilling 
and incineration increase the share of recycling. Moreover, if the relative increase of 
costs of landfilling exceeds the relative increase of costs of incineration, firms from the 
service sector will landfill less waste and incinerate more. In this sense, the landfill tax 
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can play a crucial role in the decision making of firms from the service sector with re-
spect to disposing waste. 
Has the landfill tax led to a better utilisation of the existing infrastructure for incinera-
tion and recovery/re-use/recycling, both in The Netherlands and abroad? 
On the one hand we observe that the capacity of incineration has been fairly constant 
since 1997. The number of waste incineration plants was constant, and only little fluctua-
tions in capacity were observed. On the other hand, the total amount of waste incinerated 
increased slightly in the corresponding period. In addition, the relative price of landfill-
ing tariffs and incineration costs has had a positive effect on the amount of service sector 
waste that has been incinerated. This means that higher costs of landfilling due to higher 
landfill tax levels will increase the demand of the service sector for the incineration of 
waste. Due to a constant capacity and a slightly growing incineration of waste, the effi-
ciency of use of waste incineration plants shows a slightly positive trend. In the case of 
recycling, we observed a moderate growth in the case of household waste, and a strong 
growth of recycling in the case of the service sector waste. We were not able to link 
these findings to the efficiency of the use of recycling infrastructure.  
Has the landfill tax led to investments in new capacity for incineration, separation and 
recovery/re-use/recycling, both in The Netherlands and abroad? 
During the observed period, the landfill tax has not led to new investments in new incin-
eration plants in The Netherlands (though some new plants are presently under construc-
tion). However, export of waste for incineration and use as a secondary fuel has in-
creased, so the landfill tax in the Netherlands might have contributed to a more efficient 
use of foreign waste incineration capacity and/or new foreign incineration capacity. 
More research into developments of the European waste market is needed to come to a 
reliable conclusion on this issue. If the landfill tax has led to investments in recycling in-
frastructure is ambiguous, because different kinds of recycling options require their own 
infrastructure. In future research, the development of recycling options could be mapped 
in more detail. The large and increasing export of waste paper to South-East Asia sug-
gests that global transport and recycling industries benefit from the source separation ef-
forts of consumers and companies in The Netherlands (and Europe as a whole). 
What are the conditions that the waste market has to fulfil in order to apply the landfill 
tax as an effective instrument? 
The analysis suggests a number of important conditions. There should be no restrictions 
on the availability of incineration capacity (both within The Netherlands and abroad). 
The limited capacity of incineration plants poses a barrier to the effectiveness of the 
landfill tax because it limits the options producers have to get rid of their waste. Produc-
ers cannot increase incineration and therefore only have the option of recycling more 
waste (which may be a more expensive option). Allowing export of combustible waste 
and thus effectively solving the capacity problems increases the effectiveness of the 
landfill tax, assuming that there is sufficient capacity available in neighbouring coun-
tries. Flat fee pricing of waste collection also influences the effectiveness of the landfill 
tax. Households will not increase their recycling efforts if they do not ‘feel’ the higher 
cost of landfilling. However, even in municipalities that ask a unit-based price for waste 
collection the increase in recycling effort is slight. Therefore in this case one can ques-
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tion whether it is necessary to introduce unit-based pricing as the costs of introducing 
such as system may be higher than the benefits provided by higher recycling efforts. Fi-
nally, allowing waste export to be landfilled abroad will restrict the effectiveness of the 
landfill tax significantly if this effectiveness is measured in terms of ‘the reduction in the 
total amount of waste landfilled in general’. However, if effectiveness is measured in 
terms of ‘the reduction in the amount of waste landfilled in the Netherlands’, allowing 
waste export for landfilling in other countries would turn the landfill tax into a very ef-
fective instrument. 
What is the desired or optimal rate of the waste tax in order to make the suppliers of 
waste choose alternative waste treatment options (incineration and recovery/re-
use/recycling)? In particular, should the rate be differentiated according to certain as-
pects such as type of waste, treatment option and waste supplier? 
At the present landfill tax rate of more than € 80 per tonne it is already attractive for a lot 
of waste suppliers to turn to alternatives. However, due to other restrictions (such as a 
lack of incineration capacity, a ban on the export of waste or long-term contracts with 
landfill operators) they may be forced to landfill their waste anyway. In the absence of 
such restrictions, higher levels of the landfill tax rate would lead to less landfilling, but at 
the expense of relatively high social costs. The analysis does not allow us to draw con-
clusions on the impact of a differentiation of the tax rate by type of waste, treatment op-
tion or waste supplier. However, economic theory tells us that any differentiation should 
only be based upon differences in external costs of the waste and the treatment option, 
and not on the type of waste supplier.  
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What are the social costs and benefits of the following treatment options for household 
waste and comparable waste from firms: 
• Landfilling all waste; 
• The present situation; 
• Terminating the landfilling of combustible waste by shifting it to waste incineration; 
• Terminating the landfilling of combustible waste by shifting it to co-incineration (in 
power plants); 
• Terminating the landfilling of combustible waste by optimizing/maximizing recy-
cling. 
Roughly speaking, the net social costs of these five options are estimated at the follow-
ing (rounded) amounts per year: 
• Landfilling all waste: € 500 mln; 
• Present situation: € 700 mln; 
• Shift from landfilling to incineration: € 750 mln; 
• Shift from landfilling to co-incineration: € 900 mln; 
• Optimizing/maximizing recycling: € 600 mln. 
Given the large uncertainties and data gaps, these amounts should be regarded as mere 
tentative estimates. 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 
 
124 
 
To what extent can the current level of the Dutch landfill tax rate be regarded as an in-
ternalisation of the environmental costs of landfilling? 
The calculations made strongly suggest that the current landfill tax rate of almost € 85 
per tonne is at least equal to, but probably substantially higher than the marginal external 
costs of landfilling. The ‘best’ estimate of the external costs is about € 9 per tonne, and 
even the ‘high’ estimate (€ 75 per tonne) is lower than the current tax rate. 
From a social cost-benefit perspective, what is the optimum way of waste treatment for 
household waste and comparable waste from firms? 
A definitive answer to this question cannot be given, due to lacking and sometimes con-
tradictory information, especially regarding co-incineration and various recycling op-
tions. Nevertheless, it is clear that the net social costs of landfilling are probably much 
lower than those of (co-)incineration. Some combination of landfilling (with methane re-
covery) and recycling might well be the strategy implying minimum net social costs. 
Obviously, such a strategy would be dependent on the availability of sufficient space for 
(new) landfills. 
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What are the financial consequences (in the short and the long term) of landfill taxation, 
landfill bans and legal obligations (for landfills and incineration plants) to accept waste, 
both for the waste suppliers and the waste treatment companies? 
In economic terms, a landfill ban is similar to a prohibitively high landfill tax rate (about 
€ 750 per tonne). Our analysis shows that the social costs of reducing the amount of 
landfilled waste to zero would be very high. Reducing the amount of landfilled waste 
(from the service sector) by about 90% costs about 600 million euro in production loss, 
while reducing it by 100% costs about 1,300 million euro in production loss. A similar 
calculation could not be made for the case of legal obligations to accept waste, but it is 
obvious that such an obligation would also imply welfare losses (assuming that it would 
force waste treatment companies to undertake unprofitable operations). 
Which instrument will (in the short and the long term) lead to the lowest costs of waste 
treatment for the waste suppliers? 
A well-designed system of environmental taxes will minimize the total social costs of 
waste treatment, provided that there are no market distortions. This means that waste 
suppliers should have the opportunity to choose between alternative treatment options 
(domestically or abroad) and that the tax rates reflect the external costs of the treatment 
option (landfilling as well as incineration) 
In the current Dutch situation, this would probably mean a reduction of the landfill tax 
rate and an increase in the waste tax rate for incineration (which at present has a zero 
rate). Both rates should be around € 10 per tonne of waste. However, it is clear that a 
waste tax of this magnitude would reduce the incentive to divert waste from landfilling 
to recycling and incineration substantially. Alternatively, tradable landfill permits could 
be considered. This instrument, which combines the efficiency advantages of a tax with 
the certainty of a cap on the total amount of landfilled waste, deserves further investiga-
tion.
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To assess the volume of CH4 emissions from landfill waste in the Netherlands we use the 
methodology and assumptions of RIVM (Spakman et al., 2003) that are used in the offi-
cial calculations of Dutch GHG emissions. Landfill wastes emit CH4 gas over a period of 
time. The annual emissions are dependent upon the composition of the waste (the biode-
gradable organic fraction), a decay factor, the rate of landfill gas recovery, and a number 
of technical coefficients. In formula: 
( ) 161 12 kttZ f k P s a t b e−= × × × × − × × ×    (I.1) 
Where: 
Zt = CH4 emissions in year t (in ton/ton waste); 
f =   the fraction of biodegradable waste that is actually broken down (f = 0.58 ton C/ton 
waste); 
k =   decomposition (decay) constant (k = 0.0693) ;  
P =  concentration of biodegradable waste (P = 0.120 ton C/ ton waste); 
s =   share of carbon emitted in the form of CH4 (s = 0.6); 
a(t) =  landfill gas recovery rate in year t; 
b =  fraction of non-recovered CH4 that is actually emitted to the atmosphere (b = 0.9); 
16/12 = conversion factor from mass C to mass CH4; 
t =   time since disposal (in years). 
Because the formula (A1) contains several time-independent coefficients, it can be sim-
plified to: 
( ) 0.06930.003473 1 ttZ a t e−= × − ×    (I.2) 
Total CH4 emissions per ton of waste over an entire period t = 0...T can be calculated as 
the sum of the annual emissions of CH4: 
( ) 0.0693*
0
0.003473* 1 *
T
t
t
Z a t e−
=
= −    (I.3) 
In our calculations we have assumed that T = 30.  
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Voor een nauwkeurige bepaling van woningdichtheden rond stortplaatsen en AVI’s zijn de 
geografische locatiegegevens van deze eenheden nodig en de recente ruimtelijke verdeling 
van huizen rondom deze locaties. 
De geografische locatiegegevens kunnen in eerste instantie afgeleid worden van de be-
schikbare adresgegevens. Een adresbestand met geografische coördinaten (zoals de bestan-
den van het kadaster Adres Coördinaten Nederland (ACN) en/of het Perceel Adres Plaats 
coördinaten (PAP)) is bij het SPINlab niet beschikbaar. Andere alternatieven zoals een onli-
ne dienst om de xy-coordinaten bij adressenbestanden te verkrijgen, blijken helaas niet te 
werken (zie onderdeel geo-coderen op http://www.thebitfactory.nl/).De locaties van straten 
en/of postcodes moeten daarom op de kaart gevonden worden met behulp van de Microsoft 
MapPoint applicatie of met online kaartdiensten als de Nationale Telefoongids of Map24. 
Met behulp van een of meerdere van deze applicaties konden de meeste adressen gevonden 
worden. Maar in sommige gevallen kon de exacte positie van het adresnummer in de betref-
fende straat niet met zekerheid vastgesteld worden. De bron voor de exacte adreslocatie en 
de veronderstelde nauwkeurigheid is in de spreadsheet met stortplaatsen en AVI’s voor de 
verschillende in een aparte kolom aangegeven. De geografische xy coordinaten (lat-long) 
zijn vervolgens omgezet naar de xy coordinaten in de stereografische projectie van het Ne-
derlandse Rijksdriehoekstelsel. Hiervoor is een ArcView extentie RD-conversions gebruikt, 
maar dit kan ook gebeuren aan de hand van verschillende online coordinatecalculators. 
De xy-coordinaten van de hierboven bepaalde locaties zijn geplot in een digitale kaart van 
Nederland (zie Figuur II.1) en als GIS laag toegevoegd aan de Bodemstatistiekkaart 2000.  
Aangezien op de bodemstatistiekkaart stortplaatsen als aparte categorie staan aangegeven 
kunnen de polygonen van de actieve stortplaatsen geselecteerd worden op basis van de ge-
maakte overlay van het stortplaats puntenbestand en de bodemstatistiekkaart. De geselec-
teerde stortplaatsen worden vervolgens als een aparte GIS-laag opgeslagen voor gebruik in 
verdere analyses.  
Uit deze overlay bleek dat de methode voor het bepalen van de xy-coordinaten redelijk ge-
werkt heeft, maar laat tevens de beperkingen van deze methode zien. Het bezoekadres van 
de stortplaats heeft normaal betrekking op het kantoor bij de ingang van de stortplaats, wat 
op enige afstand van de stortplaats gelegen kan zijn. Met andere woorden, de aldus bepaalde 
xy coördinaten verwijzen niet naar het middelpunt van de stortplaats zelf. Verder, omdat dit 
een puntlocatie betreft geeft het ook geen maat voor de geografische omvang van de locatie. 
Daardoor is het uitvoeren van een bufferoperatie rondom de stortplaats om een invloedsge-
bied te kunnen aangeven, van beperkte waarde omdat geen rekening wordt gehouden met de 
vorm en de grootte van de stortplaats. Hiervoor is het beter de buffer vanaf de randen van de 
stortplaats te tekenen, wat kan met behulp van de geselecteerde stortplaatsen uit de bodem-
statistiekkaart. Figuur II.2 laat als voorbeeld de stortplaats ‘De Stainkoeln’ in Groningen 
zien. De rode ster geeft de xy-positie aan die is gevonden mbv de adreslocatiemethode. De-
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ze  
locatie komt in dit geval goed overeen met het middelpunt van de stortplaats die uit 3 of 4 
verschillende delen bestaat (de vlakken met de horizontale bruingestreepte arcering). 
Rondom 3 van de 4 vlakken is een bufferzone van 800 meter gedefinieerd. 
 
 
Figuur II.1: Actieve en oude stortplaatsen in Nederland. 
Effectiveness of landfill taxation 
 
137
 
Figuur II.2  Stortplaats De Stainkoeln’ in Groningen op Bodemstatistiekkaart met 800 me-
ter buffer. 
Drie actieve stortplaatsen bleken niet voor te komen op de bodemstatistiekkaart, waarschijn-
lijk omdat deze pas na 2000 (het data-inwinningsjaar van de bodemstatistiekkaart) in ge-
bruik zijn genomen. De vermoedelijke locatie en omtrek van de stortplaatsen zijn in dit ge-
val bepaald met behulp van ondersteunende luchtfoto’s uit het jaar 2003 die online geraad-
pleegd kunnen worden vanaf de website ‘Beeldportal’: http://www.beeldportal.nl/ 
Figuur II.3a, II.3b en II.3c laten van de drie stortplaatsen de luchtfoto’s zien en de ingete-
kende vermoedelijke locaties op de bodemstatistiekkaart. In Figuur II.3a is bijvoorbeeld te 
zien dat in 2000 de stortplaatslocatie nog in gebruik was voor delfstoffenwinning volgens 
de definitie van de bodemstatistiekkaart (het lichtpaarse gedeelte betreft water met delf-
stofwinningsfunctie). Ook is op deze kaart goed het effect te zien van de grootte van de buf-
ferzone. In dit geval valt het dorp ten westen van de stortplaats net buiten de bufferzone van 
800 meter. In Figuur II.3b is de locatie van de stortplaats gedefinieerd als bouwterrein vol-
gens de classificatie van de bodemstatistiekkaart. Op basis van de luchtfoto is niet met ze-
kerheid te zeggen waar de stortplaats zich bevindt. Maar gezien de zichtbare op- en afrij 
routes op het zandige gedeelte onder in de foto lijkt dit de meest waarschijnlijke locatie van 
de stortplaats, die dan ook als zodanig op de bodemstatistiekkaart is ingetekend. Overigens 
is de aangegeven buffer hier nog getrokken rondom de puntadreslocatie en is dus onjuist. 
 
 Institute for Environmental Studies 
 
138
 
 
Figuur II.3a Stortplaats Meisner in Assen. 
 
Figuur II.3b Stortplaats Noord en Midden Zeeland in Borsele. 
In Figuur II.3c zijn de stortplaatsen in Dordrecht weergegeven. Goed te zien is dat de adres 
puntlocatie van de Stortplaats Derde Merwedehaven hier minder goed overeenkomt met de 
werkelijke locatie van de stortplaats. Meer problematisch is de tweede stortplaats Crayes-
tein-West die niet is aangegeven op de Bodemstatistiekkaart. Ook de luchtfoto geeft hier 
geen duidelijk uitsluitsel. De meest waarschijnlijke locatie lijkt het braakliggende terrein di-
rect ten oosten van de snelweg op de luchtfoto. 
In bijlage 1 zijn alle actieve stortplaatsen weergegeven met XY-coordinaten en de bron voor 
deze coördinaten en eventuele onzekerheden. 
0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Woningdichtheid wordt gebaseerd op het aantal gebouwen aangegeven op de topografische 
kaart van Nederland (schaal 1:10.000) van 2003. Onder gebouwen wordt door de TDN ver-
staan de categorieën 100 (gebouw/huis), 103 (hoogbouw) en 108 (opslagtank). In deze ana-
lyse worden alleen de categorieën 100 en 103 meegenomen in de analyse en worden alleen 
gebouwen van minimaal 30 m2 in de analyse betrokken, om zo min mogelijk bijgebouwen 
(schuren, garages e.d.) als huizen te laten meetellen. 
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Figuur II.3c Stortplaats Crayestein-West (links) en Derde Merwedehaven (rechts) in 
Dordrecht. 
De GIS laag met bebouwing is een aparte laag die is opgesplitst per kaartvlak. Ter voorbe-
reiding van de analyse zijn alle kaartvlakken bepaald waarin de actieve stortplaatsen gele-
gen zijn, inclusief de daarom heen te bepalen bufferzone. Vervolgens zijn van de GIS lagen 
met bebouwing alleen deze kaartvlakken geselecteerd en in 1 kaartlaag opgenomen met be-
hulp van een ‘merge’ operatie. Hiermee is een handzame laag gecreëerd voor de uit te voe-
ren analyses qua grootte bestandsformaat. 
Vervolgens is een bufferoperatie uitgevoerd op de laag met actieve stortplaatsen. In eerste 
instantie zijn buffers gecreëerd van 500, 1000 en 1500 meter, zie figuur 4. 
? 
? 
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Figuur II.4. Buffers van 500, 1000 en 1500 meter rond stortplaats Zaanstad. 
Vervolgens zijn selecties uitgevoerd van alle gebouwen die binnen een van de bufferzones 
vallen (respectievelijk 500, 1000 en 1500 meter). In ArcView betreft dit een zogenaamde 
‘Select by theme’ operatie waarbij de GIS laag met gebouwen als actief thema wordt geko-
zen en een van de bufferlagen als laag waarbinnen de selectie moet worden uitgevoerd, dat 
wil zeggen dat alleen polygonen geselecteerd worden die compleet binnen de bufferzones 
vallen. Van deze selectie gebouwen zijn vervolgens alleen de gebouwen groter dan 30 m2 
geselecteerd in een query operatie (select from set) op de attribuuttabel van de laag met ge-
bouwen. Deze set met gebouwen is vervolgens als een aparte laag weggeschreven waarvan 
de statistieken bepaald kunnen worden. In dit geval betreft dit alleen het totaal aantal poly-
gonen. Omdat in het aantal huizen nu ook de huizen of gebouwen zitten die op het terrein 
van de vuilstort zelf gelokaliseerd zijn, moet dit aantal huizen apart bepaald worden en van 
het aantal huizen binnen de bufferzone afgetrokken worden. Het aantal gebouwen/huizen 
groter dan 30 m2 op de vuilstortlocatie zelf bedraagt 163. Door de oppervlakte te berekenen 
van de bufferzones kan vervolgens de polygonendichtheid berekend worden (zie Tabel 
II.1). De oppervlakte van de bufferzones wordt berekend door de oppervlaktes van alle po-
lygonen per bufferlaag bij elkaar op te tellen (dit gebeurt met de statistics functie in de attri-
buuttabel). Aangezien de bufferlagen anders gedefinieerd zijn dan de polygoonlagen waar 
ze op gebaseerd zijn, moet eerst een conversie worden uitgevoerd om de oppervlakten van 
de afzonderlijke polygonen te berekenen. Dit laatste gebeurt met behulp van de XTools ex-
tensie in ArcView (Convert Multipart Shapes to Single Part Shapes). Bij de berekening van 
de bufferoppervlakte wordt steeds de oppervlakte van de stortplaats van de totale bufferop-
pervlakte afgetrokken. 
Tabel II.1 Oppervlaktes invloedsgebieden, aantal polygonen en polygonendichtheid. 
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Invloedsgebied rond stort-
plaats 
Oppervlakte in km2 Aantal polygonen Polygonendichtheid 
(aantal/km2) 
Stortplaats zelf 13,84 163 Nvt 
500 meter, excl. stortpl 72,28 2516 34,8 
1000 meter, excl. stortpl 187,98 10280 54,7 
1500 meter, excl. stortpl 347,47 22417 64,5 
Uiteraard kan er ook apart gekeken worden naar de dichtheden in gebieden op bepaalde af-
stand van de stortplaatsen, bijvoorbeeld van 1000 tot 1500 meter. Hiervoor hoeft alleen de 
oppervlakte van de 1000 meter buffer van de 1500 meter buffer afgetrokken te worden en 
evenzo het aantal huizen in de 1000 meter buffer van de 1500 meter buffer, waarna beide 
getallen door elkaar gedeeld kunnen worden om de dichtheid te berekenen. 
Laatste stap in deze analyse is een correctie van het aantal polygonen. Dit is nodig omdat er 
niet van uit kan worden gegaan dat het aantal getelde polygonen in de huizenkaart ook het 
werkelijke aantal huizen betreft. Dit komt doordat aaneengeschakelde huizen (rijtjeshuizen, 
2 onder 1 kap, appartementcomplexen) als 1 polygoon weergegeven worden. 
Om het werkelijke aantal huizen te benaderen zijn we van het volgende uitgegaan. De 
meeste niet gestapelde huizen in Nederland hebben een bebouwde oppervlakte tussen de 
100 en 200 m2 (eigen schatting, mede op grond van metingen aan huizenbestand topografi-
sche kaart). Er zijn uiteraard grotere huizen, maar de meeste polygonen > 200 m2 betreffen 
rijtjeshuizen, 2 onder 1 kap e.d. Ervan uitgaande dat de meeste polygonen > 200 m2 uit 
meerdere huizen bestaan kan daarom een selectie gemaakt worden uit het bestand van alle 
polygonen > 200 m2 en kan dit aantal gedeeld worden door een gemiddelde huisoppervlakte 
van bijv. 150 m2. Het aantal huizen wat hier uit komt wordt vervolgens opgeteld bij alle po-
lygonen (losstaande huizen) tussen de 30 en 200 m2. 
Allereerst moeten de polygonen van symboolklasse 108/109 (opslagtanks) uit het bestand 
verwijderd worden. Van de 22.094 overblijvende polygonen van het 1.500 meter invloeds-
gebied zijn er 8.501 > 200 m2. Deze hebben een gezamenlijke oppervlakte van 4.506.914 
m2 / 150 = 30.046 huizen. Als we hier het aantal van 13.593 huizen < 200 m2 bij optellen 
komen we uit op 43.639 huizen. De huizendichtheid komt dan uit op 126 huizen per km2.  
Tabel II.2 Oppervlaktes invloedsgebieden, gecorrigeerd aantal huizen en huizendichtheid. 
Invloedsgebied rond stort-
plaats 
Oppervlakte in km2 Aantal huizen Huizendichtheid 
(aantal/km2) 
Stortplaats zelf 13,84 163 nvt 
500 meter, excl. stortpl 72,28 5390 75 
1000 meter, excl. stortpl 187,98 20355 108 
1500 meter, excl. stortpl 347,47 43639 126 
Deze aantallen worden groter naarmate de invloedszone uitgebreid wordt en lopen op rich-
ting de gemiddelde dichtheid van 200 woningen per km2 in 2003 in Nederland (CBS Stat-
Line, 2005).  
Ter controle van de berekeningswijze is ook een analyse uitgevoerd op basis van het woon-
areaal in het bodemstatistiek 2000 bestand. Dit levert de volgende resultaten op. 
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Table II.3 Oppervlaktes invloedsgebieden, woonareaal en afgeleide huizendichtheid. 
Invloedsgebied rond 
stortplaats 
Oppervlakte in 
km2 
Woonareaal Aantal 
huizen 
Huizendichtheid 
(aantal/km2)1 
Stortplaats zelf 13,84 163  Nvt 
500 meter, excl. stortpl 72,28 645869 4306 75 
1000 meter, excl. stortpl 187,98 5679898 37866 201 
1500 meter, excl. stortpl 347,47 32409241 216062 621 
 1 Uitgaande van een oppervlakte van ca. 150 m2 per huis. 
Dit is duidelijk geen representatief beeld, wat een gevolg is van de afbakening van het 
woonareaal en de verschillen in huizendichtheid die voorkomen op dit woonareaal (zie Fi-
guur II.5). Een oppervlakte van 150m2 per huis is duidelijk veel te klein, maar door de ver-
schillen in bebouwingsdichtheid is het kiezen van een goede oppervlaktemaat niet mogelijk. 
Om dit te berekenen moet de zogenaamde ‘Ground Space Index’ (GSI) bekend zijn. De GSI 
geeft de verhouding tussen bebouwde en onbebouwde ruimte weer (Gemeente Amsterdam, 
2002). Ook wordt duidelijk uit de figuur dat een deel van de huizen niet als woonareaal zijn 
geclassificeerd. 
&
Door de attribuuttabellen van de GIS lagen met de polygonen en buffers rond de stortplaat-
sen uit te breiden met een kolom met de stortplaatsnamen kan per stortplaats de totale op-
pervlakte berekend worden. Door vervolgens een ‘intersect’ operatie58 uit te voeren tussen 
de bufferlagen en de lagen met huizen die binnen een bepaalde buffer vallen wordt aan elk 
huis de naam van de bijbehorende stortplaats gekoppeld en kunnen per stortplaats en per 
bufferzone het aantal en dichtheid huizen berekend worden. 
Om bijvoorbeeld het aantal huizen in een 500 meter zone rond stortplaats De Stainkoeln’ te 
Groningen te berekenen, kunnen alle records in de tabel met STRTPLAATS naam ‘De 
Staink Groningen’ bij elkaar opgeteld worden (in dit geval precies 100 polygonen). Hier 
moet vervolgens het aantal gebouwen gelegen op de stortplaats zelf afgetrokken worden; dit 
betreft 3 huizen/gebouwen. Ook moeten de records van symboolklasse 108 (opslagtanks) uit 
het bestand verwijderd worden. Dus het totale aantal polygonen rond stortplaats De Staink 
te Groningen is 97. Om het exacte aantal huizen te berekenen, moeten we in principe de-
zelfde correctie als hierboven uitvoeren, dat wil zeggen dat alle polygonen > 200 m2 bij el-
kaar opgeteld worden en gedeeld worden door 150 om het aantal huizen > 200 m2 te bere-
kenen. Hier wordt het aantal huizen tussen de 30 en 200 m2 bij opgeteld. Omdat dit voor el-
ke stortplaats afzonderlijk te berekenen erg bewerkelijk is, kan volstaan worden met een 
eenvoudiger correctie. Namelijk het delen van de totale oppervlakte huizen door een ge-
middelde huisoppervlakte van 150 m2. 
                                                   
58
  Hiervoor is  de X-Tools extentie gebruikt: Intersect Themes 
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Figuur II.5  Woonareaal in bufferzones rond stortplaats Landgraaf. 
Tabel 4 bevat een selectie uit een van de databestanden. 
Tabel II.4 Selectie uit bestand intersecthuizenbuffer500.dbf. 
SYMBOL BUFFERDIS STRTPLAATS AREA PERIMETER ACRES HECTARES 
100 500.0000 
De Staink Gro-
ningen 218.533 83.491 0.054 0.022 
100 500.0000 
De Staink Gro-
ningen 318.968 77.197 0.079 0.032 
108 500.0000 Ecopark Skarsterl 157.292 44.826 0.039 0.016 
100 500.0000 Ecopark Skarsterl 356.901 86.454 0.088 0.036 
Dit brengt het aantal huizen rond deze stortplaats op ca. 151. Voor het berekenen van de 
dichtheid geldt het zelfde, hiervoor moet de oppervlakte van de stortplaats afgetrokken 
worden (NB: de stortplaats bestaat soms uit meerdere polygonen die bij elkaar opgeteld 
moeten worden) van de oppervlakte van de 500 meter buffer (die ook de stortplaats zelf be-
vat).  
De oppervlakte van de 500 meter buffer bedraagt in dit geval 3,73 – 0,67 = 3,06 km2, dus 
een huizendichtheid van 49 huizen per vierkante kilometer. Bij het bepalen van de opper-
vlakte van buffers is van belang dat sommige buffers van 1 stortplaats uit meerdere delen 
bestaan, bijvoorbeeld voor stortplaats Smink Amersfoort (bij grotere buffers komen deze 
bufferdelen weer samen). Bij de twee stortplaatsen in Dordrecht gebeurt het omgekeerde. 
Deze twee verschillende stortplaatsen liggen zo dicht bij elkaar dat de buffers van 1000 en 
1500 meter elkaar raken en daarom als 1 buffer voor een gecombineerde stortplaats voor-
komen. 
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• Geen onderscheid is gemaakt in het type stortplaats, in verband met ander type overlast, 
stank, lawaai, verontreinigingsrisico, etc.; 
• Brondata van Bodemstatistiekkaart zijn uit 2000. Recente stortplaatsen zijn dus niet 
aangegeven en zijn derhalve zelf bepaald aan de hand van adresgegevens en beschikbare 
luchtfoto’s. Dit betreft 3 stortplaatsen: 
• Stortplaats Crayestein-West te Dordrecht; 
• Stortplaats Meisner te Assen; 
• Stortplaats Noord en Midden Zeeland in Borsele. 
• Brondata voor huizen en gebouwen op de topografische kaart kunnen van verschillende 
ouderdom zijn, afhankelijk van update-frequentie TDN van de verschillende kaartbladen 
in Nederland. Hoewel de gegevens nooit ouder dan 10 jaar zijn, kan het bijvoorbeeld 
voorkomen dat recente nieuwbouwwijken niet aangegeven staan op de kaart. Een vrij 
eenvoudige manier om dit te controleren is om de huizen en gebouwen te vergelijken 
met luchtfoto’s van 2003 op de website ‘Beeldportal’: http://www.beeldportal.nl/. 
< 
In deze uitwerking zijn alleen de onderdelen van het analyseproces die verschillen van het 
proces voor de stortplaatsen, vermeld. Voor de analyse zijn alleen de kaartbladen van de to-
pografische kaart geselecteerd en samengevoegd van het gebied rondom de AVI’s. 
Buffers rond AVI’s: 
• 1000 meter (contiguous) 
• 2000 meter 
• 3000 meter 
• 4000 meter 
• 5000 meter 
De twee vlak bij elkaar gelegen AVI’s in Dordrecht resulteren in een gezamenlijke buffer-
zone, daar we gewerkt hebben met ‘contiguous’ buffers. Na het bufferen is een ‘multi part 
shapes’ naar ‘single part shapes’ operatie uitgevoerd om de verschillende bufferzones in de 
attribuuttabel van elkaar te kunnen onderscheiden en hieraan de namen van de AVI’s te 
kunnen koppelen. 
Van de vlakkenkaart is een selectie gemaakt van de vlakken met de volgende symbool-
nummers (zie figuur 5): 
• 101 = bebouwd gebied/huizenblok 
• 102 = groot gebouw 
• 103 = hoogbouw 
Daarna zijn alle polygonen kleiner dan 30 m2 verwijderd en zijn alleen die polygonen gese-
lecteerd die binnen de begrenzingen van één van de volgende landgebruikklassen op de bo-
demstatistiekkaart vallen: 
• 20 = woongebied 
• 40 = parken en plantsoenen (sommige losstaande huizen zijn in deze gebieden gele-
gen) 
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• 60 = bos 
• 61 = droog natuurlijk terrein 
• 62 = nat natuurlijk terrein 
Polygonen die dus bijvoorbeeld binnen de grenzen van industriegebieden, sociale of open-
bare voorzieningen of die op het terrein van volkstuincomplexen zijn gelegen, zijn hiermee 
dus verwijderd. 
Van de huizenkaart zijn de volgende polygonen geselecteerd: 
• 100 = gebouw/huis 
• 103 = hoogbouw 
Uit deze selectie zijn de huizen van > 30 m2 geselecteerd die binnen bovengenoemde klas-
sen van de bodemstatistiekkaart vallen. 
 
Figuur 2.6  Buffers van 1 t/m 5 kilometer rondom het Afval Energie Bedrijf van Amster-
dam. Op de ondergrond van de bodemstatistiekkaart zijn de lagen huizen 
(rode polygonen) en gebouwen (roze polygonen) gelegd, zie ook het detail 
rechtsbovenin. Ondermeer de roze polygonen die in de grijze industriege-
bieden van de bodemstatistiekkaart vallen, zullen later worden verwijderd. 
In figuren 6a en 6b, het gebied rond de AVR in Rotterdam aan de Brielseweg, is goed het 
effect van de selecties te zien op het huizenbestand rondom de AVI’s. 
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Figuur II.7a en II.7b. Huizen en huizenblokken vóór en ná selectie van woongebieden. 
Aangezien de huizenblokkenkaart alleen maar de buitenbegrenzingen van de huizenblokken 
aangeeft, kan hier niet zomaar door een gemiddelde huizenoppervlakte (en het aantal bouw-
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lagen) gedeeld worden om het aantal afzonderlijke huizen te bepalen. Om in te kunnen 
schatten uit hoeveel huizen een huizenblok bestaat is hieronder een huizenblok uit de door 
ons afgeleide huizenblokkenkaart (zie figuur 7a) vergeleken met een zelfde huizenblok op 
de grootschalige basiskaart Nederland (zie figuur 7b), in dit geval een huizenblok betreffen-
de in Amsterdam Oud-Zuid (via website Amsterdam.nl / stadsplattegrond). 
 
Figuur II.8a Huizenblok in Amsterdam Oud Zuid op huizenblokkenkaart. 
 
Figuur II.8b Huizenblok in Amsterdam Oud Zuid op GBKN 
Deze kaart laat zien, dat een groot deel van de oppervlakte van dit blok wordt ingenomen 
door de binnenruimte (tuinen + opslagruimte). Aan het aantal huisnummers is te zien dat het 
hier gaat om 38 verschillende panden. Aangezien het hier panden betreft met 4 bouwlagen 
(het meest gebruikelijke aantal woonlagen in Amsterdam) is het totale aantal woningen in 
dit blok dus 152. Om dit aantal woningen te kunnen afleiden van de huizenblokkenkaart is 
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het nodig om de binnenruimte van de huizenblokken af te trekken. Dit kan gedaan worden 
door van een gemiddelde diepte van de huizen uit te gaan en deze dieptemaat te gebruiken 
om inwendige buffers van alle blokken te maken. Wij zijn uitgegaan van een gemiddelde 
dieptemaat van 12 meter (in Amsterdam zijn de meeste woningen dwars op de richting van 
de straat gebouwd). Indien In figuur 8 is het resultaat te zien van de bufferoperatie op de 
huizenblokken met een inwendige bufferoperatie. 
 
 
Figuur II.9 Inwendige buffer 12 meter van huizenblok in Amsterdam Oud Zuid. 
Nu is van elke buffer afzonderlijk of van alle buffers tezamen de oppervlakte te bepalen die 
gedeeld kan worden door een gemiddeld woonareaal. De bufferzone van het betreffende 
blok in Amsterdam Oud-Zuid blijkt een grootte te hebben van 3160 m2 (footprint). Indien 
uitgegaan wordt van een woonareaal van 85 m2 per pand (een redelijke maat voor dit ge-
bied), betekent dit een aantal van 37 huizen, maal 4 bouwlagen = 148 huizen. Dit aantal 
komt goed overeen met het aantal werkelijke huizen dat 152 bedraagt voor dit blok. 
De vraag is nu echter of deze benadering ook opgaat voor andere wijken en andere steden in 
Nederland. Hiervoor is het belangrijk dat uitgegaan kan worden van een gemiddeld aantal 
van 4 woonlagen, van een gemiddelde huizendiepte en een gemiddelde oppervlakte per wo-
ning. De gemiddelde huizendiepte zal afhangen van de wijze waarop de woning is gepositi-
oneerd ten opzichte van de weg, in dwars of lengterichting. Indicaties voor het gemiddelde 
woningoppervlak in Nederland worden gegeven door het Ministerie van VROM (2003). De 
Nederlandse woning heeft een gemiddeld gebruiksoppervlak (GBO) van 104 m2. Bij eenge-
zinswoningen is dat 118 m2, bij meergezinswoningen 72 m2. Deze getallen moeten vertaald 
worden naar bruto vloeroppervlakte (BVO) om ze te kunnen vergelijken met de door ons 
bepaalde woningoppervlakten. Een indicatie hiervoor wordt gegeven door de berekenings-
wijze van de GBO en de BVO, geïllustreerd met plattegronden van appartementen in de 
NEN publicatie (1997) ‘Oppervlakten en inhouden van gebouwen’. Hieruit blijkt dat de 
GBO circa 85% bedraagt van de BVO. Dat wil zeggen dat in Nederland grofweg uitgegaan 
kan worden van een gemiddeld BVO van 120 m2 (respectievelijk 135 m2 voor eengezins-
woningen en 83 m2 voor meergezinswoningen). Aangezien de huizenblokken kaart vooral 
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betrekking heeft op appartementcomplexen in de stedelijke gebieden, lijkt onze aanname 
van 85 m2 per wooneenheid in een meergezinswoning dus redelijk. 
Vervolgens zijn 10 intersecties uitgevoerd tussen respectievelijk de verschillende buffers 
van 1 tot en met 5 km en de huizenblokkenkaart en de 5 bufferzones met de huizenkaart. 
Huizen (vrijstaand en rijtjeshuizen) binnen bufferzones 
In Tabel II.5 zijn alle polygonen weergegeven van de huizenkaart die binnen de gedefini-
eerde bufferzones vallen. 
Tabel II.5 Oppervlaktes invloedsgebieden AVIs en aantal polygonen. 
Invloedsgebied rond AVI Oppervlakte in km2 Aantal polygonen 
1000 meter 35,2 530 
2000 meter 139,2 5858 
3000 meter 311,9 22418 
4000 meter 553,4 44970 
5000 meter 863,7 68111 
Van deze polygonenkaarten zijn het aantal woningen per invloedsgebied als volgt afgeleid 
en samengevat in tabel 6. 
Van de 530 polygonen in het 1000 meter invloedsgebied zijn er 426 > 200 m2. Deze hebben 
een gezamenlijke oppervlakte van 322.791 m2 / 150 = 2.152 huizen. Als we hier het aantal 
van 102 huizen < 200 m2 bij optellen komen we uit op 2.254 huizen. De huizendichtheid 
komt dan uit op 64 huizen per km2. 
Van de 5.858 polygonen in het 2000 meter invloedsgebied zijn er 3.612 > 200 m2. Deze 
hebben een gezamenlijke oppervlakte van 2.042.799 m2 / 150 = 13.619 huizen. Als we hier 
het aantal van 2.244 huizen < 200 m2 bij optellen komen we uit op 15.863 huizen. De hui-
zendichtheid komt dan uit op 114 huizen per km2. 
Van de 22.418 polygonen in het 3000 meter invloedsgebied zijn er 11.665 > 200 m2. Deze 
hebben een gezamenlijke oppervlakte van 6.178.804 m2 / 150 = 41.192 huizen. Als we hier 
het aantal van 10.751 huizen < 200 m2 bij optellen komen we uit op 51.943 huizen. De hui-
zendichtheid komt dan uit op 167 huizen per km2.  
Van de 44.970 polygonen in het 4000 meter invloedsgebied zijn er 21.855 > 200 m2. Deze 
hebben een gezamenlijke oppervlakte van 11.442.729 m2 / 150 = 76.285 huizen. Als we hier 
het aantal van 23113 huizen < 200 m2 bij optellen komen we uit op 99.398 huizen. De hui-
zendichtheid komt dan uit op 180 huizen per km2. 
Van de 68.111 polygonen in het 5000 meter invloedsgebied zijn er 34.047 > 200 m2. Deze 
hebben een gezamenlijke oppervlakte van 16.765.323 m2 / 150 = 111.769 huizen. Als we 
hier het aantal van 34.064 huizen < 200 m2 bij optellen komen we uit op 145.833 huizen. 
De huizendichtheid komt dan uit op 169 huizen per km2.  
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Table II.6 Oppervlaktes invloedsgebieden AVIs en gecorrigeerd aantal huizen. 
Invloedsgebied rond AVI Oppervlakte in km2 Aantal huizen 
1000 meter 35,2 2.254 
2000 meter 139,2 15.863 
3000 meter 311,9 51.943 
4000 meter 553,4 99.398 
5000 meter 863,7 145.833 
 Overige huizen (in huizenblokken) binnen bufferzones 
In Tabel II.7 zijn alle polygonen weergegeven van de gecorrigeerde huizenblokkaarten die 
binnen de gedefinieerde bufferzones vallen. 
Tabel II.7 Oppervlaktes invloedsgebieden AVIs en aantal polygonen. 
Invloedsgebied rond AVI Oppervlakte in km2 Aantal polygonen 
1000 meter 35,2 79 
2000 meter 139,2 220 
3000 meter 311,9 684 
4000 meter 553,4 1.023 
5000 meter 863,7 1.511 
Van deze polygonenkaarten zijn het aantal woningen per invloedsgebied als volgt afgeleid 
en samengevat in tabel 8. 
De 79 polygonen in het 1000 meter invloedsgebied hebben een gezamenlijke oppervlakte 
van 273.757 m2. Als deze oppervlakte gedeeld wordt door een gemiddelde BVO van 85 m2 
en vermenigvuldigd wordt met een gemiddelde van 4 woonlagen, komt het totale aantal 
woningen in de huizenblokken uit op 12.882.  
De 220 polygonen in het 2000 meter invloedsgebied hebben een gezamenlijke oppervlakte 
van 736.756 m2. Als deze oppervlakte gedeeld wordt door een gemiddelde BVO van 85 m2 
en vermenigvuldigd wordt met een gemiddelde van 4 woonlagen, komt het totale aantal 
woningen in de huizenblokken uit op 34.671. 
De 684 polygonen in het 3000 meter invloedsgebied hebben een gezamenlijke oppervlakte 
van 2.264.008 m2. Als deze oppervlakte gedeeld wordt door een gemiddelde BVO van 85 
m2 en vermenigvuldigd wordt met een gemiddelde van 4 woonlagen, komt het totale aantal 
woningen in de huizenblokken uit op 106.542. 
De 1023 polygonen in het 4000 meter invloedsgebied hebben een gezamenlijke oppervlakte 
van 3.427.962 m2. Als deze oppervlakte gedeeld wordt door een gemiddelde BVO van 85 
m2 en vermenigvuldigd wordt met een gemiddelde van 4 woonlagen, komt het totale aantal 
woningen in de huizenblokken uit op 161.316. 
De 1511 polygonen in het 5000 meter invloedsgebied hebben een gezamenlijke oppervlakte 
van 5.035.818 m2. Als deze oppervlakte gedeeld wordt door een gemiddelde BVO van 85 
m2 en vermenigvuldigd wordt met een gemiddelde van 4 woonlagen, komt het totale aantal 
woningen in de huizenblokken uit op 236.980. 
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Tabel II.8 Oppervlaktes invloedsgebieden AVIs en gecorrigeerd aantal huizen. 
Invloedsgebied rond AVI Oppervlakte in km2 Aantal woningen 
1000 meter 35,2 12.882 
2000 meter 139,2 34.671 
3000 meter 311,9 106.542 
4000 meter 553,4 161.316 
5000 meter 863,7 236.980 
Door het afgeleide aantal huizen/woningen uit de huizenkaart en huizenblokkenkaart, krij-
gen we het totale aantal huizen/woningen in de verschillende invloedsgebieden rond de 
AVI’s. Door deze aantallen te delen door de oppervlaktes van de verschillende invloedsge-
bieden wordt de huizen/woningendichtheid per invloedszone verkregen. Deze cijfers zijn 
weergegeven in Tabel II.9. 
Tabel II.9 Oppervlaktes invloedsgebieden AVIs, totale aantal huizen en 
huizen/woningendichtheid. 
Invloedsgebied 
 rond AVI 
Oppervl. 
in km2 
Aantal  
huizen 
Aantal blok-
woningen 
Totaal aantal  
huizen/woningen 
Dichtheid (aan-
tal/km2) 
1000 meter 35,2 2.254 12.882 15.136 430 
2000 meter 139,2 15.863 34.671 50.534 363 
3000 meter 311,9 51.943 106.542 158.485 508 
4000 meter 553,4 99.398 161.316 260.714 471 
5000 meter 863,7 145.833 236.980 382.813 443 
Uit de cijfers in Tabel II.9 valt op dat de dichtheid van huizen/woningen hoger is in een 
1000 meter zone rond de AVI’s dan in een 2000 meter zone rond AVI’s. Dit is tegen de 
verwachting in, maar kan verklaard worden als gekeken wordt naar de huizenspreiding 
rondom de verschillende AVI’s. Rondom bijna alle AVI’s zijn weinig tot geen huizen en 
woningen te vinden in een straal van 1000 meter rondom de AVI’s op één uitzondering na: 
Afvalverwerking Rotterdam aan de Brielselaan 175, te Rotterdam. Rondom deze AVI be-
vinden zich 1.445 huizen + 12.736 woningen in huizenblokken = 14.181 woningen/huizen. 
Dit betreft ca. 94% van alle huizen/woningen in een straal van 1000 meter rondom AVI’s in 
Nederland. Voor de overige invloedszones van 2000 tot 5000 meter neemt de hui-
zen/woningendichtheid volgens verwachting eerst toe om daarna weer af te nemen. De 
hoogste huizen/woningendichtheid wordt gevonden in een invloedsgebied van 3000 meter 
rondom de AVI’s. 
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• Classificatie top10 vector huizen / bebouwd gebied. Top10 vector bevat een aparte hui-
zenlaag, maar deze laag is verre van compleet als deze wordt vergeleken met het be-
bouwde gebied in de vlakkenlaag en met luchtfoto’s van de zelfde gebieden. Dit pro-
bleem lijkt vooral in de stedelijke gebieden te spelen. Hieronder in figuur 9 is dat goed 
te zien voor het gebied rond de AVR in Rotterdam aan de Brielseweg. Het is onduidelijk 
waarom sommige huizen wel apart (in rood) en sommige alleen als huizenblok (in grijs) 
in de vlakkenkaart worden weergegeven. Probleem met de weergave in huizenblokken 
is dat hier nog moeilijker het aantal huizen bepaald kan worden, daar het blok ook de 
binnenruimtes omvat. Figuur 10 laat zien dat in het landelijke gebied de bebouwing uit 
de vlakkenkaart hoofdzakelijk uit kantoren en fabriekshallen bestaat; 
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Figuur II.10 Vergelijking top10vector met luchtfoto 2003 voor stedelijk gebied rond Bri-
elseweg in Rotterdam. 
 
• Een ander probleem met de gebouwen op de vlakkenkaart is dat deze zowel woonhuizen 
als andere gebouwen zoals kantoren en fabrieken weergeeft. In de landelijke gebieden is 
dit geen probleem, omdat hier de huizenkaart vrijwel alleen huizen weergeeft en de ge-
bouwen op de vlakkenkaart andersoortige gebouwen zijn. In het havengebied zoals in 
Figuur II.10 bijvoorbeeld, is dit wel een probleem want hier worden alle industriële ge-
bouwen meegeteld indien deze kaart voor de analyse gebruikt wordt. Dit probleem is 
echter opgelost door alleen die polygonen te selecteren die binnen bepaalde klassen van 
de bodemstatistiek kaart vallen, zie figuren II.7a en II.7b; 
• Een mogelijkheid om de uitgevoerde analyses en de uitgangspunten te toetsen zou een 
controle zijn voor bijvoorbeeld 2 of 3 gebieden (bijv. een landelijk gebied, een indu-
striegebied en een woongebied bij een grotere stad) waarbij een precieze telling wordt 
uitgevoerd van het aantal woningen aan de hand van een grootschalige gemeentekaart 
(bijv. 1:1000). 
 
Figuur II.11 Vergelijking top10vector met luchtfoto 2003 voor landelijk gebied rond  
stortplaats Wieringermeer. 
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Gemeente Plaats Adres Postcode Provincie  Woningen Oppervlakte Gemiddeld Gewogen gem. latitude longitude adresbron 
Groningen  Winschoterweg 1  !"# Groningen  82691 83.69 988.06 20.58 53.19684 6.62267 MP 
Skarsterlan Oudehaske De Dolten 11 $% Friesland  10848 216.89 50.02 2.70 52.96866 5.86935 TG 
Midden-Drenthe Wijster VAMweg 7  &' Drenthe  12730 345.82 36.81 3.17 52.79291 6.51528 TG 
Assen Ubbena Vriezerhoek 1   &( Drenthe  25951 83.48 310.86 6.46 53.05486 6.57082 M24 
Hengelo  Boldershoekweg 51 !)& Overijssel  35389 61.78 572.82 8.81 52.23893 6.7846 TG 
Hardenberg Rheezerveen Ommerweg 69 !! !)" Overijssel  20767 317.24 65.46 5.17 52.55216 6.52725 TG 
Lochem  Hagendijk 1 !*) Gelderland  7584 128.8 58.88 1.89 52.17018 6.44846 TG 
Beuningen Weurt Nieuwe Pieckelaan 1 +, Gelderland  9595 47.17 203.41 2.39 51.85067 5.78398 TG 
Geldermalsen  Meersteeg 15  *- Gelderland  9637 101.67 94.79 2.40 51.86888 5.3211 TG 
Voorst Wilp Sluinerweg 12 !$" Gelderland  8614 126.52 68.08 2.14 52.20147 6.07807 TG 
Ermelo  Jhr Dr C. Sandbergweg 115 .& Gelderland  8982 87.38 102.79 2.24 52.30755 5.68252 TG 
Barneveld  Wencopperweg 33 !!.* Gelderland  16481 176.74 93.25 4.10 52.16441 5.62145 M24 
Zevenaar  Doesburgseweg 16d  .* Gelderland  11052 27.65 399.71 2.75 51.94339 6.08368 TG 
Almere  Kemphaanweg 2 % Flevoland  63771 248.77 256.35 15.87 52.33856 5.2686 TG 
Amersfoort Hoogland Lindeboomseweg 15 *# Utrecht  54031 63.78 847.15 13.45 52.20295 5.39051 MP 
Alkmaar  Boekelerdijk 13a / Noord-Holland  41008 31.22 1313.52 10.21 52.60508 4.76343 M24 
Zaanstad Assendelft Nauerna 1 .% Noord-Holland  58512 83.04 704.62 14.56 52.44112 4.74601 MP 
Wieringermeer Middenmeer Koggenrandweg 1 !!)# Noord-Holland  4992 307.76 16.22 1.24 52.76662 5.06721 kaart website 
Dordrecht  Baanhoekweg 20  Zuid-Holland  52338 99.45 526.27 13.03 51.81627 4.71592 MP 
Dordrecht  Baanhoekweg 92a . Zuid-Holland  52338 99.45 526.27 13.03 51.81513 4.74931 M24 onduidelijk 
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Rotterdam Maasvlakte Rotterdam Loswalweg 50   # Zuid-Holland  286762 304.24 942.55 71.37 51.92604 4.02849 M24 
Terneuzen Sluiskil Koegorsstraat 19 (& Zeeland  24872 318.78 78.02 6.19 51.27355 3.87029 M24 onduidelijk 
Borsele Nieuwdorp Frankrijkweg 2 &) Zeeland  8831 194.44 45.42 2.20 51.45568 3.70879 MP 
Tilburg  Vloeiveldweg 8 &+ Noord-Brabant  82757 118.83 696.43 20.60 51.60072 5.06004 TG 
Bergen op Zoom  Moervaart 25 )) Noord-Brabant  27770 93.13 298.19 6.91 51.50527 4.33918 TG 
Nuenen c.a.  Gulberg 9 !&0 Noord-Brabant  9081 34.11 266.23 2.26 51.45024 5.56845 MP 
Schijndel  Vlagheide 10 *' Noord-Brabant  8740 41.65 209.84 2.18 51.60148 5.48416 TG 
Landgraaf  Europaweg Noord 179 !"( Limburg  17469 24.69 707.53 4.35 50.92819 6.02725 TG 
Ambt Montfoort  Maasbrachterweg 3 ** Limburg  4317 44.28 97.49 1.07 51.14221 5.934 M24 onduidelijk 
Weert  Hazenweg 1 &" Limburg  20115 105.44 190.77 5.01 51.21498 5.65052 M24 
       4017.89 358.93 268.31    
MP = Microsoft MapPoint            
TG = kaartservice Nationale TelefoonGids (http://www.nationaletelefoongids.nl)           
M24 = Map24 (http://www.nl.map24.com/)            
